On Monday, February 4, 2013 9:22:02 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
>  Hi Alberto G. Corona 
>  
> Here's my view:
>  
> The physical is that which is extended in space.
>  
> Mind is nonphysical, since not extended in space.
>

I don't think that it is that simple though. If you close your eyes and 
imagine the words 'Right hand side' and then push them to the right, you 
can imagine the words 'Left hand side' to the left of them. Is this not a 
type of spatial extension?

The difference then is not that mind is nonphysical but that it is 
non-public. The extension of mental objects into mental space is not the 
same as the extension of experienced objects in public since the spatial 
relations are fixed and persistent. We can expect the Great Pyramids to 
stay right where they are (geographically) but there is no mental object 
which can persist spatially for long. Every time we refer to the Right and 
Left hand side words in our imagination, they are not fixed geographically 
or metrically, only by visual gesture. One set of words is 'over there' and 
one set is 'over here'.

The key then, to understanding the difference is that fully public 
experiences are, from our perspective *only* spatially extended and lack 
any intention. Of course this is only a function of perspective, as we can 
see when our brain activity is examined, there is no sign of intention even 
though that activity does correlate temporally to the intention which is 
known to us privately.

The physicality of something has more to do with how directly a phenomenon 
is presented. When we see an Ace of Spades, the shape of the letter A and 
the spade symbol are, for example more 'physical' than the representations 
which we can attach to them (the Motorhead song, winning a hand of 
blackjack, the words 'Ace of Spaces', etc). 

This however is only a relative distinction, as the meanings of those 
associations are also presentations in their own right, concretely felt 
meanings about other meanings, so that although nested within abstraction, 
what it is that is abstracted is actually a physical presence. There is no 
'non-physical' then, only a sense of the degree to which one physical 
experience is a direct presentation of itself or is intended more as an 
indirect representation of something else.

Craig


 
> Mathematics may describe things extended in space, but it is descriptive 
> knowledge of
>     things extended in space (3p), and like all descriptive knowledge, and 
> like numbers, 
>     must be and is part of mind, of platonia.
>     So the mathematical manifolds are not extened in space, hence 
> nonphysical.a
>  
>
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <javascript:> 
> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
> *Time:* 2013-02-03, 19:26:52
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: Re: Lessons from the Block Universe
>
>   Depend on what you mean by physical. For me , the block universes is a 
> manifold, a pure mathematical structure which may not contain the minds but 
> somehow contain their history and determine their lawful and communicable 
> experiences. The physical world, what we see, with his causalities, his 
> time, his 3d space, his macroscopical laws, is a product of the mind when 
> he contemplate the mathematical structure from inside.
>
>
> 2013/2/3 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>
>
>>  Hi Alberto G. Corona 
>>  My understanding is that the block universe is the physical universe,
>> so it does not include the world of mind.
>>   
>>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <javascript:> 
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 14:14:51
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: Lessons from the Block Universe
>>  
>>   In the world of the mind, that is, in what we call reality, it causes 
>> everithing because causality is another phenomenon introduced by the mind 
>> (1p) 
>>
>> In the timeless view, there is no causality buy casualty Viewed from 
>> above in a broad perspective, then to cause something is to select it, so 
>> there is a identity between the anthropic principle at large, natural 
>> selection and voluntary conscious selection by a mind. all three can be 
>> seen as causations when we examine them from a 1p perspective, in a timeful 
>> fashion. But viewing the block universe from above, simply they are 
>> correlations. There is no causality but local phenomenons. 
>>
>> I have to mention that a view from above would need a mind with 
>> space-time qualia and probably a meta-time that we can only imagine. for 
>> this mind, creation of the universes adquire another very different 
>> meaning, since he would look at the complete figure of the universe, the 
>> beginning and at the end of it simultaneously. he would see what exist for 
>> us (the phenomena that we have selected by the fact that we live in them) 
>> and what does not exist (because we don′nt observe it, and maybe we can not 
>> even imagine it).
>>
>>
>> 2013/2/2 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>
>>
>>>  Hi Alberto G. Corona 
>>>  Does your version of mind actually do anything ?
>>>  
>>>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>>> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <javascript:> 
>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>>> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 04:43:54
>>> *Subject:* Re: Re: Lessons from the Block Universe
>>>  
>>>   I do think that a block universe can contain minds in a certain way. 
>>> The objections against that are based in the absence of time, but space(3D 
>>> geometry) and time can and should be a product of the machinery of the 
>>> mind, in the kantian sense. But while in Kant things in themselves are 
>>> unreachable, in the block universe the thing in themselves are pure 
>>> mathematics. so there are infinite minds at different moments that produce 
>>> psychological phenomenons in coherence with the infinite sucession of 
>>> brains along their lines of life, that are perceived psychologicaly as 
>>> time. these brains and living beings, are localy perceived as products of 
>>> natural selection, but seen from above, their lines of life are just 
>>> trajectories where, by fortunate collisions of particles, chemical and 
>>> electrical signals, the entropy is exceptionally maintained constant (until 
>>> the end of the line of life) 
>>>
>>> But the minds are somehow in another world, the world of the mind, which 
>>> includes not only our thoughs but everithing we see around us, because 
>>> everithing the mind see is produced by the machinery of the brain. Then the 
>>> block universe of mathematics brings only the coherent substrate where the 
>>> world of the mind can appear by evolution. Because it is a world with laws 
>>> and rules, given by the mathematical nature behind, it is not a collection 
>>> of boltzmann brains, or, if it is, they are a extraordinary persistent and 
>>> coherent form of it so that it appear to contain laws of nature and shared 
>>> experiences, because we can ask ourselves and communicate and agree, on 
>>> these laws and these experiences.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2013/1/31 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>
>>>
>>>>  Hi Bruno Marchal 
>>>>  The block universe is the physical universe. So we are not part of it,
>>>> for it does not allow subjectivity, which is nonphysical. Or
>>>> mathematics or comp, which are also nonphysical. 
>>>>  
>>>>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>>>> *From:* Bruno Marchal <javascript:> 
>>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>>>> *Time:* 2013-01-30, 12:45:53
>>>> *Subject:* Re: Lessons from the Block Universe
>>>>
>>>>    On 29 Jan 2013, at 15:04, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > A block universe does not allow for consciousness.
>>>>
>>>> With comp consciousness does not allow any (aristotelian) universes.
>>>>
>>>> There is comp block mindscape, and the universe(s) = the border of the 
>>>> mindscape as seen from inside.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > The fact the we all possess consciousness, so we think,
>>>> > means that our universe is not completely blocked,
>>>>
>>>> From inside.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > although the deviations from "block" may be minor
>>>> > and inconsequential regarding the Omega Point.
>>>>
>>>> The comp mind-body problems can be restated by the fact that with 
>>>> comp, there is an infinity of omega points, and the physics of here 
>>>> and now should be retrieved from some sum or integral on all omega 
>>>> points.
>>>>
>>>> By using the self-reference logics we got all the nuances we need (3p, 
>>>> 1p, 1p-plural, communicable, sharable, observable, etc.).
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > Richard.
>>>> >
>>>> > On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 11:18 PM, meekerdb 
>>>> > <meek...@verizon.net<javascript:>> 
>>>>
>>>> > wrote:
>>>> >> Here's an essay that is suggestive of Bruno's distinction between 
>>>> >> what is
>>>> >> provable and what is true (knowable) but unprovable. Maybe this is 
>>>> >> a place
>>>> >> where COMP could contribute to the understanding of QM.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Brent
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Lessons from the Block Universe
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Ken Wharton
>>>> >> Department of Physics and Astronomy
>>>> >> San Jos State University 
>>>>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> 
>>>> http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wharton_Wharton_Essay.pdf?phpMyAdmin=0c371ccdae9b5ff3071bae814fb4f9e9
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> In Liouville mechanics, states of incomplete
>>>> >> knowledge exhibit phenomena analogous to those exhibited
>>>> >> by pure quantum states. Among these are the existence
>>>> >> of a no-cloning theorem for such states [21, 23],
>>>> >> the impossibility of discriminating such states with certainty
>>>> >> [21, 24], the lack of exponential divergence of such
>>>> >> states (in the space of epistemic states) under chaotic
>>>> >> evolution [25], and, for correlated states, many of the
>>>> >> features of entanglement [26]. On the other hand, states
>>>> >> of complete knowledge do not exhibit these phenomena.
>>>> >> This suggests that one would obtain a better analogy
>>>> >> with quantum theory if states of complete knowledge
>>>> >> were somehow impossible to achieve, that is, if somehow
>>>> >> maximal knowledge was always incomplete knowledge
>>>> >> [21, 22, 27]. This idea is borne out by the results
>>>> >> of this paper. In fact, the toy theory suggests that the
>>>> >> restriction on knowledge should take a particular form,
>>>> >> namely, that one� knowledge be quantitatively equal to
>>>> >> one� ignorance in a state of maximal knowledge. 
>>>>
>>>> >>
>>>> >> It is important to bear in mind that one cannot derive
>>>> >> quantum theory from the toy theory, nor from any
>>>> >> simple modification thereof. The problem is that the
>>>> >> toy theory is a theory of incomplete knowledge about
>>>> >> local and noncontextual hidden variables, and it is well
>>>> >> known that quantum theory cannot be understood in this
>>>> >> way [28, 30, 31]. This prompts the obvious question: if
>>>> >> a quantum state is a state of knowledge, and it is not
>>>> >> knowledge of local and noncontextual hidden variables,
>>>> >> then what is it knowledge about? We do not at present
>>>> >> have a good answer to this question.
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
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>>>
>>>
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>
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