On 20 Feb 2013, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/20/2013 8:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Feb 2013, at 05:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, February 19, 2013 10:53:46 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:


On Wednesday, February 20, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:

If he is making mice conscious of infra-red light though, then I would say he works with consciousness.

How do you know the mice are conscious of infra-red light? If it were a machine you would say it wasn't conscious, it just reacted to the light in a way that superficially resembles consciousness.

That's because we are obliged to give organisms like us the benefit of the doubt. The opposite is true of machines, where we have seen that their behavior has no basis in any innate sensitivity or agenda of the machine.

1) nobody has seen this (and I am not sure "seeing that kind of thing" can make sense).

We can see behavior which is indicative of different levels of intelligence and we can also observe the structures responsible for computation. For example I know a neuroscientist who, for ethical reasons, won't eat any kind of animal to that has a cerebral cortex.

We agree on that. But Craig said that he was able to see that computer are not conscious or that computer cannot be conscious. And I see you answered him as I do here. We can't see an absence of possibility. We might prove it, in some case, but Craig did not. He was begging the question, as he does on this question since the beginning. In fact he *assumes* non-comp, but for some reason he want us to believe that comp is contradictory, but fails to see that all his arguments are based on his assumption of non-comp.

Bruno






Brent


2) seeing is no proof of existence or inexistence. Nor even ontological evidence.

Bruno


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