On 3/7/2013 4:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 08/03/2013, at 2:43 AM, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
Yes, we know that classical determinism is wrong, but it is not logically
inconsistent with consciousness.
I must disagree. It is baked into the topology of classical mechanics that
a system cannot semantically act upon itself. There is no way to define
intentionality in classical physics. This is what Bruno proves with his
To act on itself, as far as I can understand it, would mean to be uncaused or truly
random, which is indeed incompatible with determinism. But why should that have anything
to do with "intentionality"?
If I follow Bruno correctly, he is telling us that numbers can
literally act upon themselves, via the Godel bewsbar or numbering. I
don't see how his idea works... Maybe I am missing something, but we are
told that in Platonia there is no time nor physicality, thus your point
is well made iff we are talking about a material or immaterial monist
What I am exploring is a dual aspect theory that allows for minds
to act on bodies and bodies to act on minds in a symmetric way. As Pratt
explains it in http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf , this leads to
the appearance of bodies acting on bodies and minds acting on minds in a
It is also not logically inconsistent with choice and free will, unless you
define these terms as inconsistent with determinism, in which case in a
deterministic world we would have to create new words meaning pseudo-choice and
pseudo-free will to avoid misunderstanding, and then go about our business as
usual with this minor change to the language.
So you say...
Which part do you disagree with? That people can define free will differently?
Or that people wouldn't care if they learned that under a particular definition
they lack free will?
People are free to be inconsistent with facts all day... Nature
does not care about our words and their definitions. The fact is that at
least I have a persistent illusion that I can veto the potentials that
build up in the neurons in my brain. How does materialism answer that
fact? Dennett himself stopped after claiming that consciousness, and
thus free will, is an illusion but didn't notice that the illusion need
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