On 01 Mar 2013, at 16:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, March 1, 2013 10:23:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2013, at 01:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, February 28, 2013 5:37:50 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 2/28/2013 1:50 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You have no way of knowing what I can't know about you either.

You have no way of knowing what ways I have of knowing what you know about what ways John knows of having ways of knowing about what you can know...either. :-)

Brent
blather, n. strings of words in the form of assertions having no testable consequences.

Calling it blather doesn't change the fact that you can't make an omniscient claim against someone else's non-omniscience.

You are the one claiming knowing that all machines cannot think.

I don't know that all machines cannot think,

Thanks God.



but I understand why the reasons for assuming that they ever could are rooted in bad assumptions from the start.


Which bad assumption? You never give them without begging the question.



If we don't what consciousness actually is and what it does, then we skip the important part and reverse engineer a false confidence in unconscious programs.


And Bruno said, from Memory, in Sylvie and Bruno (Lewis Carroll): "I am so happy that I hate spinach, because, you know, if ever I could appreciate spinach, I guess I would eat some of them, and that is exactly what I would like never to think possible".

You beg the question again.

Betting that machine could be conscious does not entail that we know what consciousness is or rely on. You have a reductionist view of science, leading you to close prematurely an inquiry.

All rational computationalist are open to the falsity of comp, and what I show is that [comp + precise theory of knowledge] becomes refutable, so that we can progress.

But up to now, comp explains a lot of things, even if incorrect, notably the apparent many worlds, the quantum like logic of observation, the existence of non communicable truth and sensations, and eventually some non trivial Plotinian theology.

In a sense comp explains why first person are not machine, and only borrow them to say hello to others machines. Why would not some immaterial programs be able to support human first person?

I am not saying that this is true, only that it makes possible to formulate the mind problem, indeed to translate it into a problem in number theory.

Bruno



Craig



Bruno




Craig

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