On 3/7/2013 3:24 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/7/2013 4:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 08/03/2013, at 2:43 AM, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
To act on itself, as far as I can understand it, would mean to be uncaused or truly
random, which is indeed incompatible with determinism. But why should that have
anything to do with "intentionality"?
Yes, we know that classical determinism is wrong, but it is not logically
inconsistent with consciousness.
I must disagree. It is baked into the topology of classical mechanics that a
system cannot semantically act upon itself. There is no way to define intentionality
in classical physics. This is what Bruno proves with his argument.
If I follow Bruno correctly, he is telling us that numbers can literally act upon
themselves, via the Godel bewsbar or numbering. I don't see how his idea works... Maybe
I am missing something, but we are told that in Platonia there is no time nor
physicality, thus your point is well made iff we are talking about a material or
immaterial monist ontology.
What I am exploring is a dual aspect theory that allows for minds to act on bodies
and bodies to act on minds in a symmetric way.
How is this any different than saying mind is what a brain does. They physical processes
of the brain and the psychological processes of the mind are just different levels of
talking about the same thing.
As Pratt explains it in http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf , this leads to the
appearance of bodies acting on bodies and minds acting on minds in a sequential order.
Which part do you disagree with? That people can define free will differently? Or that
people wouldn't care if they learned that under a particular definition they lack free
It is also not logically inconsistent with choice and free will, unless you define
these terms as inconsistent with determinism, in which case in a deterministic world
we would have to create new words meaning pseudo-choice and pseudo-free will to avoid
misunderstanding, and then go about our business as usual with this minor change to
So you say...
People are free to be inconsistent with facts all day... Nature does not care about
our words and their definitions. The fact is that at least I have a persistent illusion
that I can veto the potentials that build up in the neurons in my brain. How does
materialism answer that fact? Dennett himself stopped after claiming that consciousness,
and thus free will, is an illusion but didn't notice that the illusion need explained.
He didn't say free will was an illusion - he said the only will worth wanting was
compatible with determinism.
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