On 11 Feb 2013, at 20:02, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2013 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2013 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2013, at 11:13, [email protected] wrote:
Why? And why do you think science has made no progress since
1947?
Brent-
========.
Science made great technological ( !) progress since 1947,
but not ' philosophical progress ' (!).
We still haven't answers to the questiohs:
What is the negative 4D Minkowski continuum ?,
What is the quantum of light ?,
What is an electron?,
What is entropy ?
. . . . . etc. . . . .etc.
To create new abstraction ( quarks, big-bang, method
of renormalization . . . etc ) is not a progress.
Good. So you might open your mind on the consequences of
computationalism. It needs to backtrack on Plato, for the
theological/fundamental matter. The physical reality becomes the
border of the (Turing) universal mind, in some verifiable way.
The Aristotelian *assumption* that there is a physical reality,
although fertile, seems to be wrong once we assume consciousness
to be invariant for some digital transformation. Eventually it
leads to new invariant in physics. Physics does no more depend on
the choice of the computational base, notably.
So does comp answer socratus questions?
It provides the only (with comp) path to formulate anew the
questions, and get partial answers.
Physics already gives partial answers. A quantum of light and an
electron are just things that satisfy certain equations. I think
that's as good an answer as comp is going to be able to provide -
except comp can't yet even say what the equations are.
The answers given by physics have to assume a relation between fist
person and third person which is in contradiction with the
computationalist hypothesis (by UDA). So it assumes a non
computationalist theory of mind, on which it remains quite vague.
And comp gives the equations, with the Z and X logics. Comp does not
leave any choice on that matter.
Some physicists don't see equations there, because they are not used
to mathematical logic, but the equation and open problems are already
there.
Physics gives impressively good local compression of information, but
does not address the mind-body problem, and yet, uses implicitly an
identity thesis which assume non-comp.
Physics is good on the physical realm, but *physicalism* is just
refuted once we assume the brain is a finite machine.
Bruno
Brent
And socratus seems aware of the failure of physics with that
respect, so comp might help him (above the fact that to keep
physicalism you must assume that we are not Turing emulable).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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