On 2/11/2013 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Feb 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sunday, February 10, 2013 11:16:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Feb 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Saturday, February 9, 2013 3:32:52 PM UTC-5, Simon Forman wrote:
But then doesn't that leave subjectivity fundamentally mysterious?

I think that human subjectivity is a range of qualities of experience, some rooted in the sub-personal, some in the super-personal, and some reflected from the impersonal ranges. From this island of possible personal sensitivities, the influences arising from beneath, behind, or beyond us does seem mysterious, but from an absolute perspective, the only thing mysterious is why we should assume that it is not fundamental.

Because we want to explain it from something simpler. That's what make comp interesting, it allows at least the search (and then computer science illustrates that it works indeed).

It may not have any choice but to prove it works.


If comp has no access to geometry, why would it have access to subjectivity?

Comp is an hypothesis, not a being. I guess you mean "if a machine has no access to geometry ...". But why would a machine not having access to geometry. On the contrary, geometry is rather simple for machines, bith in the quanta and qualia parts. See the theory of qualia in some of my papers.

In either case, there will be tautological internal consistency, but only because it comp is a closed-circuit echo chamber.

Machine intelligence is open, never close. I'm afraid that you are still using the pre-Gödelian, or pre-Turingian notion of machine.



Dear Bruno,

Just to be clear , is the definition of a machine that you support is: that whatever the machine is, it is capable of being exactly represented by a recursively enumerable function?



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