That's interesting to me too. Actually I'm surprised you are not more
embracing of Bruno's ideas because they give life to the idea of conscious
software. You seem to me to be reluctant to give up materialism, but
philosophically speaking I think materialism dooms AI.

On the more theoretical side of things, I will say this. It occurred to me
the other day that the trace of the UD (aka UD*) is a fractal, in that many
of the programs executed by the UD are themselves universal dovetailers. It
is reminiscent of the Mandelbrot set, in that there are many such paths (an
infinite number) that replicate the UD but alter it in some small way.
Every program generated by the UD in fact is replicated an infinite number
of times, and also altered slightly an infinite number of times. I wonder
if there are clues to the measure problem hidden in the fractal
characteristics of the UD*. But that's wild-ass speculation. I don't have
the mathematical chops to take that idea any further.


On Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 11:46 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

>  On 3/7/2013 11:37 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Ah. That's above my pay grade unfortunately. But I don't think our
> immediate failure to solve that problem dooms the idea that a cat's
> experience of the world is explainable in terms of mechanism. Conversely,
> even if we did solve it, there would still be doubts. For the time being,
> comp remains for me the most fruitful assumption about reality, such as it
> is. It assumes so little and opens up such incredible vistas.
>
>  Terren
>
>
> Hi,
>
>     I agree. I think that it becomes more open to applications once it is
> aligned with, say, David Chalmers and Ben Goertzel's ideas. I am interested
> in applications <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qnd-hdmgfk>. ;-)
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 11:17 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>
>>  On 3/7/2013 10:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> I'm game. Which puzzle are we figuring out?
>>
>>
>>      A solution to Bruno's 'arithmetic body problem'.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to