On 2/22/2013 12:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Feb 2013, at 11:55, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Do you get separate universes from comp alone?
We get many separate dreams. It is an open question if some
collections of sharable dreams define an unique complete physical
If we consider that a 'reality' is that which is incontrovertible
for some collection of intercommunicating observers the answer is
obvious. Consider an observer as having a set of observables that
mutually commute and are mutually consistent (form a Boolean algebra).
For some arbitrarily large collection of such, communications (that
carry actual signals and not just noise) will only occur between members
of the collection that involve some subset of the observables of the
Completeness is not necessary and might even be counter-productive
as the problem of solving satisfiability for an arbitrarily large
collection of propositions is NP-complete.
The laws of physics are the same for all Turing machines, as they
emerge from all computations, but they still can have non isomorphic
I disagree. This claim is sound iff the laws of physics are 'the
same' for all Turing machines only if one has a universal equivalence
class of Turing machines and one can show that only one set of physical
laws can exist.
My feeling is that an unique complete physical reality is not quite
I don't think this is compatible with the SWE+comp.
If the SWE is correct, then the SWE is an epistemological consequence
of comp, including the MWI; and if QM is not correct, with comp, this
could lead to multiverses but also to multi-multiverses, or
multi-multiverses, etc. Even them might be only local, without any
definite global physical reality.
ISTM that comp requires some form of MWI via the indeterminacy
If the zero of the Riemann function corresponds to the eigenvalue of
some hermitian operator, like some hope to show for solving Riemann
conjecture, reality could emerge from a quantum chaos, which would
implement a quantum universal dovetailing. To solve the mind body
problem with this would still need to extract this from the
(quantified) arithmetical hypostases. I mean this quantum chaos should
be prove the "win" the "measure competition" among all universal systems.
I think that this is a quixotic request as proving the Riemann
conjecture requires the inspection of all primes. This is asuper task
Let us be clear. If computationalism is correct, we are really only at
the very start of getting the comp physics. We have only the logic of
the observable, and a tuns of open mathematical problems, which does
not interest anyone, by lack of motivation on the mind-body problem.
To use the comp-physics to do cosmology or particle physics is like
using superstring theory to do a coffee. It is the "weakness" of comp,
it leads to complex mathematics, very quickly, and cannot have direct
applications (unlike most of physics).
The main non direct but important, in my sight, application is in the
understanding that machine's theology is a science, indeed a branch of
computer science, and so with comp (usually believed even if
unconsciously) theology can be approached with the modest attitude of
science. That can help the understanding that science has not decided
between the two quite opposite conceptions of reality developed by
Plato and Aristotle.
Comp provides a lot of jobs for the futures. Even without comp,
biotechnologies will develop into theotechnologies, we might get
artificial brains because some doctor might not ask you, and just
consider it is the best treatment for you. We, here and now, might get
consistent extensions in computers build by our descendents, etc.
It is not a luxe to dig on what that could mean.
To sum up, computationalism leads to the many separate physical
universes, in any large sense of physical universes.
With a too much strict definition of physical universe, it is possible
that comp leads to just 0 universes. Just a web of dreams, defining no
global sharable physical realities.
A problem: physicists don't try to define what is a (primary or not)
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