On Thursday, March 7, 2013 4:15:21 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
> I must disagree. It is baked into the topology of classical mechanics
>> that a system cannot semantically act upon itself. There is no way to
>> define intentionality in classical physics. This is what Bruno proves with
>> his argument.
> Exactly Stephen. What are we talking about here? How is a deterministic
> system that has preferences and makes choices and considers options
> different from free will. If something can have a private preference which
> cannot be determined from the outside, then it is determined privately,
> i.e. the will of the private determiner.
> As I said, it depends on how you define "free will".
How do you think it should be defined?
> It is also not logically inconsistent with choice and free will, unless
>> you define these terms as inconsistent with determinism, in which case in a
>> deterministic world we would have to create new words meaning pseudo-choice
>> and pseudo-free will to avoid misunderstanding, and then go about our
>> business as usual with this minor change to the language.
>> So you say...
> Yeah, right. Why would a deterministic world need words having anything to
> do with choice or free will? At what part of a computer program is
> something like a choice made? Every position on the logic tree is connected
> to every other by unambiguous prior cause or intentionally generated
> (pseudo) randomness. It makes no choices, has no preferences, just follows
> a sequence of instructions.
> In general, the existence of words for something does not mean it has an
> actual referent; consider "fairy" or "God".
It's not clear that 'actual' is an actual referent.
> An adequate response to your position is that you're right - we don't
> really have choices. Another response is that your definition of "choice"
> is not the only possible one.
Another response is "I concede."
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