On Friday, March 8, 2013 1:35:12 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>
> On 07 Mar 2013, at 17:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>
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> On Thursday, March 7, 2013 8:19:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 06 Mar 2013, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> I understand where you are coming from in MGA now, Bruno, and again there 
>> is nothing wrong with your reasoning, but in that your initial assumptions 
>> are not the universe that we live in.
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>> (the assumption of the whole reasoning is just comp. Then in MGA i make 
>> some local assumption to make a point, but they are discharged before 
>> getting the conclusion).
>>
>
> Right. It's the comp where the assumptions are which don't match our 
> universe.
>
>
> "our universe"? That's more an object of enquiry than a something I would 
> take for granted. 
>

I don't find the notion of a shared universe especially controversial. What 
leads you to draw away from it?


>
>
> I don't have any particular problem with what you add to it - you make 
> perfect sense if comp were true... but comp can't be true, so it doesn't 
> matter.
>
>
>
> You say often that comp can't be true, but when will you say no to a 
> doctor proposing very little protheses in the brain, and then bigger one.
>

I would feel the same about replacing body parts. The more that's being 
replaced, the more I want to say no.
 

> Also, nothing in the brain seems to be not Turing emulable. 
>

Nothing that is examined with Turing emulable instruments can seem other 
than Turing emulable. Once we engage in the world as a body, and uses 
instruments which extend our body's sense organs, then we have amplified 
our instrumental view of the world as public-objects-divided-by-space. What 
is gained is gained at the expense of our natural orientation as 
private-experiences-united-through-time, which atrophies under our own 
reflected gaze as outsiders. Indeed, once you map the self as a brain, then 
the map fits into any other map, but you can't get that map back into a 
self without losing the Turing emulable knowledge and control. They are 
mutually exclusive, just as private and public are mutually exclusive.
 

> Comp is without doubt a strong hypothesis, with counter-intuitive 
> consequences, 
>

The consequences don't bother me, Comp just happens to be incorrect because 
it mistakes forms and functions for that which experiences and participates 
through forms and functions.
 

> but non-comp is a vague label for theories which are never presented. As I 
> try to explain, many things you say make sense from a computationalist 
> perspective, so it is weird you believe so much that comp can't be true.
>

Non-comp is a weird label...sounds like it must have been coined by Comp 
fanciers. Something like 'Natural' sounds better to me. Before we imagined 
that we could stitch a living mind on a very large pillowcase, we imagined 
that we were natural persons, irreducible to smaller parts.


>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Let me give you a thought experiment that might give you a sense of where 
>> I see the assumptions jump to the wrong conclusion.
>>
>> Suppose Alice didn't have an energetic particle to save her logic misfire 
>> and she ended up confusing her own name with Alison. Nobody tried to 
>> correct her use of her own name, so people assumed that she has begun using 
>> a new name, or that one of the two names was just a nickname. As she went 
>> about her business over the next several years, opening new accounts and 
>> receiving mail as Alison, she had essentially lost her old name, except for 
>> the very closest family members and government records which retained 
>> unambiguous reference to Alice. 
>>
>> Now suppose a more catastrophic event happens with many of her logic 
>> gates. Every name that she has ever heard is now switched in her memory. 
>> Instead of Romeo and Juliet, her star-crossed lovers are Pizza-Foot and 
>> Sycorax. Instead of Charlie Brown and Snoopy, she remembers those 
>> characters as Baron Von Slouchcousin and Pimento. The stories are otherwise 
>> in-tact of course. The function of the characters is identical.
>>
>> As the brain parts keep failing and then coming back online, all of the 
>> content of history and fiction have become hopelessly scrambled, but the 
>> stories and information are undamaged. Star Wars takes place in Egypt. 
>> Queen Elizabeth was named Treewort and lives in the trunk of a 2003 Mazda 
>> but otherwise the succession of the British throne is clearly understood. 
>>
>> As luck would have it, the problem with her name interpreter was mirrored 
>> by a problem in her output modules, which translates all of her twisted 
>> names into the expected ones, effectively undoing her malfunction as far as 
>> anyone else is concerned. There is no problem for her socially, and no 
>> problem for her psychologically, as she does not suspect any malfunction, 
>> and neither does anyone else.
>>
>> Who is the British monarch? Elizabeth or Treewort? Is there a difference 
>> between the two?
>>
>> It comes down to exploring the reality of proprietary vs generic, or 
>> qualitative vs quantitative identity. In math - all identities are generic 
>> and interchangeable. A name is not a name of what is being named (which is 
>> a real and unique natural presence), but a label which refers to another 
>> label or variable (which is not a presence but a figure persisting by 
>> axiom-fiat). Using this quantitative framework, all entities are assumed to 
>> be built up from these starchy mechanical axioms, so that a name is simply 
>> a character string used for naming - it has no proprietary content. When a 
>> computer does do proprietary content, it doesn't look like Harry or Jane, 
>> it looks like ct1000068612 - now that means something to a computer. If it 
>> can be assumed that the label matches some serial number or address, then 
>> it is a good name. In no case is the computer able to value a name in any 
>> other way. It has no way of knowing if Buckingham Palace is a better place 
>> to live than in the trunk of an old car, as long as the digits fulfill the 
>> same functional role, they are the same.
>>
>> In reality however, maybe nothing is 'the same'? Maybe there aren't any 
>> shortcuts or simulations which can make something which is not us into us?
>>
>>
>> Comp does not exclude such a possibility. There are (in the arithmetical 
>> truth) infinitely many processes which can be simulated only by themselves, 
>> having no shortcut, and that might indeed play some role in cosmology, and 
>> even consciousness or in the stability of conscious experience. Open 
>> problems.
>>
>
> Cool. Why is it still a computation though?
>
>
> Because there is a program, perhaps even small, which generates such a 
> process or such processes, (which is so rich that the only way to emulate 
> it is in running it). Typically constructive definition of quantum vacuum, 
> and universal dovetailing belongs to that category. The UD generates some 
> computations which we can't figure out if they will stop or not, and we can 
> only "look" at them to see, if ever, they will stop, for example.
>

Maybe the experience of not knowing compels the program as a simple record 
keeping system, and not the other way around. 

Craig


> Bruno
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>
>
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> Craig
>  
>
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>> Bruno
>>
>>
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>> Craig
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>>
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>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2013 11:37:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi, 
>>>
>>>
>>> I have promised to let you know when I explain the MGA, actually a new   
>>> version, in the FOAR list of Russell Standish. 
>>>
>>> Well we have begun two days ago. Sorry for this delay. 
>>>
>>> Note that MGA has already been explained in this list. 
>>> See for example: 
>>> http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html 
>>>
>>> Feel free to participate on the FOAR list, if you have still problem   
>>> with it. 
>>>
>>> You might should, as it is a subtle point, and I am just progressing   
>>> on it, notably through such discussion. 
>>>
>>> Best, 
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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