On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

    On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

        On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
        *Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate
        term than Artificial Intelligence?*

        Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can
        model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a
        simulation, not an �artificial hurricane�. If we modeled
        any physical substance, force, or field, we would similarly
        say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or
        electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial
        hydrogen, gravity, etc.

        No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a robot
        or other machine which interacts with the real world, whereas
        a simulate AI or hurricane acts within a simulated world.

    AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though. It makes
    no difference to the AI whether its environment is real or
    simulated. Just because we can attach a robot to a simulation
    doesn't change it into an experience of a real world.

    Hi Craig,

        I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a difference
    that does not always make a difference between a public world and
    a private world! IMHO, that makes the 'real' physical world "Real"
    is that we can all agree on its properties (subject to some
    constraints that matter). Many can point at the tree over there
    and agree on its height and whether or not it is a deciduous variety.

Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean anything other than that though?

Hi Craig,

Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way? Don't forget about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The duals...

We are people living at the same time with human sized bodies, so it would make sense that we would agree on almost everything that involve our bodies.

We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system capable of being described by a QM wave function or, more simply, capable of being represented by a semi-complete atomic boolean algebra.

You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who point to your dream tree and agree on its characteristics, but upon waking, you are re-oriented to a more real, more tangibly public world with longer and more stable histories.

Right, it is the "upon waking' part that is important. Our common 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up' from when we depart the mortal coil. Have you followed the quantum suicide discussion any?

These qualities are only significant in comparison to the dream though. If you can't remember your waking life, then the dream is real to you, and to the universe through you.

You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why? What one observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not necessarily real to every one else... but there is a huge overlap between our 1p 'realities'. Andrew Soltau has this idea nailed now in his Multisolipsism stuff. ;-)

    By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete
notion of natural vs man-made as categories of origin.

    Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence of a
    child and the artificial intelligence of a Mars rover
    obsolete?� The latter is one we create by art, the other is
    created by nature.

Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us.

I disagree! We can fool ourselves into thinking that we "understand' but what we can do is, at best, form testable explanations of stuff... We are fallible!

I agree, but I don't see how that applies to us being nature.

We are part of Nature and there is a 'whole-part isomorphism' involved..

What would it mean to be unnatural? How would an unnatural being find themselves in a natural world?

    They can't, unless we invent them... Pink Ponies!!!!

    We can certainly use the term informally to clarify what we are
    referring to, like we might call someone a plumber because it
    helps us communicate who we are talking about, but anyone who
    does plumbing can be a plumber. It isn't an ontological
    distinction. Nature creates our capacity to create art, and we
    use that capacity to shape nature in return.

        I agree! I think it is that aspect of Nature that can "throw
    itself into its choice", as Satre mused, that is making the
    computationalists crazy. I got no problem with it as I embrace
    non-well foundedness.

Cool, yeah I mean it could be said that aspect is defines nature?

    Can we put Nature in a box? No...

    "L'homme est d'abord ce qui se jette vers un avenir, et ce qui est
    conscient de se projeter dans l'avenir."/ ~ Jean Paul Satre

        If we used simulated instead, the measure of intelligence
        would be framed more modestly as the degree to which a
        system meets our expectations (or what we think or assume
        are our expectations). Rather than assuming a universal
        index of intelligent qualities which is independent from our
own human qualities,

        But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to human

    I think that it is a misconception to imagine that we have access
    to any other measure.


        we will be saying that visual pattern recognition is
        intelligence but solving Navier-Stokes equations is not.

    Why, equations are written by intelligent humans?

        People are confounded by computational intractability and
    eagerly spin tales of hypercomputers and other perpetual motion

Complexity seems to be the only abstract principle that the Western-OMMM orientation respects.

And look at the benefits that it engenders! It is nice to not to have to worry about freezing in the winter or spending every waking moment seeking subsistence. Our pets sure don't complain...

        � This is the anthropocentrism that continually demotes
        whatever computers can do as "not really intelligent" even
        when it was regarded a the apothesis of intelligence *before*
        computers could� do it.

    If I had a camera with higher resolution than a human eye, that
    doesn't mean that I can replace my eyes with those cameras.
    Computers can still be exemplary at computation without being
    deemed literally intelligent. A planetarium's star projector can
    be as accurate as any telescope and still be understood not to be
    projecting literal galaxies and stars into the ceiling of the

        we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing
        emulation purely on its merits as a convincing reflection of

        But there is no one-dimensional measure of intelligence -
        it's just competence in many domains.

    Competence in many domains is fine. I'm saying that the
    competence relates to how well it reflects or amplifies existing
    intelligence, not that it actually is itself intelligent.

        rather than presuming to have replicated an organic
        conscious experience mechanically.

        I don't think that's a presumption.� It's an inference from
        the incoherence of the idea of a philosophical zombie.

    The idea of a philosophical zombie is a misconception based on
    some assumptions about matter and function which I clearly
    understand to be untrue. A sociopath is already a philosophical
    zombie as far as emotional intelligence is concerned. Someone
    with blindsight is a philosophical zombie as far as visual
    perception is concerned. Someone who is sleepwalking is a
    p-zombie as far as bipedal locomotion is concerned. The concept
    is bogus.

        I 100% concur!

Cool! It's so strange because for almost everything else I think that Chalmers is The Man, but p-zombies are the concept of this that most people seem to grab on to, other than the Hard Problem.

From what I can tell, Chalmers uses the concept of a p-zombie as a device in a proof of panprotopsychism. He is trying to get people to understand for themselves that the concept of a p-zombie is absurd. This is important because material monism demands that we actually are zombies! See Dennett's eliminatist defense of materialism!

        The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering
        awareness would, I think, be outweighed by the gain of a
        more scientifically circumspect approach. Putting the
        Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the shadow
        of its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a
        precaution, the promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1
        simulacrum (a faithful copy of an original, in
        Baudrillard�s terms
        will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks
        the absence of a profound reality, where the simulacrum
        pretends to be a faithful copy.) --�

        The assumption that there is a 'profound reality' is what
        Stathis showed to be 'magic'.

    Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular,
    only the sum of whatever is in the original which is not
    accessible in the copy. His phrase 'profound reality' is apt
    though. If you don't experience a profound reality, then you
    might be a p-zombie already.


Cool. I've known about the Baudrillard stuff for a long time, but today was the first time I realized how it applies to comp and what it makes me motivated to try to explain it. Cos it isn't just a misrepresentation of consciousness, it actively presents itself as containing proof that it is not a misrepresentation.





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