On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:07:00 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:
>
> The fact that a machine can act in a discriminatory based 
>
> upon some signal (sign, information) input is demonstration 
>
> of value judgment.
>

Only in our eyes, not in its own eyes. It's like telling a kid to say some 
insult to someone in another language. The fact they are able to carry out 
your instruction doesn't mean that they communicated with judgment.
 

>  
>
> Just as there is no **in** in a machine, so to there is no **in** 
>
> in a biological organism; they both, machine and organism, 
>

But there is an 'in' with respect to the experience of an organism - only 
because we know it first hand. There would seem to be no reason why a 
machine couldn't have a similar 'in', but it actually seems that their 
nature indicates they do not. I take the extra step and hypothesize exactly 
why that is - because experience is not generated out of the bodies 
associated with them, but rather the bodies are simply a public view of one 
aspect of the experience. If you build a machine, you are assembling bodies 
to relate to each other, as external forms, so that no interiority 
'emerges' from the gaps between them.
 

> are forms that treat other forms in certain proscribed ways.
>
>  
>
> You cannot demonstrate otherwise.
>

Sure I can. Feelings, colors, personalities, intentions, historical 
zeitgeists...these are not forms relating to forms.

Craig
 

>  
>
> wrb
>
>  
>
> *From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:> [mailto:
> everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>] *On Behalf Of *Craig Weinberg
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 05, 2013 10:37 AM
> *To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>
> *Subject:* Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information
>
>  
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, March 5, 2013 3:53:31 AM UTC-5, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Let´s say that what we call "information" is an extended form of sensory 
> input. What makes this input "information" is the usability of this input 
> for reducing the internal entropy of the receiver or increase the internal 
> order. The receiver can be a machine, a cell, a person or a society for 
> example. If the input do not produce this effect in the receiver, then that 
> input is not information.
>
>
> The increase of internal order of the receiver is a symptom of an 
> experience of being informed but they are not the same thing. It's not 
> really even relevant in most cases. I would not call it an extended form of 
> sensory input, but a reduction of sensory experience. Input is not a 
> physical reality, it is a conceptual label.
>
> Consider Blindsight:
>
> I hold up two fingers and ask how many fingers? 
>
> "I don't know.'
>
> Guess
>
> 'two'.
>
> This example tells us about information without tying it to decreased 
> entropy. My two fingers are a form. I am putting them into that form, so 
> the process of my presenting my fingers is a formation of a sign. 
>
> The sign is not information at this point. It means something different to 
> an ant or a frog than it does to a person looking at it. If you can't see, 
> there is no formation there at all unless you can collide with my fingers.
>
> When the patient responds that they don't know how many fingers, it is 
> because they personally have no experience of seeing it. They are not being 
> informed personally by the form of my fingers in front of their face 
> because they have blindsight.
>
> When they guess correctly, they still have not been informed. Only we know 
> that the information is correct. At this point you could say that there is 
> some decrease in information entropy of the receiver as far as we are 
> concerned, but in fact, for the receiver themselves, they have not 
> increased any internal order.
>
> A machine has blindsight about everything. They can be queried and produce 
> valid responses to inform us, but they are never informed themselves. There 
> is no 'in' in a machine, it is an organization of forms which treat other 
> forms in a proscribed way. Forms are copied, transformed, and presented in 
> a context that it has no experience of. My computer sees nothing that I see 
> on this screen. It reads nothing that I type here. It doesn't know what the 
> Everything List is - not even Google knows what it is - only that the 
> string of characters in the name is to be associated with an ip address.
>
> Craig
>
>  
>
> 2013/3/2 William R. Buckley <bill.b...@gmail.com>
>
>
> >Thinking about how information content of a message
>
> Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but
> exactly one exception, an envelope.
>
> I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer regarding a
> statement in his book Biosemiotics, that information
> is represented but not contained in that representation.
> That marks of chalk upon slate may be taken to represent
> information at a meta level above the reality of streaks
> of a deformed amorphous solid has nothing to do with
> the information represented by that deformation, nor the
> increase of entropy associated with the greater disorder
> obtained from that deformation; these are but three of
> the *informations* to be found upon review of those
> streaks.  Entropy is how nature sees information (not
> yet an established fact but I think the tea leaves read
> clear enough) but that has (presumably) nothing to do
> with how intelligent individuals see information, or
> as von Uexküll called such phenomena, signs.
>
> Most definitely the information is not to be found
> within the material of its expression, its representation.
> Rather, the information is already to be found within the
> interpreter.
>
> That which is information is so by virtue of the acceptor
> of that information; else, it is noise.
>
> And, write the information on a piece of paper and seal
> the paper within an envelope and you may justifiably
> claim that the information is contained; else, you are
> deluding yourself.
>
>
> >has an inversely proportionate relationship with the
> >capacity of sender and receiver to synchronize with
> >each other.
> >
>
> ....<snip>
>
> wrb
>
>
>
>
>  
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> -- 
> Alberto. 
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