2013/2/8 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > > > > On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 4:06 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> 2013/2/8 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 1:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2013/2/8 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 12:39 PM, Quentin Anciaux >>>>> <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> 2013/2/8 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected] >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 2013/2/8 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 2/7/2013 3:52 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 7:04 PM, John Clark <[email protected] >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 6:00 PM, Telmo Menezes < >>>>>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>> I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > Do you believe that your fellow human beings have minds? If >>>>>>>>>>>>> so why? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> > Yes (weakly). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You believe that only weakly?! Do you really think there is a >>>>>>>>>>> 49% chance that you are the only conscious being in the universe? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't know how to assign a probability to that. I guess I >>>>>>>>>> believe it's in ]0.5, 1] because I would bet on it, but that's all I >>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> say. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I say weakly because the only thing I have to back this belief >>>>>>>>>> is an heuristic, which I find to be a weaker form of approximating >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> truth than mathematical proof or experimental confirmation. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> By the way, I don't believe other people have minds when they >>>>>>>>>>> are sleeping or under anesthesia or dead because when they are in >>>>>>>>>>> those >>>>>>>>>>> states they don't behave very intelligently. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But that is because you believe that intelligence == mind. I >>>>>>>>>> don't. Certain experiences that you can do on yourself might make >>>>>>>>>> you doubt >>>>>>>>>> that belief, but I don't know of any way to convince you except >>>>>>>>>> suggesting >>>>>>>>>> that you do those experiences. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> > Occam's razor. If I'm the only human being with a mind, >>>>>>>>>>>> then, for some mysterious reason, there are two types of human >>>>>>>>>>>> beings: me >>>>>>>>>>>> (with a mind) and the others (zombies). So heuristically I'm >>>>>>>>>>>> inclined to >>>>>>>>>>>> believe that all human beings have a mind, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> OK, but if you also believe in Darwin's theory of Evolution then >>>>>>>>>>> you must also believe that consciousness MUST be a byproduct of >>>>>>>>>>> intelligence because Evolution can't directly see consciousness any >>>>>>>>>>> better >>>>>>>>>>> than we can and so cannot select for it, and yet you and probably >>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>> people are conscious. Thus you must also believe that if a computer >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> intelligent then it is conscious. Then you must also believe that >>>>>>>>>>> intelligence == mind. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You are begging the question. You're assuming, to begin with, >>>>>>>>>> that intelligence == mind and then you claim to prove that >>>>>>>>>> intelligence == >>>>>>>>>> mind. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> By the way, for evolution to generate consciousness there has >>>>>>>>>> to exist a gradient to climb. Unless the evolutionary process just >>>>>>>>>> stumbles >>>>>>>>>> into consciousness, but in that case it is not a valid theory of it's >>>>>>>>>> origin. So you are implicitly assuming that there is some measure of >>>>>>>>>> consciousness, where you can say that entity A is more conscious than >>>>>>>>>> entity B. What would that even mean? My cat seems conscious to me >>>>>>>>>> (but I >>>>>>>>>> can't know for sure). Is he less conscious than me? Well I know >>>>>>>>>> stuff that >>>>>>>>>> he doesn't, but he also knows stuff that I don't -- for example he >>>>>>>>>> knows >>>>>>>>>> how it feels to be a cat. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But that doesn't mean there's something magic about being a cat. >>>>>>>>>> I think it might be possible to change your brain, and your sensory >>>>>>>>>> organs, >>>>>>>>>> so that it implemented consciousness very similar to a cat's (it >>>>>>>>>> couldn't >>>>>>>>>> be exact because you'd need a cat's body for that). Of course it >>>>>>>>>> wouldn't >>>>>>>>>> be Telmo Menezes any more. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that this might be possible. But the paradox then is the >>>>>>>>> following: to make me feel like a cat you have to strip me of my >>>>>>>>> memories >>>>>>>>> (read/write access), so when I'm back from the experience I won't >>>>>>>>> remember >>>>>>>>> it. In fact I turned into a cat for a while and then back to Telmo >>>>>>>>> Menezes. >>>>>>>>> Telmo Menezes still knows nothing about being a cat. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, while going from Telmo to the cat, you're rigth that Telmo >>>>>>>> memories should be erased, the inverse is not true. Why couldn't you be >>>>>>>> back as Telmo + the memories of having been a cat ? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Quentin, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Because that would require that I had write-only access to my human >>>>>>> memories while being a cat. I don't think that's possible. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Why not ?? You put forward a technical problem on a thought >>>>>> experiment which have if you go that way a bigger technical problem in >>>>>> the >>>>>> first place... so your objection is totally irrelevant, we are in a >>>>>> thought >>>>>> experiment, in that setting, if we can conceive transferring consciousnes >>>>>> of the cat, then there is no reason we can't imagine you remember being a >>>>>> cat after the experiment. I'll agree to talk technical problems the day >>>>>> we >>>>>> would have the first insight of how to really do it... before, it is just >>>>>> premature to use technical arguments. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Fair enough, maybe it's my CS bias. But I'm still not convinced this >>>>> is a purely technical issue. Can you conceive of any system that stores >>>>> information in some coherent way that you can write to without reading? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Well, yes... with computer you could imagine doing just that... so why >>>> not ? >>>> >>> >>> How? >>> >> >> Add a controller to an hard disk which only answer to write request and >> return nothing for read request... >> > > Ok, explain the algorithm of that write operation to me. Remember that > you're not allowed to read. >
I just did, your controller only acknowledge write request, and does nothing on read request.. ===> write only. What's your point ? > > >> Don't forget that write only is only for the POV of the cat in our >> thought experiment... >> > > But how can I then, as Telmo, possibly access those memories? They are > completely disconnected from my personal diary and context. > Why not ? Do you have definite proof of what is consciousness, how memory works, how you can do the thought experiment ? If you don't then, that's just premature useless at this stage technical argument. > > >> write-only does not have to be for everybody. But it's still a technical >> disgression and it is discussing the number of angels on a pin for now. >> > > I think it's a deep question. > It's not unless you have good working knowledge of the question. > > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> Also, the fact that you can't imagine a solution yourself, doesn't mean >>>> there isn't one, lack of imagination is also not an argument. >>>> >>> >>> I agree, but it's an intuition. >>> >> >> Well... >> >> Quentin >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Quentin >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> Quentin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> For example, to store the memories on how a cat feels about >>>>>>> climbing a tree, I would have to access my human representation of a >>>>>>> tree >>>>>>> to connect the memories to it, but accessing my human representation of >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> tree would spoil my cat experience. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>>> Quentin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And yes I think there are degrees and kinds of consciousness and >>>>>>>>>> that a cat's consciousness differs in both respects. There's >>>>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>>>> of being an individual and of being located in 3-space and in time. >>>>>>>>>> You >>>>>>>>>> and the cat have both of those (whereas a Mars rover only has the >>>>>>>>>> latter). >>>>>>>>>> But there's language and narrative memory that you have and the cat >>>>>>>>>> doesn't. There's reflective thought,"I'm Telmo and I'm thinking >>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> myself and where I fit in the world". The cat probably doesn't have >>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>> because it's not social - but a dog might. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But is this really a case of "degrees of consciousness" or is it >>>>>>>>> just the general property of "being conscious" instantiated in >>>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>>> contexts? The fact that you believe you can turn me into a cat seems >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> indicate that ultimately you believe that consciousness is all the >>>>>>>>> same. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the >>>>>>>>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>>>>> Visit this group at >>>>>>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>>>> Visit this group at >>>>>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>>> Visit this group at >>>>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message 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http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at 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