On 2/16/2013 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, February 15, 2013 7:23:28 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
On 2/15/2013 4:07 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 11:01:30 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul
On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen
Paul King wrote:
On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent
On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
*Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more
appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence?*
Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program
which can model a hurricane, we would call that
hurricane a simulation, not an �artificial
hurricane�. If we modeled any physical
substance, force, or field, we would similarly say
that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or
electromagnetism, not that we had created
artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.
No, because the idea of an AI is that it can
control a robot or other machine which interacts
with the real world, whereas a simulate AI or
hurricane acts within a simulated world.
AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though.
It makes no difference to the AI whether its
environment is real or simulated. Just because we can
attach a robot to a simulation doesn't change it into
an experience of a real world.
I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a
difference that does not always make a difference
between a public world and a private world! IMHO, that
makes the 'real' physical world "Real" is that we can
all agree on its properties (subject to some constraints
that matter). Many can point at the tree over there and
agree on its height and whether or not it is a deciduous
Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean
anything other than that though?
Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way?
Don't forget about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The
We might be agreeing here. I thought you were saying that our
agreeing on what we observe is a sign that things are 'real', so
I was saying that it doesn't have to be a sign of anything, just
that reality is the quality of having to agree involuntarily on
We are stumbling over a subtle issue within semiotics. This
video in 5 parts is helpful:
Is there something in particular that we're not semiotically square on?
We seem to talk passed each other on some details within semiotic
theory. For example, what is a 'sign'?
We are people living at the same time with human sized
bodies, so it would make sense that we would agree on almost
everything that involve our bodies.
We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system
capable of being described by a QM wave function or, more
simply, capable of being represented by a semi-complete
atomic boolean algebra.
We in this case is you and me. I try to avoid using the word
object, since it can be used in a lot of different ways. An
object can be anything that isn't the subject. In another sense
an object is a publicly accessible body.
I use the word 'object' purposefully. We need to
deanthropomorphize the observer! An object is what one observer
senses of another (potential) observer.
I agree but would add that we need to demechanemorphize the observed
Mechanisms are zombies, at best, in your thinking, no?
You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who
point to your dream tree and agree on its characteristics,
but upon waking, you are re-oriented to a more real, more
tangibly public world with longer and more stable histories.
Right, it is the "upon waking' part that is important.
Our common 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up'
from when we depart the mortal coil. Have you followed the
quantum suicide discussion any?
I haven't been, no.
It is helpful for the understanding of the argument I am
making. The way that a user of a QS system notices or fails to
notice her demise is relevant here. The point is that we never
sense the switch in the "off" position...
I can follow the concept of not sensing the off position (as in the
retinal blindspot) if that's where you're going.
These qualities are only significant in comparison to the
dream though. If you can't remember your waking life, then
the dream is real to you, and to the universe through you.
You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why?
What one observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not
necessarily real to every one else... but there is a huge
overlap between our 1p 'realities'. Andrew Soltau has this
idea nailed now in his Multisolipsism stuff. ;-)
One can observe that one is observing something that is 'not
real' also though.
Exactly, but that is the point I am making. There has to be a
'real' thing for there to be a simulated thing, no? Or is that
just the standard tacit assumption of people new to this question?
I think that there only has to be an expectation of sensory fidelity.
Realism builds from multiple fulfillment of expectations, divided by
failures to fulfill expectations. Otherwise simulation and reality are
the same thing - just experiences.
Right, but it is the same as not knowing what we do not know...
By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of
obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories
Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence
of a child and the artificial intelligence of a Mars
rover obsolete?� The latter is one we create by art,
the other is created by nature.
Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us.
I disagree! We can fool ourselves into thinking that we
"understand' but what we can do is, at best, form testable
explanations of stuff... We are fallible!
I agree, but I don't see how that applies to us being nature.
We are part of Nature and there is a 'whole-part
Since we are part of nature, there is nothing that we are or do
which is not nature.
What would it mean to be unnatural? How would an unnatural
being find themselves in a natural world?
They can't, unless we invent them... Pink Ponies!!!!
Pink Ponies are natural to imagine for our imagination. A square
circle would be unnatural - which is why we can't imagine it.
This demonstrates that there is a limit on the coherence of a
language, maybe even to its possible recursive depth...
Sure, yeah language has lots of limits.
The problem is when people operate as if only that which is named
within their own language is possibly 'real'.
We can certainly use the term informally to clarify
what we are referring to, like we might call someone a
plumber because it helps us communicate who we are
talking about, but anyone who does plumbing can be a
plumber. It isn't an ontological distinction. Nature
creates our capacity to create art, and we use that
capacity to shape nature in return.
I agree! I think it is that aspect of Nature that
can "throw itself into its choice", as Satre mused, that
is making the computationalists crazy. I got no problem
with it as I embrace non-well foundedness.
Cool, yeah I mean it could be said that aspect is defines
Can we put Nature in a box? No...
"L'homme est d'abord ce qui se jette vers un avenir, et
ce qui est
conscient de se projeter dans l'avenir."/ ~ Jean Paul Satre
If we used simulated instead, the measure of
intelligence would be framed more modestly as the
degree to which a system meets our expectations
(or what we think or assume are our expectations).
Rather than assuming a universal index of
intelligent qualities which is independent from
our own human qualities,
But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to
I think that it is a misconception to imagine that we
have access to any other measure.
we will be saying that visual pattern recognition
is intelligence but solving Navier-Stokes equations
Why, equations are written by intelligent humans?
People are confounded by computational
intractability and eagerly spin tales of hypercomputers
and other perpetual motion machines.
Complexity seems to be the only abstract principle that the
Western-OMMM orientation respects.
And look at the benefits that it engenders! It is nice to
not to have to worry about freezing in the winter or spending
every waking moment seeking subsistence. Our pets sure don't
Definitely, it's not all bad and it is a big improvement over
Oriental-ACME fanaticism. Even so, we have pushed it too far and
now we are starting to pay the price.
The jury is still out on that, IMHO...
It depends how we look at it I suppose. The Dark Ages were only 'dark'
by certain measures. Then as now, it all depends on who and where you
happen to be as to whether any era is paradise or Hell on Earth. The
particular methods and models which have characterized our science and
philosophy since the Enlightenment can be more objectively said to
have reached their End of Life.
OK, so what can we draw from that? We are fallible. We compensate,
IMHO, for this by constantly implementing error correction methods in
our thinking. If we are not willing to question even our most basis
premises about what is 'true', then there is a problem. We become
hidebound and intransigent.
� This is the anthropocentrism that continually
demotes whatever computers can do as "not really
intelligent" even when it was regarded a the
apothesis of intelligence *before* computers
could� do it.
If I had a camera with higher resolution than a human
eye, that doesn't mean that I can replace my eyes with
those cameras. Computers can still be exemplary at
computation without being deemed literally intelligent.
A planetarium's star projector can be as accurate as
any telescope and still be understood not to be
projecting literal galaxies and stars into the ceiling
of the observatory.
we could evaluate the success of a particular
Turing emulation purely on its merits as a
convincing reflection of intelligence
But there is no one-dimensional measure of
intelligence - it's just competence in many domains.
Competence in many domains is fine. I'm saying that the
competence relates to how well it reflects or amplifies
existing intelligence, not that it actually is itself
rather than presuming to have replicated an
organic conscious experience mechanically.
I don't think that's a presumption.� It's an
inference from the incoherence of the idea of a
The idea of a philosophical zombie is a misconception
based on some assumptions about matter and function
which I clearly understand to be untrue. A sociopath is
already a philosophical zombie as far as emotional
intelligence is concerned. Someone with blindsight is a
philosophical zombie as far as visual perception is
concerned. Someone who is sleepwalking is a p-zombie as
far as bipedal locomotion is concerned. The concept is
I 100% concur!
Cool! It's so strange because for almost everything else I
think that Chalmers is The Man, but p-zombies are the
concept of this that most people seem to grab on to, other
than the Hard Problem.
From what I can tell, Chalmers uses the concept of a
p-zombie as a device in a proof of panprotopsychism. He is
trying to get people to understand for themselves that the
concept of a p-zombie is absurd. This is important because
material monism demands that we actually are zombies! See
Dennett's eliminatist defense of materialism!
Yes, and it's a defense of panprotopsychism, but I think for the
wrong reason. Blindsight for example shows how qualia can be
absent on one level, but another part of our awareness can be
informed on another level.
I sorta disagree. Blind sight merely shows that verbal
reportage is not the sum of what can be known of consciousness.
I think that the injuries are to the visual cortex though, not areas
associated with language. There is no reason that we should expect
their reports to be less accurate than anyone else's. It sounds like
you are saying that it isn't blindsight at all, it's just compulsive
The mind (generated by brain) does not recognize that it is missing
There probably are cases of global head injuries where that could be
possible, but why would they only lie about what they could see?
Because one of the things that the brain does is semi-continuously
generate a complete simulation of 'self-in-the-world. We don't sense the
parts that are missing. We see evidence of this when someone has a
stroke that cuts of part of the brain that control and process info from
a limb, aspects of so-called limb neglect
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