2013/2/8 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>

>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>  On 2/7/2013 3:52 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>  On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 7:04 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 6:00 PM, Telmo Menezes 
>>> <[email protected]>wrote:
>>>
>>>        >>> I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> > Do you believe that your fellow human beings have minds? If so why?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>   > Yes (weakly).
>>>>
>>>
>>> You believe that only weakly?! Do you really think there is a 49% chance
>>> that you are the only conscious being in the universe?
>>>
>>
>>  I don't know how to assign a probability to that. I guess I believe
>> it's in ]0.5, 1] because I would bet on it, but that's all I can say.
>>
>>  I say weakly because the only thing I have to back this belief is an
>> heuristic, which I find to be a weaker form of approximating the truth than
>> mathematical proof or experimental confirmation.
>>
>>
>>>  By the way, I don't believe other people have minds when they are
>>> sleeping or under anesthesia or dead because when they are in those states
>>> they don't behave very intelligently.
>>>
>>
>>  But that is because you believe that intelligence == mind. I don't.
>> Certain experiences that you can do on yourself might make you doubt that
>> belief, but I don't know of any way to convince you except suggesting that
>> you do those experiences.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    > Occam's razor. If I'm the only human being with a mind, then, for
>>>> some mysterious reason, there are two types of human beings: me (with a
>>>> mind) and the others (zombies). So heuristically I'm inclined to believe
>>>> that all human beings have a mind,
>>>>
>>>
>>> OK, but if you also believe in Darwin's theory of Evolution then you
>>> must also believe that consciousness MUST be a byproduct of intelligence
>>> because Evolution can't directly see consciousness any better than we can
>>> and so cannot select for it, and yet you and probably other people are
>>> conscious. Thus you must also believe that if a computer is intelligent
>>> then it is conscious. Then you must also believe that intelligence == mind.
>>>
>>
>>  You are begging the question. You're assuming, to begin with, that
>> intelligence == mind and then you claim to prove that intelligence == mind.
>>
>>  By the way, for evolution to generate consciousness there has to exist
>> a gradient to climb. Unless the evolutionary process just stumbles into
>> consciousness, but in that case it is not a valid theory of it's origin. So
>> you are implicitly assuming that there is some measure of consciousness,
>> where you can say that entity A is more conscious than entity B. What would
>> that even mean? My cat seems conscious to me (but I can't know for sure).
>> Is he less conscious than me? Well I know stuff that he doesn't, but he
>> also knows stuff that I don't -- for example he knows how it feels to be a
>> cat.
>>
>>
>> But that doesn't mean there's something magic about being a cat.  I think
>> it might be possible to change your brain, and your sensory organs, so that
>> it implemented consciousness very similar to a cat's (it couldn't be exact
>> because you'd need a cat's body for that).  Of course it wouldn't be Telmo
>> Menezes any more.
>>
>
> I agree that this might be possible. But the paradox then is the
> following: to make me feel like a cat you have to strip me of my memories
> (read/write access), so when I'm back from the experience I won't remember
> it. In fact I turned into a cat for a while and then back to Telmo Menezes.
> Telmo Menezes still knows nothing about being a cat.
>

Well, while going from Telmo to the cat, you're rigth that Telmo memories
should be erased, the inverse is not true. Why couldn't you be back as
Telmo + the memories of having been a cat ?

Regards,
Quentin


>
>>
>> And yes I think there are degrees and kinds of consciousness and that a
>> cat's consciousness differs in both respects.  There's consciousness of
>> being an individual and of being located in 3-space and in time.  You and
>> the cat have both of those (whereas a Mars rover only has the latter).  But
>> there's language and narrative memory that you have and the cat doesn't.
>> There's reflective thought,"I'm Telmo and I'm thinking about myself and
>> where I fit in the world".  The cat probably doesn't have this because it's
>> not social - but a dog might.
>>
>
> But is this really a case of "degrees of consciousness" or is it just the
> general property of "being conscious" instantiated in different contexts?
> The fact that you believe you can turn me into a cat seems to indicate that
> ultimately you believe that consciousness is all the same.
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
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