On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 25 Feb 2013, at 20:10, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
> On 2/25/2013 1:26 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Feb 2013, at 01:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 24, 2013 3:07:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Yes. That something that the machine can prove and know.
>>
>>
>> How can we know what a machine can prove or know if our own knowledge is
>> only belief?
>>
>>
>> Because some time our beliefs are true.
>
>
> What does 'true' mean if we can only believe?
>
>
> We can't define that, but we have a lot of example.
>
> Suppose we meet and that I give you a slap. Then "Bruno gave a slap to
> Craig" would be true. It would not be true, if we meet, or not, and don't
> give you a slap.
>
> Dear Bruno and Craig,
>
>     The slap is a physical action. How was it defined? Bruno, the physical
> world that we perceive our bodies to be immersed in, is acting in this
> example as the definer of truth. Is this your intention?
>
>
> It was just an illustration. See our preceding conversation for where the
> physical reality emerge from, once we assume computationalism.
>
>
>
>
>
> When we believe something, it means that we believe that it is true, even
> when keeping in mind that it is a belief, and that we might be wrong, that
> is not true.
>
>
>     But there could exist a physical world different from the one we are in
>
>
> We are in infinities of computations, and the physical world emerges from
> that.
>
>
>
> that has an entity in it and there is a physical condition that validates
> the belief of that entity, no?
>
>
> That's correct, for the physical truth, which are epistemological in the
> comp setting.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> p is true means that it is the case that p, in the domain where p is
> supposed to be applied.
>
>
>     Can the domain be defined recursively?
>
>
> No.
>
>
>
> For example, what if p is the proposition that p' is experienced and p' is
> the proposition that p'' is experienced and ... ?
>
>
> I cannot parse this.
>
>
>
>
>
> If you believe that Obama is the president of the USA, it means that you
> believe that in our local geographico-historical situation, it is a true
> fact, even if you can have a doubt, because you might find conceivable to
> wake up, perhaps younger, and that Ronald Reagan is the president of the US.
> A black pothead being a president of America... that sound like a dream,
> after all.
>
>
>     A dream only for some...
>
>
>
>>
>> We can't know that, but we can still have sharable beliefs. By a sort of
>> informal habits, in most informal talk, we use very often the term "know"
>> for the beliefs based on quite common sharable assumption, like "O has a
>> successor", or the laws of addition and multiplication. But when thinking
>> rigorously *about* such kind of beliefs, we have to use the term belief. It
>> is simple: except for the consciousness here and now, we have only beliefs.
>
>
> I don't think it has to be that simple. You are only taking your own word
> for that limitation on your sense. We could have all kinds of intuitive
> influences beneath the threshold of our conscious awareness which are in
> fact true beyond mere belief.
>
>
> True is not opposed to belief. Sometimes some beliefs can be true.
>
>
>     ISTM that a belief is contingent on the existence of something that
> contains a representation of that belief,
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
> be it a human mind or a Platonic algorithm or whatever else may satisfy the
> role.
>
>
> No problem.
>
>
>
>
>
> But once a belief concerns a reality different from
> consciousness-here-and-now, I don't see how we can be sure that any
> statement is true, independently of their plausibility.
> We can be failed on all dreamable content, except one (actual
> consciousness).
>
>
>     If infinitely many physical worlds exist then there could be a 'reality'
> for each and every belief.
>
>
> That does not work. We belong automatically to an infinity of computations.
> With comp, the physical reality is unique, and derivable from 0, s, + and *
> (and the usual axioms). But cosmos or branch of a multiverse can be
> numerous, but before they differentiated, we are in all of them.
>

Bruno,

I am pleased that you believe that "With comp, the physical reality is
unique" because that is what I conclude in my paper "Dreams of a
Metaverse- Math///Mind -Matter Doubly Dualistic Loop-String Cosmology"
Richard
>
> I conjecture that most of those physical realities would be Boltzmann
> brains.
>
>
> We don't need them, arithmetic is enough. It contains the UD.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Rather than assuming that belief is a logical stick model built up from
> nothing,
>
>
> It is not build up for nothing. It is an arithmetical relation between a
> number, and some universal numbers.
>
>
>     No, Bruno. The fact that we can construct any number from the empty set
>
>
> I don't assume sets, at the base level.
>
>
>
> explicitly demands that we are building up things from nothing.
>
>
> You refer to one implementation of number in set theory. But we don't need
> that.
>
>
>
>
> This does not, IMHO, remove the 'reality' from them so long as the mutual
> agreement actions are possible.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
>
> I think it makes more sense to see it as a local fog which interferes with
> out larger grounding in the sense of eternity and totality.
>
>
> Knowledge does that. By linking belief with truth.
>
>
>     But where does the 'truth' obtain from if not a physical instance?
>
>
> It comes from arithmetical truth.
>
>
>
> It need not be ontological primitive, as a physical world could be defined
> as merely that which at least 3 observers can agree upon as being real.
>
>
> Not with comp. Physics is more solid than that. Infinities of observers can
> be wrong.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> We say: "Jim believed that Brussels was the capital of the USA, but now, he
> know better".
> We don't say "Jim knew that Brussels was the capital of the USA, but now, he
> believed better".
>
>
>     Careful that we don't define a word to have a property and then use the
> word to show the existence of that property. This is bootstrapping!
>
>
> This is not done here.
>
>
>
> This is something that can easily creep into any immaterialist ontology and
> ruin it (unless it is accounted for, like what Jon Barwise does in his
> work).
>
>
> We can't bootstrap belief from inert conditions - sense and participation
> are implicit and inherent in any discussion of belief, whether we
> acknowledge it or not.
>
>
> I study the case of machines believing in some limited number of sentences
> in computer science, with some rules of reasoning, and study what they can
> believe, known, observe, feel, etc. With precise definition of each terms.
> It is testable, as comp predicts they will believe in some precise physics
> that we can compare with nature, and so we can refute
> comp+classical-epistemology.
> As it is a very weak theory (comp is weak, and classical epistemology too),
> its refutation would make us learning a lot. If it is not refuted, then we
> have a much simpler theory of everything, ---simpler than the actual one,
> which is QM (+general relativity). And the new theory explains the
> difference between qualia and quanta, and this is a point where QM  fails to
> address explicitly the question, although with Everett it leans toward the
> comp theory.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>     We need to have a long discussion as to how the quanta emerges in such a
> way as to allow the appearance of a physical world (a 'reality') for
> multiple observers. I am assuming that an observer is defined as the
> intersection of infinitely many computations as per comp.
>
>
> See sane04 for a precise rendering on this, based on the first person
> statistics in the UD* or arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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