On 13 Feb 2013, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Wouldn’t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence?
A better term would be "natural imagination". But terms are not important.
Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an ‘artificial hurricane’. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.
Assuming those things exist.
By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of origin. If we used simulated instead, the measure of intelligence would be framed more modestly as the degree to which a system meets our expectations (or what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather than assuming a universal index of intelligent qualities which is independent from our own human qualities, we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing emulation purely on its merits as a convincing reflection of intelligence rather than presuming to have replicated an organic conscious experience mechanically.
Comp assumes we are Turing emulable, and in that case we can be emulated, trivially. To assume this being not possible assume the existence of infinite process playing relevant roles in the mind or in life. But it is up to you to motivates for them. The problem, for you, is that you have to speculate on something that we have not yet observed. You can't say "consciousness", as this would just beg the question.
The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering awareness would, I think, be outweighed by the gain of a more scientifically circumspect approach.
Invoking infinities is not so much circumspect, especially for driving negative statement about the consciousness of possible entities.
Putting the Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the shadow of its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a precaution, the promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1 simulacrum (a faithful copy of an original, in Baudrillard’s terms), will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks the absence of a profound reality, where the simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy.)
Assuming a non comp theory, like the quite speculative theory of mind by Penrose. Your own proposl fits remarkably ith comp, and some low level of substitution, it seems to me (we have already discussed this).
Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.