On Tuesday, February 26, 2013 7:15:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Feb 2013, at 21:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 25, 2013 12:53:47 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 25 Feb 2013, at 01:41, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> You'll forgive me if I don't jump at the chance to shell out $51.96 for >> 300+ pages of the same warmed over cog-sci behaviorism-cum-functionalism >> that I have been hearing from everyone. >> >> >> By making explicit the level of digital substitution, functionalism is >> made less trivial that in many accounts that you can find. And comp is >> stronger hypothesis that behavioral-mechanism (agnostic on zombie). >> > > To me it's like arguing Episcopalian vs Presbyterian. Sure, there are > differences, but the problem I have is that they all approach consciousness > from the outside in while failing to recognize that the idea of there being > an exterior to consciousness is only something which we have come to expect > through consciousness itself. > > > Computationalism explains consciousness from the inside. It explains > physics from inside as well, despite being refutable from the outside. > > It explains numerical relations which might remind us of consciousness, but where does computation actually become conscious? As I have pointed out, computation never even becomes geometry, let alone colors, flavors, feelings, etc. Comp has no need for consciousness or physics - you can see this in basic programming, where things like collision detection of avatars have to be intentionally defined. There is no physics inherent in a graphic avatar, and it has not preference for developing physics.