On 3/7/2013 4:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 08/03/2013, at 2:43 AM, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:

Yes, we know that classical determinism is wrong, but it is not logically 
inconsistent with consciousness.
     I must disagree. It is baked into the topology of classical mechanics that 
a system cannot semantically act upon itself. There is no way to define 
intentionality in classical physics. This is what Bruno proves with his 
argument.
To act on itself, as far as I can understand it, would mean to be uncaused or truly 
random, which is indeed incompatible with determinism. But why should that have anything 
to do with "intentionality"?

Hi Stathis,

If I follow Bruno correctly, he is telling us that numbers can literally act upon themselves, via the Godel bewsbar or numbering. I don't see how his idea works... Maybe I am missing something, but we are told that in Platonia there is no time nor physicality, thus your point is well made iff we are talking about a material or immaterial monist ontology. What I am exploring is a dual aspect theory that allows for minds to act on bodies and bodies to act on minds in a symmetric way. As Pratt explains it in http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf , this leads to the appearance of bodies acting on bodies and minds acting on minds in a sequential order.


It is also not logically inconsistent with choice and free will,  unless you 
define these terms as inconsistent with determinism, in which case in a 
deterministic world we would have to create new words meaning pseudo-choice and 
pseudo-free will to avoid misunderstanding, and then go about our business as 
usual with this minor change to the language.
     So you say...
Which part do you disagree with? That people can define free will differently? 
Or that people wouldn't care if they learned that under a particular definition 
they lack free will?


People are free to be inconsistent with facts all day... Nature does not care about our words and their definitions. The fact is that at least I have a persistent illusion that I can veto the potentials that build up in the neurons in my brain. How does materialism answer that fact? Dennett himself stopped after claiming that consciousness, and thus free will, is an illusion but didn't notice that the illusion need explained.

--
Onward!

Stephen


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