On 04 Mar 2013, at 20:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/4/2013 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 03 Mar 2013, at 20:35, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/2/2013 11:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
So you admit that what you say contradicts the fact that you are
>intentionally saying it?
"Intentional", as far as I can understand its use in philosophy, is
more or less equivalent to "mental" or "conscious". You seem to take it as an a priori fact that something that is either deterministic or random cannot have intentionality. This seems to me obviously wrong.

Me too. Intentionality just consists in having a hierarchy of goals which drive actions. To say something is done intentionally just means it is done pursuant to some goal. When the Mars rover steers around rock it does so intentionally in order to reach some place beyond which is a higher level goal.

I agree too, but of course some non-computationalist will argue that "intention" needs consciousness (which i think is wrong), and that goal driven algorithm can be non conscious (which i think is possible).

I am a bit astonished that some people still believe that indeterminacy can help for free will.

Some randomness can be useful, if only to solve the problem of Buridan's ass.

I see what you mean, but some could argue that when you use a random device (like a coin) to make a decision, you abandon free will. Indeed you let a coin decide for you, when free will meant more that you are the one making the free decision.




But effective randomness is easy to come in the complex environment of life.

On the contrary, deterministic free will make sense, because free will comes from a lack of self-determinacy, implying hesitation in front of different path, and self-indeterminacy follows logically from determinism and self-reference.

First person indeterminacy can be used easily to convince oneself that indeterminacy cannot help for free will. Iterating a self- duplication can't provide free-will.

As Dennett says deterministic free will is the only free will worth having.

I agree with him on that. My pint above illustrate that. Random choice are not really "free" choice.


Why would anyone want to make decisions that were not determined by their learning and memories and values.

Indeed. But even more when they feel such value as being universal or close to universal.



But based on your experience with salvia, Bruno, you seem to think there is a "you" which is independent of those things.

Not just salvia. The 8 hypostases describes already a "you" (with 8 views), which are more (semantically) and less (bodily or syntactically) than memory. The value are not necessarily part of the memory (as opposed to their instantiations). Salvia can help to illustrate this in a vivid way, by an hallucination of remembering having been that kind of things for all time.

It is comparable to the realization that you don't die when you stop doing something which was part of what you take as an important personality trait, like when people succeed in stopping tobacco. They can remind how they felt and were before taking tobacco, for example.


Isn't it more likely that the drug simply makes your narrative thoughts less able than usual to trace their sources? So it is like the Poincare' effect writ large?

I am not sure. Perhaps. If you make that idea more precise, I might concur. Is it consistent with what I just say here?

Bruno



Brent



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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