On 04 Feb 2013, at 18:02, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

Sorry, I keep forgetting about the UTM.

But isn't your view a circular argument, since you
employ UTM as a mind in showing that comp is mind-like ?

I assume comp. I never try to convince anyone that comp is true. It is my working hypothesis.

I just explain (argue, actually even prove) that IF comp is true, then Plato is correct and Aristotle is false (on both physics and theology).

I explain also why if comp is correct, then we will never been able to justify it from any theory, that is why I insist that comp is a theology: it asks for an irreducible act of faith.

bruno






----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-04, 10:47:28
Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas


On 03 Feb 2013, at 12:18, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

How can numbers understandi anything ?
Do they have a mind ?

They have a mind relatively to the universal numbers which implement them, like a computer has a mind relatively to a possible universal neighborhood. But when I say that a number, or a computer can have a mind, it means only that they can support a person having a mind. The number, like the bodies, do not think per se.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to