On 3/4/2013 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Mar 2013, at 20:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/2/2013 11:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
So you admit that what you say contradicts the fact that you are
>intentionally saying it?
"Intentional", as far as I can understand its use in philosophy, is
more or less equivalent to "mental" or "conscious". You seem to take
it as an a priori fact that something that is either deterministic or
random cannot have intentionality. This seems to me obviously wrong.
Me too. Intentionality just consists in having a hierarchy of goals which drive
actions. To say something is done intentionally just means it is done pursuant to some
goal. When the Mars rover steers around rock it does so intentionally in order to
reach some place beyond which is a higher level goal.
I agree too, but of course some non-computationalist will argue that "intention" needs
consciousness (which i think is wrong), and that goal driven algorithm can be non
conscious (which i think is possible).
I am a bit astonished that some people still believe that indeterminacy can help for
free will.
Some randomness can be useful, if only to solve the problem of Buridan's ass. But
effective randomness is easy to come in the complex environment of life.
On the contrary, deterministic free will make sense, because free will comes from a lack
of self-determinacy, implying hesitation in front of different path, and
self-indeterminacy follows logically from determinism and self-reference.
First person indeterminacy can be used easily to convince oneself that indeterminacy
cannot help for free will. Iterating a self-duplication can't provide free-will.
As Dennett says deterministic free will is the only free will worth having. Why would
anyone want to make decisions that were not determined by their learning and memories and
values.
But based on your experience with salvia, Bruno, you seem to think there is a "you" which
is independent of those things. Isn't it more likely that the drug simply makes your
narrative thoughts less able than usual to trace their sources? So it is like the
Poincare' effect writ large?
Brent
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