On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 02:54:59PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, March 7, 2013 5:21:48 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> >
> > Hi Craig, 
> >
> >      Excellent post! You have nailed computational immaterialism where 
> > it really hurts. Computations cannot see, per the Turing neo-Platonists, 
> > any hardward at all. This is their view of computational universality. 
> > But here in the thing, it is the reason why they have a 'body problem'. 
> > For a Platonistic Machine, there is no hardware or physical world at 
> > all. So, why do I have the persistent illusion that I am in a body and 
> > interacting with another computation via its body? 
> >
> >      The physical delusion is the thin client, to use your words and 
> > discussion. 
> >
> 
> Thanks Stephen!
> 
> Right, if we were just logging into accounts in Platonia, where does a body 
> illusion come in handy?
> 
> Craig
> 

It is required to resolve the "Occam catastrophe" (see my book for an
explanation). It is therefore quite likely that the "body illusion" is
essential for consciousness. If it weren't, then COMP (and indeed
idealism in general) has some serious explainin' to do. 

-- 

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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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