On 16 Feb 2013, at 01:01, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/15/2013 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Feb 2013, at 22:00, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/14/2013 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:37, Stephen P. King wrote, to Craig Weinberg

Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular, only the sum of whatever is in the original which is not accessible in the copy. His phrase 'profound reality' is apt though. If you don't experience a profound reality, then you might be a p-zombie already.



    Right!


Right?

Here Craig is on the worst slope. It looks almost like " if *you* believe that a machine is not a zombie, it means that you are a zombie yourself".

They will persecuted the machines and the humans having a different opinion altogether.

Craig reassure me. he is willing to offer steak to my sun in law (who get an artificial brain before marriage).

But with Baudrillard, not only my sun in law might no more get his steak, but neither my daughter! Brr...

Bruno

Dear Bruno,

Could you re-write this post. It's wording is unintelligible to me. :_(


Craig sum up well Baudrillard with the sentence "If you don't experience a profound reality, then you might be a p-zombie already."

That sentence illustrate the willingness to not attribute a consciousness to a person with a copied, or artificial brain, as such copy is suspected not being able to live a "profound reality". This is like saying, we the human with the original carbon brain, can live profound reality, but not the machine, together with "and if you doubt that profound reality" then *you* are a zombie too.

It remind me a fundamentalist of some confessional religion who told me "if your machine cannot believe that some man is the son of God, then your machine can't think". I told him "---and what I doubt that a man is the son of God?". he told me that in that case I can't think either ...

This leads to the idea that not only a machine cannot be conscious, but any human who would pretend the contrary is also not conscious.

As I said: brrr...

Bruno


Ah! I see.. Yeah, Craig seems to have some trouble communicating the variability of Sense.

I think that Craig is clear. He is just opposed to comp.



It is 1p and thus cannot have a 3p measure, so... I feel his pain. I am trying to use the idea of the difference between a "simulation of X" as compared to "the real X" by a large ensemble of observers to parse this distinction to connect with your ideas...

I take it as meaning "with comp". I have no ideas.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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