On 2/15/2013 4:07 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 11:01:30 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

    On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul
    King wrote:

        On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

        On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

            On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
            *Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more
            appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence?*

            Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which
            can model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a
            simulation, not an �artificial hurricane�. If we
            modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we
            would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or
            gravity or electromagnetism, not that we had created
            artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.

            No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a
            robot or other machine which interacts with the real
            world, whereas a simulate AI or hurricane acts within a
            simulated world.

        AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though. It
        makes no difference to the AI whether its environment is
        real or simulated. Just because we can attach a robot to a
        simulation doesn't change it into an experience of a real world.

        Hi Craig,

            I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a
        difference that does not always make a difference between a
        public world and a private world! IMHO, that makes the 'real'
        physical world "Real" is that we can all agree on its
        properties (subject to some constraints that matter). Many
        can point at the tree over there and agree on its height and
        whether or not it is a deciduous variety.

    Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean
    anything other than that though?

    Hi Craig,

        Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way? Don't
    forget about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The duals...

We might be agreeing here. I thought you were saying that our agreeing on what we observe is a sign that things are 'real', so I was saying that it doesn't have to be a sign of anything, just that reality is the quality of having to agree involuntarily on conditions.

Hi Craig,

We are stumbling over a subtle issue within semiotics. This video in 5 parts is helpful: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxV3ompeJ-Y

    We are people living at the same time with human sized bodies, so
    it would make sense that we would agree on almost everything that
    involve our bodies.

        We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system capable
    of being described by a QM wave function or, more simply, capable
    of being represented by a semi-complete atomic boolean algebra.

We in this case is you and me. I try to avoid using the word object, since it can be used in a lot of different ways. An object can be anything that isn't the subject. In another sense an object is a publicly accessible body.

I use the word 'object' purposefully. We need to deanthropomorphize the observer! An object is what one observer senses of another (potential) observer.

    You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who point
    to your dream tree and agree on its characteristics, but upon
    waking, you are re-oriented to a more real, more tangibly public
    world with longer and more stable histories.

        Right, it is the "upon waking' part that is important. Our
    common 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up' from when
    we depart the mortal coil. Have you followed the quantum suicide
    discussion any?

I haven't been, no.

It is helpful for the understanding of the argument I am making. The way that a user of a QS system notices or fails to notice her demise is relevant here. The point is that we never sense the switch in the "off" position...

    These qualities are only significant in comparison to the dream
    though. If you can't remember your waking life, then the dream is
    real to you, and to the universe through you.

        You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why? What
    one observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not necessarily
    real to every one else... but there is a huge overlap between our
    1p 'realities'. Andrew Soltau has this idea nailed now in his
    Multisolipsism stuff. ;-)

One can observe that one is observing something that is 'not real' also though.

Exactly, but that is the point I am making. There has to be a 'real' thing for there to be a simulated thing, no? Or is that just the standard tacit assumption of people new to this question?

        By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of
        obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of

        Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence of a
        child and the artificial intelligence of a Mars rover
        obsolete?� The latter is one we create by art, the other
        is created by nature.

    Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us.

        I disagree! We can fool ourselves into thinking that we
    "understand' but what we can do is, at best, form testable
    explanations of stuff... We are fallible!

    I agree, but I don't see how that applies to us being nature.

        We are part of Nature and there is a 'whole-part isomorphism'

Since we are part of nature, there is nothing that we are or do which is not nature.


    What would it mean to be unnatural? How would an unnatural being
    find themselves in a natural world?

        They can't, unless we invent them... Pink Ponies!!!!

Pink Ponies are natural to imagine for our imagination. A square circle would be unnatural - which is why we can't imagine it.

This demonstrates that there is a limit on the coherence of a language, maybe even to its possible recursive depth...

        We can certainly use the term informally to clarify what we
        are referring to, like we might call someone a plumber
        because it helps us communicate who we are talking about,
        but anyone who does plumbing can be a plumber. It isn't an
        ontological distinction. Nature creates our capacity to
        create art, and we use that capacity to shape nature in return.

            I agree! I think it is that aspect of Nature that can
        "throw itself into its choice", as Satre mused, that is
        making the computationalists crazy. I got no problem with it
        as I embrace non-well foundedness.

    Cool, yeah I mean it could be said that aspect is defines nature?

        Can we put Nature in a box? No...

        "L'homme est d'abord ce qui se jette vers un avenir, et ce
        qui est
        conscient de se projeter dans l'avenir."/ ~ Jean Paul Satre

            If we used simulated instead, the measure of
            intelligence would be framed more modestly as the
            degree to which a system meets our expectations (or
            what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather
            than assuming a universal index of intelligent
            qualities which is independent from our own human

            But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to
            human intelligence

        I think that it is a misconception to imagine that we have
        access to any other measure.


            we will be saying that visual pattern recognition is
            intelligence but solving Navier-Stokes equations is not.

        Why, equations are written by intelligent humans?

            People are confounded by computational intractability and
        eagerly spin tales of hypercomputers and other perpetual
        motion machines.

    Complexity seems to be the only abstract principle that the
    Western-OMMM orientation respects.

        And look at the benefits that it engenders! It is nice to not
    to have to worry about freezing in the winter or spending every
    waking moment seeking subsistence. Our pets sure don't complain...

Definitely, it's not all bad and it is a big improvement over Oriental-ACME fanaticism. Even so, we have pushed it too far and now we are starting to pay the price.

    The jury is still out on that, IMHO...

            � This is the anthropocentrism that continually
            demotes whatever computers can do as "not really
            intelligent" even when it was regarded a the apothesis
            of intelligence *before* computers could� do it.

        If I had a camera with higher resolution than a human eye,
        that doesn't mean that I can replace my eyes with those
        cameras. Computers can still be exemplary at computation
        without being deemed literally intelligent. A planetarium's
        star projector can be as accurate as any telescope and still
        be understood not to be projecting literal galaxies and
        stars into the ceiling of the observatory.

            we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing
            emulation purely on its merits as a convincing
reflection of intelligence

            But there is no one-dimensional measure of intelligence
            - it's just competence in many domains.

        Competence in many domains is fine. I'm saying that the
        competence relates to how well it reflects or amplifies
        existing intelligence, not that it actually is itself

            rather than presuming to have replicated an organic
            conscious experience mechanically.

            I don't think that's a presumption.� It's an inference
            from the incoherence of the idea of a philosophical zombie.

        The idea of a philosophical zombie is a misconception based
        on some assumptions about matter and function which I
        clearly understand to be untrue. A sociopath is already a
        philosophical zombie as far as emotional intelligence is
        concerned. Someone with blindsight is a philosophical zombie
        as far as visual perception is concerned. Someone who is
        sleepwalking is a p-zombie as far as bipedal locomotion is
        concerned. The concept is bogus.

            I 100% concur!

    Cool! It's so strange because for almost everything else I think
    that Chalmers is The Man, but p-zombies are the concept of this
    that most people seem to grab on to, other than the Hard Problem.

        From what I can tell, Chalmers uses the concept of a p-zombie
    as a device in a proof of panprotopsychism. He is trying to get
    people to understand for themselves that the concept of a p-zombie
    is absurd. This is important because material monism demands that
    we actually are zombies! See Dennett's eliminatist defense of

Yes, and it's a defense of panprotopsychism, but I think for the wrong reason. Blindsight for example shows how qualia can be absent on one level, but another part of our awareness can be informed on another level.

I sorta disagree. Blind sight merely shows that verbal reportage is not the sum of what can be known of consciousness.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to