On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 12:46:23 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Feb 2013, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > *Wouldn’t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than > Artificial Intelligence?* > > > A better term would be "natural imagination". But terms are not important. >
Except that we already have natural imagination, so what would we be developing? Replacing something with itself? > > > > > Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a > hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an ‘artificial > hurricane’. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we would > similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or > electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc. > > > Assuming those things exist. > Whether they exist or not, the mathematically generated model of X is simulated X. It could be artificial X as well, but whether X is natural or artificial only tells us the nature of its immediate developers. > > > > By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of > natural vs man-made as categories of origin. If we used simulated instead, > the measure of intelligence would be framed more modestly as the degree to > which a system meets our expectations (or what we think or assume are our > expectations). Rather than assuming a universal index of intelligent > qualities which is independent from our own human qualities, we could > evaluate the success of a particular Turing emulation purely on its merits > as a convincing reflection of intelligence rather than presuming to have > replicated an organic conscious experience mechanically. > > > Comp assumes we are Turing emulable, > Which is why Comp fails. Not only are we not emulable, emulation itself is not primitively real - it is a subjective consensus of expectations. > and in that case we can be emulated, trivially. > Comp can't define us, so it can only emulate the postage stamp sized sampling of some of our most exposed, and least meaningful surfaces. Comp is a stencil or silhouette maker. No amount of silhouettes pieced together and animated in a sequence can generate an interior experience. If it did, we would only have to draw a cartoon and it would come to life on its own. > To assume this being not possible assume the existence of infinite process > playing relevant roles in the mind or in life. But it is up to you to > motivates for them. The problem, for you, is that you have to speculate on > something that we have not yet observed. You can't say "consciousness", as > this would just beg the question. > It is consciousness, and it is not begging the question, since all possible questions supervene on consciousness. Not sure what you mean about infinite processes or why they would mean that simulations can become experiences on their own. > > > > > The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering awareness would, I > think, be outweighed by the gain of a more scientifically circumspect > approach. > > > Invoking infinities is not so much circumspect, especially for driving > negative statement about the consciousness of possible entities. > What infinities do you refer to? > > > > Putting the Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the shadow of > its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a precaution, the > promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1 simulacrum (a faithful copy of > an original, in Baudrillard’s > terms<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation>), > will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks the absence of a > profound reality, where the simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy.) > > > Assuming a non comp theory, like the quite speculative theory of mind by > Penrose. Your own proposl fits remarkably ith comp, and some low level of > substitution, it seems to me (we have already discussed this). > Sense contains comp, by definition, but a comp world cannot generate, support, or benefit by sense in any way as far as I can tell. Craig > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.