On Saturday, March 2, 2013 6:40:44 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote: > > Craig: > > > > The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, that how another > > receiver of signs responds is irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one > > case of conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units; where you > > intend for knowledge to be conveyed. In that case, it is behooving of > > the sender to ensure that the receiver can receive and understand the > > message. >
I'm not sure what you are bringing up here, but I would say that my point is that all messages have multiple levels of reception, perhaps as many levels as their are receivers in the universe. At the same time, if we are assuming human senders and receivers and a content range which is highly normative and practical (i.e. Morse code alphabet rather than emoticons, inside jokes, etc), then the information entropy is reduced dramatically. Maybe you can give me an example of that you mean by the irrelevance of the receiver's knowledge. Does that include the expectation of the possibility of there being a receiver? > In all other cases, the recipient response is irrelevant; all > > values and measures originate in the sender of the message. > I would tend to agree with that, although the expectation of the recipient response informs the motives, values, and measures of the sender - otherwise there would be no message being sent. > > > The receiver of transmitted information is irrelevant to the mechanics > > of that transmission. > I'm not sure what you mean. Again, maybe an example would help. We expect that human audiences can see, so we have TV screens to provide optical stimulation. If we didn't have eyes, there would be no mechanism of TV. Craig > > > wrb > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.