On 25 Feb 2013, at 20:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 25, 2013 1:26:49 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Feb 2013, at 01:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, February 24, 2013 3:07:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Feb 2013, at 17:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, February 21, 2013 12:11:36 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2013, at 15:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, February 21, 2013 5:58:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
On 20 Feb 2013, at 21:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2013 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Feb 2013, at 23:28, John Mikes wrote:
Craig, it seems we engaged in a fruitful discussion- thank you.
I want to reflect to a few concepts only from it to clarify MY
First my use of a 'model'. There are different models, from
the sexy young females over the math-etc. descriptions of
theoretical concepts (some not so sexy). - What I (after
Robert Rosen?) use by this word is an extract of something, we
may not know in toto. Close to an 'Occamized' version, but
"cut" mostly by ignorance of the 'rest of it', not for added
clarity. Applied to whatever we know TODAY about the world.
Or: we THINK WE KNOW.
A scientist know nothing. Just nothing, not even his own
In science we have only beliefs,
But then, according to you, if they happen to be true they are
Yes, but "we" can't know that.
Can "we" know that we can't know that?
Yes. That something that the machine can prove and know.
How can we know what a machine can prove or know if our own
knowledge is only belief?
Because some time our beliefs are true.
What does 'true' mean if we can only believe?
We can't define that, but we have a lot of example.
Suppose we meet and that I give you a slap. Then "Bruno gave a slap
to Craig" would be true. It would not be true, if we meet, or not,
and don't give you a slap.
How do you know that we met or didn't meet? Maybe it was just a dream?
Then it is true, or false, with respect to the dream. I was only
illustrating a concept, known to de not definable, although
When we believe something, it means that we believe that it is true,
even when keeping in mind that it is a belief, and that we might be
wrong, that is not true.
Not necessarily. There may be no objective truth quality.
We may be creating belief synthetically by our expectation.
That is called wishful thinking.
If your criteria is wishful thinking, that might explain your question
begging type of 'argument'.
If you ask someone whether they believe that eating meat is immoral,
they may not have had an opinion one way or another about it before
you asked. There may not be an expectation that their spontaneously
projected 'belief' reflects something that is 'true', but just an
expression of what makes sense to them - what feels best in their
mind or seems appropriate for their idea of their own character.
I think it is better to try to see on what we agree, and build from
that. Statements like "eating meat is immoral" are very complex high
level statements not well suited for reasoning.
p is true means that it is the case that p, in the domain where p is
supposed to be applied. If you believe that Obama is the president
of the USA, it means that you believe that in our local geographico-
I don't think that one necessarily implies the other. A machine
could easily associate the string "Obama" with "president of the
USA" without having any knowledge of what that might mean. In a
dream, you could believe that the USA is actually the Underground
in which case choose another example. "Obama" was not the main point
here, neither the USA.
it is a true fact, even if you can have a doubt, because you might
find conceivable to wake up, perhaps younger, and that Ronald Reagan
is the president of the US. A black pothead being a president of
America... that sound like a dream, after all.
But if you sleep too long, he won't be president anymore. Maybe you
will wake up in 100 years when the historical revisionist party is
in power and has everyone believing that the Obama presidency was a
hoax...some kind of early information-media terrorism by the Chinese.
Here you betray that you have a notion of truth. If not you would not
refer to something like revisionism.
We can't know that, but we can still have sharable beliefs. By a
sort of informal habits, in most informal talk, we use very often
the term "know" for the beliefs based on quite common sharable
assumption, like "O has a successor", or the laws of addition and
multiplication. But when thinking rigorously *about* such kind of
beliefs, we have to use the term belief. It is simple: except for
the consciousness here and now, we have only beliefs.
I don't think it has to be that simple. You are only taking your
own word for that limitation on your sense. We could have all kinds
of intuitive influences beneath the threshold of our conscious
awareness which are in fact true beyond mere belief.
True is not opposed to belief. Sometimes some beliefs can be true.
But once a belief concerns a reality different from consciousness-
here-and-now, I don't see how we can be sure that any statement is
true, independently of their plausibility.
We can be failed on all dreamable content, except one (actual
You don't see how we can be sure, but that doesn't mean that we
can't have a sense for what is true.
That's my point. I knew we agree.
Insisting on only demonstrable certainty may itself dull your
intuitive sensitivities. Some epiphanies may in fact be too fragile
to be hammered into a Boolean ice cube tray. In my experience, it is
not uncommon at all to know more than we think we know, and it is
not uncommon to find that we know less also. If we are looking at
what consciousness really is about, I don't think that we can bias
only one or the other epistemological expectations.
Rather than assuming that belief is a logical stick model built up
It is not build up for nothing. It is an arithmetical relation
between a number, and some universal numbers.
But the relation is isolated within it's description. It has no
roots which extend beyond it's given definition within arithmetic.
The relation is isolated, like a brain in a vat, for Bp. (belief)
But it is no more related when Bp is conjuncted to truth, like a brain
in a vat which supports a person believing in galaxies, when the vat
belongs in a reality owning galaxies.
I think it makes more sense to see it as a local fog which
interferes with out larger grounding in the sense of eternity and
Knowledge does that. By linking belief with truth.
Our only contact with knowledge, belief, or truth is participatory
sense experience. If we ingest a chemical, our knowledge, beliefs,
and perhaps truths can change without benefit of logical
justification in our mind.
OK. This is rather normal in the comp setting.
We say: "Jim believed that Brussels was the capital of the USA, but
now, he know better".
We don't say "Jim knew that Brussels was the capital of the USA, but
now, he believed better".
That doesn't mean that the second statement isn't more accurate.
? This does not make sense, even in case Brussels is the capital of
When we communicate with others, we share a number of perceptual
inertial frames - ensembles of expectation on every level, from the
physical-biological to the psychological-cultural. It is natural to
treat the boundaries of these frames as if they were absolute, even
though from an absolute perspective, they are only local.
I'm not arguing for truth relativism though. Just the opposite. I
say that there would be truth relativism if truth was arithmetic
abstraction, forms or functions - but it isn't. Truth is concrete
sensory physical experience which permeates from universal to local
frames and local to universal frames.
You might confuse objective truth, which we can doubt and search, and
subjective truth, which are based on a non doubtable part
We can't bootstrap belief from inert conditions - sense and
participation are implicit and inherent in any discussion of
belief, whether we acknowledge it or not.
I study the case of machines believing in some limited number of
sentences in computer science, with some rules of reasoning, and
study what they can believe, known, observe, feel, etc. With precise
definition of each terms. It is testable, as comp predicts they will
believe in some precise physics that we can compare with nature, and
so we can refute comp+classical-epistemology.
As it is a very weak theory (comp is weak, and classical
epistemology too), its refutation would make us learning a lot. If
it is not refuted, then we have a much simpler theory of everything,
---simpler than the actual one, which is QM (+general relativity).
And the new theory explains the difference between qualia and
quanta, and this is a point where QM fails to address explicitly
the question, although with Everett it leans toward the comp theory.
Whether it's driven by comp or QM or GR, or classical-epistemology,
if it doesn't begin with a recognition of sensory-motor
participation, then it is a theory of an alien universe as far as I
Comp recognize consciousness, free will, sense, participation, but the
goal consists in explaining it from the working of some machine. You
beg the issue by asserting that this is not possible by referring to
your sense, but this begs the question.
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