On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> *Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than 
> Artificial Intelligence?*
>
> Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a 
> hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an �artificial 
> hurricane�. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we 
> would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or 
> electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.
>
>
> No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a robot or other 
> machine which interacts with the real world, whereas a simulate AI or 
> hurricane acts within a simulated world.
>

AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though. It makes no 
difference to the AI whether its environment is real or simulated. Just 
because we can attach a robot to a simulation doesn't change it into an 
experience of a real world.
 

>
>
> By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of 
> natural vs man-made as categories of origin. 
>
>
> Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence of a child and the 
> artificial intelligence of a Mars rover obsolete?� The latter is one we 
> create by art, the other is created by nature.
>

Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us. We can 
certainly use the term informally to clarify what we are referring to, like 
we might call someone a plumber because it helps us communicate who we are 
talking about, but anyone who does plumbing can be a plumber. It isn't an 
ontological distinction. Nature creates our capacity to create art, and we 
use that capacity to shape nature in return.
 

>
> If we used simulated instead, the measure of intelligence would be framed 
> more modestly as the degree to which a system meets our expectations (or 
> what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather than assuming a 
> universal index of intelligent qualities which is independent from our own 
> human qualities, 
>
>
> But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to human intelligence
>

I think that it is a misconception to imagine that we have access to any 
other measure.
 

> we will be saying that visual pattern recognition is intelligence but 
> solving Navier-Stokes equations is not.
>

Why, equations are written by intelligent humans?
 

> � This is the anthropocentrism that continually demotes whatever 
> computers can do as "not really intelligent" even when it was regarded a 
> the apothesis of intelligence *before* computers could� do it.
>

If I had a camera with higher resolution than a human eye, that doesn't 
mean that I can replace my eyes with those cameras. Computers can still be 
exemplary at computation without being deemed literally intelligent. A 
planetarium's star projector can be as accurate as any telescope and still 
be understood not to be projecting literal galaxies and stars into the 
ceiling of the observatory.
 

>
> we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing emulation purely on 
> its merits as a convincing reflection of intelligence 
>
>
> But there is no one-dimensional measure of intelligence - it's just 
> competence in many domains.
>

Competence in many domains is fine. I'm saying that the competence relates 
to how well it reflects or amplifies existing intelligence, not that it 
actually is itself intelligent.
 

>
> rather than presuming to have replicated an organic conscious experience 
> mechanically.
>
>
> I don't think that's a presumption.� It's an inference from the 
> incoherence of the idea of a philosophical zombie.
>

The idea of a philosophical zombie is a misconception based on some 
assumptions about matter and function which I clearly understand to be 
untrue. A sociopath is already a philosophical zombie as far as emotional 
intelligence is concerned. Someone with blindsight is a philosophical 
zombie as far as visual perception is concerned. Someone who is 
sleepwalking is a p-zombie as far as bipedal locomotion is concerned. The 
concept is bogus.
 

>
>
> The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering awareness would, I 
> think, be outweighed by the gain of a more scientifically circumspect 
> approach. Putting the Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the 
> shadow of its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a 
> precaution, the promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1 simulacrum (a 
> faithful copy of an original, in Baudrillard�s 
> terms<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation>), 
> will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks the absence of a 
> profound reality, where the simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy.) 
> --�
>
>
> The assumption that there is a 'profound reality' is what Stathis showed 
> to be 'magic'.
>

Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular, only the sum 
of whatever is in the original which is not accessible in the copy. His 
phrase 'profound reality' is apt though. If you don't experience a profound 
reality, then you might be a p-zombie already.

Craig


> Brent
>
> 

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