On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 11:01:30 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> *Wouldnï¿½t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than >>> Artificial Intelligence?* >>> >>> Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a >>> hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an ï¿½artificial >>> hurricaneï¿½. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we >>> would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or >>> electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc. >>> >>> >>> No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a robot or other >>> machine which interacts with the real world, whereas a simulate AI or >>> hurricane acts within a simulated world. >>> >> >> AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though. It makes no >> difference to the AI whether its environment is real or simulated. Just >> because we can attach a robot to a simulation doesn't change it into an >> experience of a real world. >> >> >> Hi Craig, >> >> I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a difference that >> does not always make a difference between a public world and a private >> world! IMHO, that makes the 'real' physical world "Real" is that we can all >> agree on its properties (subject to some constraints that matter). Many can >> point at the tree over there and agree on its height and whether or not it >> is a deciduous variety. >> > > Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean anything other > than that though? > > > Hi Craig, > > Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way? Don't forget > about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The duals... >
We might be agreeing here. I thought you were saying that our agreeing on what we observe is a sign that things are 'real', so I was saying that it doesn't have to be a sign of anything, just that reality is the quality of having to agree involuntarily on conditions. > > We are people living at the same time with human sized bodies, so it > would make sense that we would agree on almost everything that involve our > bodies. > > > We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system capable of > being described by a QM wave function or, more simply, capable of being > represented by a semi-complete atomic boolean algebra. > We in this case is you and me. I try to avoid using the word object, since it can be used in a lot of different ways. An object can be anything that isn't the subject. In another sense an object is a publicly accessible body. > > You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who point to > your dream tree and agree on its characteristics, but upon waking, you are > re-oriented to a more real, more tangibly public world with longer and more > stable histories. > > > Right, it is the "upon waking' part that is important. Our common > 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up' from when we depart the > mortal coil. Have you followed the quantum suicide discussion any? > I haven't been, no. > > These qualities are only significant in comparison to the dream though. > If you can't remember your waking life, then the dream is real to you, and > to the universe through you. > > > You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why? What one > observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not necessarily real to every > one else... but there is a huge overlap between our 1p 'realities'. Andrew > Soltau has this idea nailed now in his Multisolipsism stuff. ;-) > One can observe that one is observing something that is 'not real' also though. > > > > >> >> >> By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of >> natural vs man-made as categories of origin. >> >> >> Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence of a child and >> the artificial intelligence of a Mars rover obsolete?ï¿½ The latter is one >> we create by art, the other is created by nature. >> > > Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us. > > > I disagree! We can fool ourselves into thinking that we "understand' > but what we can do is, at best, form testable explanations of stuff... We > are fallible! > > I agree, but I don't see how that applies to us being nature. > > > We are part of Nature and there is a 'whole-part isomorphism' > involved.. > Since we are part of nature, there is nothing that we are or do which is not nature. > > What would it mean to be unnatural? How would an unnatural being find > themselves in a natural world? > > > They can't, unless we invent them... Pink Ponies!!!! > Pink Ponies are natural to imagine for our imagination. A square circle would be unnatural - which is why we can't imagine it. > > > >> >> We can certainly use the term informally to clarify what we are >> referring to, like we might call someone a plumber because it helps us >> communicate who we are talking about, but anyone who does plumbing can be a >> plumber. It isn't an ontological distinction. Nature creates our capacity >> to create art, and we use that capacity to shape nature in return. >> >> >> I agree! I think it is that aspect of Nature that can "throw itself >> into its choice", as Satre mused, that is making the computationalists >> crazy. I got no problem with it as I embrace non-well foundedness. >> > > Cool, yeah I mean it could be said that aspect is defines nature? > > > Can we put Nature in a box? No... > > > >> >> "L'homme est d'abord ce qui se jette vers un avenir, et ce qui est >> conscient de se projeter dans l'avenir."/ ~ Jean Paul Satre >> >> >> >>> >>> If we used simulated instead, the measure of intelligence would be >>> framed more modestly as the degree to which a system meets our expectations >>> (or what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather than assuming a >>> universal index of intelligent qualities which is independent from our own >>> human qualities, >>> >>> >>> But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to human intelligence >>> >> >> I think that it is a misconception to imagine that we have access to any >> other measure. >> >> >> Yeah! >> >> >> >>> we will be saying that visual pattern recognition is intelligence but >>> solving Navier-Stokes equations is not. >>> >> >> Why, equations are written by intelligent humans? >> >> >> People are confounded by computational intractability and eagerly >> spin tales of hypercomputers and other perpetual motion machines. >> > > Complexity seems to be the only abstract principle that the Western-OMMM > orientation respects. > > > And look at the benefits that it engenders! It is nice to not to have > to worry about freezing in the winter or spending every waking moment > seeking subsistence. Our pets sure don't complain... > Definitely, it's not all bad and it is a big improvement over Oriental-ACME fanaticism. Even so, we have pushed it too far and now we are starting to pay the price. > > >> >> >> >>> ï¿½ This is the anthropocentrism that continually demotes whatever >>> computers can do as "not really intelligent" even when it was regarded a >>> the apothesis of intelligence *before* computers couldï¿½ do it. >>> >> >> If I had a camera with higher resolution than a human eye, that doesn't >> mean that I can replace my eyes with those cameras. Computers can still be >> exemplary at computation without being deemed literally intelligent. A >> planetarium's star projector can be as accurate as any telescope and still >> be understood not to be projecting literal galaxies and stars into the >> ceiling of the observatory. >> >> >>> >>> we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing emulation purely on >>> its merits as a convincing reflection of intelligence >>> >>> >>> But there is no one-dimensional measure of intelligence - it's just >>> competence in many domains. >>> >> >> Competence in many domains is fine. I'm saying that the competence >> relates to how well it reflects or amplifies existing intelligence, not >> that it actually is itself intelligent. >> >> >>> >>> rather than presuming to have replicated an organic conscious experience >>> mechanically. >>> >>> >>> I don't think that's a presumption.ï¿½ It's an inference from the >>> incoherence of the idea of a philosophical zombie. >>> >> >> The idea of a philosophical zombie is a misconception based on some >> assumptions about matter and function which I clearly understand to be >> untrue. A sociopath is already a philosophical zombie as far as emotional >> intelligence is concerned. Someone with blindsight is a philosophical >> zombie as far as visual perception is concerned. Someone who is >> sleepwalking is a p-zombie as far as bipedal locomotion is concerned. The >> concept is bogus. >> >> >> I 100% concur! >> > > Cool! It's so strange because for almost everything else I think that > Chalmers is The Man, but p-zombies are the concept of this that most people > seem to grab on to, other than the Hard Problem. > > > From what I can tell, Chalmers uses the concept of a p-zombie as a > device in a proof of panprotopsychism. He is trying to get people to > understand for themselves that the concept of a p-zombie is absurd. This is > important because material monism demands that we actually are zombies! See > Dennett's eliminatist defense of materialism! > Yes, and it's a defense of panprotopsychism, but I think for the wrong reason. Blindsight for example shows how qualia can be absent on one level, but another part of our awareness can be informed on another level. > > > >> >> >>> >>> >>> The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering awareness would, >>> I think, be outweighed by the gain of a more scientifically circumspect >>> approach. Putting the Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the >>> shadow of its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a >>> precaution, the promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1 simulacrum (a >>> faithful copy of an original, in Baudrillardï¿½s >>> terms<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation>), >>> will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks the absence of a >>> profound reality, where the simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy.) >>> --ï¿½ >>> >>> >>> The assumption that there is a 'profound reality' is what Stathis showed >>> to be 'magic'. >>> >> >> Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular, only the >> sum of whatever is in the original which is not accessible in the copy. His >> phrase 'profound reality' is apt though. If you don't experience a profound >> reality, then you might be a p-zombie already. >> >> >> >> Right! >> > > Cool. I've known about the Baudrillard stuff for a long time, but today > was the first time I realized how it applies to comp and what it makes me > motivated to try to explain it. Cos it isn't just a misrepresentation of > consciousness, it actively presents itself as containing proof that it is > not a misrepresentation. > > > > Good!!!! > > > Craig > > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.