On 2/16/2013 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, February 15, 2013 7:23:28 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    On 2/15/2013 4:07 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


    On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 11:01:30 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul
    King wrote:

        On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


        On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen
        Paul King wrote:

            On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


            On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent
            wrote:

                On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
                *Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more
                appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence?*

                Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program
                which can model a hurricane, we would call that
                hurricane a simulation, not an �artificial
                hurricane�. If we modeled any physical
                substance, force, or field, we would similarly say
                that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or
                electromagnetism, not that we had created
                artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.

                No, because the idea of an AI is that it can
                control a robot or other machine which interacts
                with the real world, whereas a simulate AI or
                hurricane acts within a simulated world.


            AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though.
            It makes no difference to the AI whether its
            environment is real or simulated. Just because we can
            attach a robot to a simulation doesn't change it into
            an experience of a real world.

            Hi Craig,

                I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a
            difference that does not always make a difference
            between a public world and a private world! IMHO, that
            makes the 'real' physical world "Real" is that we can
            all agree on its properties (subject to some constraints
            that matter). Many can point at the tree over there and
            agree on its height and whether or not it is a deciduous
            variety.


        Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean
        anything other than that though?

        Hi Craig,

            Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way?
        Don't forget about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The
        duals...


    We might be agreeing here. I thought you were saying that our
    agreeing on what we observe is a sign that things are 'real', so
    I was saying that it doesn't have to be a sign of anything, just
    that reality is the quality of having to agree involuntarily on
    conditions.

    Hi Craig,

        We are stumbling over a subtle issue within semiotics. This
    video in 5 parts is helpful:
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxV3ompeJ-Y
    <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxV3ompeJ-Y>


Is there something in particular that we're not semiotically square on?

We seem to talk passed each other on some details within semiotic theory. For example, what is a 'sign'? <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm>




        We are people living at the same time with human sized
        bodies, so it would make sense that we would agree on almost
        everything that involve our bodies.

            We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system
        capable of being described by a QM wave function or, more
        simply, capable of being represented by a semi-complete
        atomic boolean algebra.


    We in this case is you and me. I try to avoid using the word
    object, since it can be used in a lot of different ways. An
    object can be anything that isn't the subject. In another sense
    an object is a publicly accessible body.

        I use the word 'object' purposefully. We need to
    deanthropomorphize the observer! An object is what one observer
    senses of another (potential) observer.


I agree but would add that we need to demechanemorphize the observed also.

    Mechanisms are zombies, at best, in your thinking, no?






        You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who
        point to your dream tree and agree on its characteristics,
        but upon waking, you are re-oriented to a more real, more
        tangibly public world with longer and more stable histories.

            Right, it is the "upon waking' part that is important.
        Our common 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up'
        from when we depart the mortal coil. Have you followed the
        quantum suicide discussion any?


    I haven't been, no.

        It is helpful for the understanding of the argument I am
    making. The way that a user of a QS system notices or fails to
    notice her demise is relevant here. The point is that we never
    sense the switch in the "off" position...


I can follow the concept of not sensing the off position (as in the retinal blindspot) if that's where you're going.

    Right.





        These qualities are only significant in comparison to the
        dream though. If you can't remember your waking life, then
        the dream is real to you, and to the universe through you.

            You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why?
        What one observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not
        necessarily real to every one else... but there is a huge
        overlap between our 1p 'realities'. Andrew Soltau has this
        idea nailed now in his Multisolipsism stuff. ;-)


    One can observe that one is observing something that is 'not
    real' also though.

        Exactly, but that is the point I am making. There has to be a
    'real' thing for there to be a simulated thing, no? Or is that
    just the standard tacit assumption of people new to this question?


I think that there only has to be an expectation of sensory fidelity. Realism builds from multiple fulfillment of expectations, divided by failures to fulfill expectations. Otherwise simulation and reality are the same thing - just experiences.

    Right, but it is the same as not knowing what we do not know...










            By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of
            obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories
of origin.

            Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence
            of a child and the artificial intelligence of a Mars
            rover obsolete?� The latter is one we create by art,
            the other is created by nature.


        Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us.

            I disagree! We can fool ourselves into thinking that we
        "understand' but what we can do is, at best, form testable
        explanations of stuff... We are fallible!

        I agree, but I don't see how that applies to us being nature.

            We are part of Nature and there is a 'whole-part
        isomorphism' involved..


    Since we are part of nature, there is nothing that we are or do
    which is not nature.

        Right.



        What would it mean to be unnatural? How would an unnatural
        being find themselves in a natural world?

            They can't, unless we invent them... Pink Ponies!!!!


    Pink Ponies are natural to imagine for our imagination. A square
    circle would be unnatural - which is why we can't imagine it.

        This demonstrates that there is a limit on the coherence of a
    language, maybe even to its possible recursive depth...


Sure, yeah language has lots of limits.

The problem is when people operate as if only that which is named within their own language is possibly 'real'.







            We can certainly use the term informally to clarify
            what we are referring to, like we might call someone a
            plumber because it helps us communicate who we are
            talking about, but anyone who does plumbing can be a
            plumber. It isn't an ontological distinction. Nature
            creates our capacity to create art, and we use that
            capacity to shape nature in return.

                I agree! I think it is that aspect of Nature that
            can "throw itself into its choice", as Satre mused, that
            is making the computationalists crazy. I got no problem
            with it as I embrace non-well foundedness.


        Cool, yeah I mean it could be said that aspect is defines
        nature?

            Can we put Nature in a box? No...



            "L'homme est d'abord ce qui se jette vers un avenir, et
            ce qui est
            conscient de se projeter dans l'avenir."/ ~ Jean Paul Satre



                If we used simulated instead, the measure of
                intelligence would be framed more modestly as the
                degree to which a system meets our expectations
                (or what we think or assume are our expectations).
                Rather than assuming a universal index of
                intelligent qualities which is independent from
our own human qualities,

                But if we measure intelligence strictly relative to
                human intelligence


            I think that it is a misconception to imagine that we
            have access to any other measure.

                Yeah!


                we will be saying that visual pattern recognition
                is intelligence but solving Navier-Stokes equations
                is not.


            Why, equations are written by intelligent humans?

                People are confounded by computational
            intractability and eagerly spin tales of hypercomputers
            and other perpetual motion machines.


        Complexity seems to be the only abstract principle that the
        Western-OMMM orientation respects.

            And look at the benefits that it engenders! It is nice to
        not to have to worry about freezing in the winter or spending
        every waking moment seeking subsistence. Our pets sure don't
        complain...


    Definitely, it's not all bad and it is a big improvement over
    Oriental-ACME fanaticism. Even so, we have pushed it too far and
    now we are starting to pay the price.

        The jury is still out on that, IMHO...


It depends how we look at it I suppose. The Dark Ages were only 'dark' by certain measures. Then as now, it all depends on who and where you happen to be as to whether any era is paradise or Hell on Earth. The particular methods and models which have characterized our science and philosophy since the Enlightenment can be more objectively said to have reached their End of Life.

OK, so what can we draw from that? We are fallible. We compensate, IMHO, for this by constantly implementing error correction methods in our thinking. If we are not willing to question even our most basis premises about what is 'true', then there is a problem. We become hidebound and intransigent.








                � This is the anthropocentrism that continually
                demotes whatever computers can do as "not really
                intelligent" even when it was regarded a the
                apothesis of intelligence *before* computers
                could� do it.


            If I had a camera with higher resolution than a human
            eye, that doesn't mean that I can replace my eyes with
            those cameras. Computers can still be exemplary at
            computation without being deemed literally intelligent.
            A planetarium's star projector can be as accurate as
            any telescope and still be understood not to be
            projecting literal galaxies and stars into the ceiling
            of the observatory.


                we could evaluate the success of a particular
                Turing emulation purely on its merits as a
convincing reflection of intelligence

                But there is no one-dimensional measure of
                intelligence - it's just competence in many domains.


            Competence in many domains is fine. I'm saying that the
            competence relates to how well it reflects or amplifies
            existing intelligence, not that it actually is itself
            intelligent.


                rather than presuming to have replicated an
                organic conscious experience mechanically.

                I don't think that's a presumption.� It's an
                inference from the incoherence of the idea of a
                philosophical zombie.


            The idea of a philosophical zombie is a misconception
            based on some assumptions about matter and function
            which I clearly understand to be untrue. A sociopath is
            already a philosophical zombie as far as emotional
            intelligence is concerned. Someone with blindsight is a
            philosophical zombie as far as visual perception is
            concerned. Someone who is sleepwalking is a p-zombie as
            far as bipedal locomotion is concerned. The concept is
            bogus.

                I 100% concur!


        Cool! It's so strange because for almost everything else I
        think that Chalmers is The Man, but p-zombies are the
        concept of this that most people seem to grab on to, other
        than the Hard Problem.

            From what I can tell, Chalmers uses the concept of a
        p-zombie as a device in a proof of panprotopsychism. He is
        trying to get people to understand for themselves that the
        concept of a p-zombie is absurd. This is important because
        material monism demands that we actually are zombies! See
        Dennett's eliminatist defense of materialism!


    Yes, and it's a defense of panprotopsychism, but I think for the
    wrong reason. Blindsight for example shows how qualia can be
    absent on one level, but another part of our awareness can be
    informed on another level.


        I sorta disagree. Blind sight merely shows that verbal
    reportage is not the sum of what can be known of consciousness.


I think that the injuries are to the visual cortex though, not areas associated with language. There is no reason that we should expect their reports to be less accurate than anyone else's. It sounds like you are saying that it isn't blindsight at all, it's just compulsive lying.

The mind (generated by brain) does not recognize that it is missing something...



There probably are cases of global head injuries where that could be possible, but why would they only lie about what they could see?

Because one of the things that the brain does is semi-continuously generate a complete simulation of 'self-in-the-world. We don't sense the parts that are missing. We see evidence of this when someone has a stroke that cuts of part of the brain that control and process info from a limb, aspects of so-called limb neglect <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hemispatial_neglect>.


Craig


--
Onward!

Stephen

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