On 2/15/2013 4:07 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 11:01:30 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King
On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul
On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
*Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more
appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence?*
Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which
can model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a
simulation, not an �artificial hurricane�. If we
modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we
would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or
gravity or electromagnetism, not that we had created
artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.
No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a
robot or other machine which interacts with the real
world, whereas a simulate AI or hurricane acts within a
AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though. It
makes no difference to the AI whether its environment is
real or simulated. Just because we can attach a robot to a
simulation doesn't change it into an experience of a real world.
I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a
difference that does not always make a difference between a
public world and a private world! IMHO, that makes the 'real'
physical world "Real" is that we can all agree on its
properties (subject to some constraints that matter). Many
can point at the tree over there and agree on its height and
whether or not it is a deciduous variety.
Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean
anything other than that though?
Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way? Don't
forget about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The duals...
We might be agreeing here. I thought you were saying that our agreeing
on what we observe is a sign that things are 'real', so I was saying
that it doesn't have to be a sign of anything, just that reality is
the quality of having to agree involuntarily on conditions.
We are stumbling over a subtle issue within semiotics. This video
in 5 parts is helpful: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxV3ompeJ-Y
We are people living at the same time with human sized bodies, so
it would make sense that we would agree on almost everything that
involve our bodies.
We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system capable
of being described by a QM wave function or, more simply, capable
of being represented by a semi-complete atomic boolean algebra.
We in this case is you and me. I try to avoid using the word object,
since it can be used in a lot of different ways. An object can be
anything that isn't the subject. In another sense an object is a
publicly accessible body.
I use the word 'object' purposefully. We need to deanthropomorphize
the observer! An object is what one observer senses of another
You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who point
to your dream tree and agree on its characteristics, but upon
waking, you are re-oriented to a more real, more tangibly public
world with longer and more stable histories.
Right, it is the "upon waking' part that is important. Our
common 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up' from when
we depart the mortal coil. Have you followed the quantum suicide
I haven't been, no.
It is helpful for the understanding of the argument I am making.
The way that a user of a QS system notices or fails to notice her demise
is relevant here. The point is that we never sense the switch in the
These qualities are only significant in comparison to the dream
though. If you can't remember your waking life, then the dream is
real to you, and to the universe through you.
You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why? What
one observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not necessarily
real to every one else... but there is a huge overlap between our
1p 'realities'. Andrew Soltau has this idea nailed now in his
Multisolipsism stuff. ;-)
One can observe that one is observing something that is 'not real'
Exactly, but that is the point I am making. There has to be a
'real' thing for there to be a simulated thing, no? Or is that just the
standard tacit assumption of people new to this question?
By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of
obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of
Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence of a
child and the artificial intelligence of a Mars rover
obsolete?� The latter is one we create by art, the other
is created by nature.
Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us.
I disagree! We can fool ourselves into thinking that we
"understand' but what we can do is, at best, form testable
explanations of stuff... We are fallible!
I agree, but I don't see how that applies to us being nature.
We are part of Nature and there is a 'whole-part isomorphism'
Since we are part of nature, there is nothing that we are or do which
is not nature.
What would it mean to be unnatural? How would an unnatural being
find themselves in a natural world?
They can't, unless we invent them... Pink Ponies!!!!
Pink Ponies are natural to imagine for our imagination. A square
circle would be unnatural - which is why we can't imagine it.
This demonstrates that there is a limit on the coherence of a
language, maybe even to its possible recursive depth...
We can certainly use the term informally to clarify what we
are referring to, like we might call someone a plumber
because it helps us communicate who we are talking about,
but anyone who does plumbing can be a plumber. It isn't an
ontological distinction. Nature creates our capacity to
create art, and we use that capacity to shape nature in return.
I agree! I think it is that aspect of Nature that can
"throw itself into its choice", as Satre mused, that is
making the computationalists crazy. I got no problem with it
as I embrace non-well foundedness.
Cool, yeah I mean it could be said that aspect is defines nature?
Can we put Nature in a box? No...
"L'homme est d'abord ce qui se jette vers un avenir, et ce
conscient de se projeter dans l'avenir."/ ~ Jean Paul Satre
If we used simulated instead, the measure of
intelligence would be framed more modestly as the
degree to which a system meets our expectations (or
what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather
than assuming a universal index of intelligent
qualities which is independent from our own human
But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to
I think that it is a misconception to imagine that we have
access to any other measure.
we will be saying that visual pattern recognition is
intelligence but solving Navier-Stokes equations is not.
Why, equations are written by intelligent humans?
People are confounded by computational intractability and
eagerly spin tales of hypercomputers and other perpetual
Complexity seems to be the only abstract principle that the
Western-OMMM orientation respects.
And look at the benefits that it engenders! It is nice to not
to have to worry about freezing in the winter or spending every
waking moment seeking subsistence. Our pets sure don't complain...
Definitely, it's not all bad and it is a big improvement over
Oriental-ACME fanaticism. Even so, we have pushed it too far and now
we are starting to pay the price.
The jury is still out on that, IMHO...
� This is the anthropocentrism that continually
demotes whatever computers can do as "not really
intelligent" even when it was regarded a the apothesis
of intelligence *before* computers could� do it.
If I had a camera with higher resolution than a human eye,
that doesn't mean that I can replace my eyes with those
cameras. Computers can still be exemplary at computation
without being deemed literally intelligent. A planetarium's
star projector can be as accurate as any telescope and still
be understood not to be projecting literal galaxies and
stars into the ceiling of the observatory.
we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing
emulation purely on its merits as a convincing
reflection of intelligence
But there is no one-dimensional measure of intelligence
- it's just competence in many domains.
Competence in many domains is fine. I'm saying that the
competence relates to how well it reflects or amplifies
existing intelligence, not that it actually is itself
rather than presuming to have replicated an organic
conscious experience mechanically.
I don't think that's a presumption.� It's an inference
from the incoherence of the idea of a philosophical zombie.
The idea of a philosophical zombie is a misconception based
on some assumptions about matter and function which I
clearly understand to be untrue. A sociopath is already a
philosophical zombie as far as emotional intelligence is
concerned. Someone with blindsight is a philosophical zombie
as far as visual perception is concerned. Someone who is
sleepwalking is a p-zombie as far as bipedal locomotion is
concerned. The concept is bogus.
I 100% concur!
Cool! It's so strange because for almost everything else I think
that Chalmers is The Man, but p-zombies are the concept of this
that most people seem to grab on to, other than the Hard Problem.
From what I can tell, Chalmers uses the concept of a p-zombie
as a device in a proof of panprotopsychism. He is trying to get
people to understand for themselves that the concept of a p-zombie
is absurd. This is important because material monism demands that
we actually are zombies! See Dennett's eliminatist defense of
Yes, and it's a defense of panprotopsychism, but I think for the wrong
reason. Blindsight for example shows how qualia can be absent on one
level, but another part of our awareness can be informed on another
I sorta disagree. Blind sight merely shows that verbal reportage is
not the sum of what can be known of consciousness.
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