On 2/7/2013 8:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Beyond our view of matter, I would guess that both of them would agree that matter is a function of quantum functions, which to me is the same thing as an image of the mind made impersonal.

But that is not what people means by quantum, which need to refer to the *assumed* (not derived like in comp) physics.

Comp is derived from an assumption.  Physics is derived from observation.

    Dennett made clear that he is physicalist, naturalist, and weak materialist.

    I don't know any scientist being idealist, and even in philosophy of mind, 
    dictionaries describe it as being abandoned.

I agree in the sense that you intend, but I think that functionalism is the same thing as impersonal idealism.

You can't provide new meaning to terms having standard definition.

That's pretty funny from a guy who redefines "God", "theology", and 
"mechanism". :-)


Most functionalist are weak-materialist today. Most scientists believe that comp needs materialism. They are still completely unaware of the first person indeterminacy, and the immaterialist consequences. Functionalism might imply immaterialism, as comp does (comp is that there is a level where functionalism is correct. Functionalism is usually vague on the level, which is implicitly given by some neuro-level, comp is just a much weaker hypothesis).


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