On 14 Feb 2013, at 17:01, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 2/14/2013 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that weare making anassumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we lookclosely, aproposition can only be another level of B. p is reallynothing but a groupof sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) whichwe arearbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is nogivencondition in actual experience. All experiences arecontingent upon whatthe experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agreewith youthat the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me uncomfortable, post Popper. I'm happy for Bp& p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with Bsemantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes toscientificknowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step toofar.But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modifyTheatetus :(.Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modallogic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more strongerlogic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knowerunnameable and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "innerGod".As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes'as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence heargued that the belief must be causally connected to the factof the proposition in order to count as knowledge.We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accepta notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither incomp, nor in platonism.From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experimentsin contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate adefinition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Thecategory of problem owes its name to a three-page paper publishedin 1963, by Edmund Gettier, called "Is Justified True BeliefKnowledge?". In it, Gettier proposed two scenarios where the threecriteria (justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, butwhere the majority of readers would not have felt that the resultwas knowledge due to the element of luck involved."Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)Not with Bp & p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge.Hi Bruno,I don't understand the difference between knowledge andobservation when considering 1p. Knowledge isn't just recollectionof facts, it is always observation, event if purely internalexperience of abstractions. I am aware of that I have knowledge of,especially when I am thinking of it.

`Knowledge and observation can be related, but it is better to`

`distinguish different notions. With comp and the naive Theaetetus,`

`say, knowledge is given by Bp & p, and observation is given by the Bp`

`& Dt. And feeling is given by Bp & Dt & p.`

`This gives an intuitionist epistemic logic for the first person`

`knowledge, with an antisymmetrical knowledge state evolution. Bp & Dt`

`( & p) gives, for observation, at the "*" level, a symmetrical`

`structures, with a quantum like quasi orthomodular structure. It`

`provides steps toward having the arithmetical frame to get a Gleason-`

`like theorem, to solve the measure problem, in the way UDA explains to`

`do.`

`With comp, a physical proposition is a true sigma_1 proposition`

`pondered by the frequence of its proof in the universal dovetailing`

`(UD*), or equivalently, in arithmetic. That follows from the global 1p`

`indeterminacy, on UD*.`

`p is arithmetical truth. You can see it as Dennett intentional stance`

`toward the set of the Gödel numbers of the true proposition, true in`

`the standard model of Peano Arithmetic. Comp will explain notably why`

`we cannot define that standard model. p plays the role of Plotinus' one.`

`Bp is a statement made by some number relatively to some universal`

`number. It plays the role of Plotinus' discursive reasoner, or`

`'man' (that includes woman, as it is the generic term). Here it is the`

`3p, finitely describable machine, or its Gödel number, programs, etc.`

`It is the 3p duplicable entity you can bet on.`

`Bp & p, is simply the same statement made in the case of p. It`

`restrict the prover or justifier to truth, in a non necessary`

`constructive way. The intensional interpretation of p can be given by`

`the set of worlds, or of computations, satisfying (in some sense) p.`

`Or p can represent some actual truth in this actual world. A lot of`

`variation are possible, but I concentrate on the simplest case. It`

`provides already something highly non trivial, despite being a simple`

`common part of the possible knower. It corresponds to Plotinus' soul,`

`and it has the unique quality, among the hypostases of not splitting`

`between G and G* metatheories. Its logic is S4Grz1, and S4Grz1 =`

`S4Grz1*.`

`Bp & Dt, is observation, and should give the logic of the observable.`

`As UDA generalize Everett on arithmetic, the observable with certainty`

`will be the provable-and-consistent propositions. You will be certain`

`to get a cup of coffee in a WM-duplication experience, in case you get`

`a cup of coffee in both W and M. But you have to take into account the`

`act of faith, which is the fact that Dt has to be made explicit. Only`

`G* knows that Dt is true about "you" (the correct machine), but you`

`can't know that, and this will change the pov on the arithmetical`

`truth. Like with Bp & p, actually. G* knows that Bp and Bp & p sees`

`the same arithmetical reality, but they don't know that, and see it`

`differently.`

`It corresponds to Plotinus Intelligible Matter, with Dt playing the`

`role of the non determinate, and his bastard calculus becoming the`

`arithmetical "physical" probability theory.`

`Bp & Dt & p, is the Theaetetus definition reapplied on observation. It`

`is the observation + that non communicable component related to the`

`truth. It corresponds to Plotinus' sensible matter. The logic of both`

`Bp & Dt, and Bp & Dt & p, are non transitive, and implements a notion`

`of locus and proximity notions, like the theorem p -> BDp can help to`

`figure out.`

`The naive scientist is classical, the soul is intuitionist, but on UD*`

`get already quantum-like. Both sensible and intelligible matter are`

`quantum-like. The generalization B^n p and D^m t (& p) provides a`

`graded quantum structure.`

`The soul and the sensible matter marries both symmetry on the sigma_1`

`"bottom" (the UD*), and antisymmetry on whatever the machine can`

`extract from that bottom. It is a chance that those logic does not`

`collapse, it would have made comp implying there is no physics at all,`

`only geographies. The multiverse would be a continuum of all physical`

`laws, F = ma^3 would be realized somewhere. By the non collapse, we`

`have a much more less trivial physics, but not entirely digital.`

`You can take this as a toy theology, but it is the only way I know of`

`to get quanta and qualia when taking into account the (global) first`

`person indeterminacy. The measure one, the laws of physics, are`

`determined by the logic of self-reference, and the intensional`

`variants described by the "intelligible and sensible" matter.`

Bruno

The betting is handled with Bp & Dt & p. Somehow, we impose theconsistency: that is, for machine talking first person logic, theexistence of at least one reality (Dt).(By Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness !) we havethat Dt is true iff "B" has a model (a mathematical reality"satisfying" his beliefs)). Bp & Dt (& p) makes p true in all theaccessible realities in the neighborhood, so the "p" has measureone, and the corresponding logic is the logic of the "probability"one.Bruno-- Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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