On Thursday, March 7, 2013 8:19:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Mar 2013, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I understand where you are coming from in MGA now, Bruno, and again there 
> is nothing wrong with your reasoning, but in that your initial assumptions 
> are not the universe that we live in.
>
>
> ?
>
> (the assumption of the whole reasoning is just comp. Then in MGA i make 
> some local assumption to make a point, but they are discharged before 
> getting the conclusion).
>

Right. It's the comp where the assumptions are which don't match our 
universe. I don't have any particular problem with what you add to it - you 
make perfect sense if comp were true... but comp can't be true, so it 
doesn't matter.

 

>
>
>
>
> Let me give you a thought experiment that might give you a sense of where 
> I see the assumptions jump to the wrong conclusion.
>
> Suppose Alice didn't have an energetic particle to save her logic misfire 
> and she ended up confusing her own name with Alison. Nobody tried to 
> correct her use of her own name, so people assumed that she has begun using 
> a new name, or that one of the two names was just a nickname. As she went 
> about her business over the next several years, opening new accounts and 
> receiving mail as Alison, she had essentially lost her old name, except for 
> the very closest family members and government records which retained 
> unambiguous reference to Alice. 
>
> Now suppose a more catastrophic event happens with many of her logic 
> gates. Every name that she has ever heard is now switched in her memory. 
> Instead of Romeo and Juliet, her star-crossed lovers are Pizza-Foot and 
> Sycorax. Instead of Charlie Brown and Snoopy, she remembers those 
> characters as Baron Von Slouchcousin and Pimento. The stories are otherwise 
> in-tact of course. The function of the characters is identical.
>
> As the brain parts keep failing and then coming back online, all of the 
> content of history and fiction have become hopelessly scrambled, but the 
> stories and information are undamaged. Star Wars takes place in Egypt. 
> Queen Elizabeth was named Treewort and lives in the trunk of a 2003 Mazda 
> but otherwise the succession of the British throne is clearly understood. 
>
> As luck would have it, the problem with her name interpreter was mirrored 
> by a problem in her output modules, which translates all of her twisted 
> names into the expected ones, effectively undoing her malfunction as far as 
> anyone else is concerned. There is no problem for her socially, and no 
> problem for her psychologically, as she does not suspect any malfunction, 
> and neither does anyone else.
>
> Who is the British monarch? Elizabeth or Treewort? Is there a difference 
> between the two?
>
> It comes down to exploring the reality of proprietary vs generic, or 
> qualitative vs quantitative identity. In math - all identities are generic 
> and interchangeable. A name is not a name of what is being named (which is 
> a real and unique natural presence), but a label which refers to another 
> label or variable (which is not a presence but a figure persisting by 
> axiom-fiat). Using this quantitative framework, all entities are assumed to 
> be built up from these starchy mechanical axioms, so that a name is simply 
> a character string used for naming - it has no proprietary content. When a 
> computer does do proprietary content, it doesn't look like Harry or Jane, 
> it looks like ct1000068612 - now that means something to a computer. If it 
> can be assumed that the label matches some serial number or address, then 
> it is a good name. In no case is the computer able to value a name in any 
> other way. It has no way of knowing if Buckingham Palace is a better place 
> to live than in the trunk of an old car, as long as the digits fulfill the 
> same functional role, they are the same.
>
> In reality however, maybe nothing is 'the same'? Maybe there aren't any 
> shortcuts or simulations which can make something which is not us into us?
>
>
> Comp does not exclude such a possibility. There are (in the arithmetical 
> truth) infinitely many processes which can be simulated only by themselves, 
> having no shortcut, and that might indeed play some role in cosmology, and 
> even consciousness or in the stability of conscious experience. Open 
> problems.
>

Cool. Why is it still a computation though?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, March 6, 2013 11:37:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi, 
>>
>>
>> I have promised to let you know when I explain the MGA, actually a new   
>> version, in the FOAR list of Russell Standish. 
>>
>> Well we have begun two days ago. Sorry for this delay. 
>>
>> Note that MGA has already been explained in this list. 
>> See for example: 
>> http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html 
>>
>> Feel free to participate on the FOAR list, if you have still problem   
>> with it. 
>>
>> You might should, as it is a subtle point, and I am just progressing   
>> on it, notably through such discussion. 
>>
>> Best, 
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>
>>
>>
>>
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