On 11 Mar 2013, at 18:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 11, 2013 1:27:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2013, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 11, 2013 8:43:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Mar 2013, at 15:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 10, 2013 4:33:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Mar 2013, at 01:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, March 9, 2013 7:26:25 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 3/9/2013 4:06 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, March 9, 2013 6:30:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Craig Weinberg
<whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> They are not powerless to stop them since if someone yells,
"Hey, stop!"
>> they may stop. This is the case even though the process is
still
>> deterministic or probabilistic.
>
>
> In a deterministic universe, a person who is determined to
steal a car will
> steal it regardless of whether someone yells at them. If
someone yelling at
> the thief creates an opportunity for the them to exercise free
will over
> their own actions, then it is not a deterministic universe.
You can yell at
> a stone rolling down a hill as much as you want and there will
be no change
> in where the stone rolls.
In a deterministic universe it is determined whether the thief
will
stop if someone yells at him. However, neither the person
yelling nor
the thief knows for sure whether he will stop or not.
What difference would it make to them if neither the person
yelling nor the thief can control whether or not they are
yelling or stealing?
It will make exactly whatever difference is determined (or random).
You're not getting my point. If you say that the boat doesn't
exist, why would it matter if it has a hole in it or not?
I don't know whether or not a puddle in the gutter will dry out
or not overnight, but why would that generate some sort of
interest to me?
Furthermore, it
is not possible to know for sure if the thief will stop or not
even
with a perfect model of his brain, due to the nature of classical
chaotic systems.
It doesn't matter because in a deterministic universe it would
be impossible to care whether the thief would stop or not.
Unless it was determined that you would care, in which case it
would impossible not to care. That's what deterministic means,
things are *determined*.
Why would there be a such thing as "care" in a deterministic
universe? I don't think it is defensible that it could. If *all
things are determined* then there can be no "care".
Everything is determined does not entail that *you* can determine
everything.
But it does entail that we cannot determine anything. That's my
point, is that care can only arise out of the possibility of
determining something ourselves, just as the idea of a game can
only arise out of the possibility of participation. Without that
possibility of direct participation, the whole ontological basis
of "care" is nullified as "clouds" would be nullified in the
absence of the possibility of atmosphere.
OK, but then you agree that the "universe" can be entirely
deterministic, and determined (perhaps only in God eyes), and yet
we have still free will, due to the fact that "we" cannot determine
everything. this will be in general the case when we are confronted
with machine as complex, or more complex than ourselves.
No, it doesn't make sense to me that there would be a highly valued
qualia of free will (and highly charged qualia of responsibility)
if our participation did not actually contribute causally in
determining the universe.
But our participation do actually contribute, causally indeed, in
determining the universe. It is real genuine high level causation,
capable of reflecting our values and our deepest beliefs.
What does it mean to contribute causally to a deterministic process
though? What contribution does the stone make to its rolling down
hill?
I have no evidence that a stone support a will relatively to its
environment. I was not talking about stones, but about computers.
A free spectator in a deterministic machine can feel no
responsibility or presence.
Not only a machine (the person supervening on a machine) can feel
responsibility, but that person can be responsible.
Why should there be any such feeling even possible in the universe
as 'responsibility' under determinism? Who feels responsible for the
rolling stone?
I was watching a CGI cartoon this morning and was noticing that the
sterility of the medium must be fought every step of the way by the
animators to inject some warmth and character. The digital medium
is not neutral, it is anesthetically biased. Because computation is
devoid both of the gravity of realism
You betray a naive conception of computations.
I would say that my analysis is more rooted in aesthetic and
experiential qualities rather than conceptual evaluations of
computation. I look at what all CGI has in common, and how that
differs from what other forms of animation, or film, or reality have
in common.
You can rely only on 3p behavior. Once a machine is allowed to look
inward, his behavior can become very complex, and involve non
communicable truth. Nobody says that all computations support
consciousness, but that some might.
and the vitality of animation, the CGI animator must compensate
with low level visual distractions at all times - plugging the
holes in the audience's experience with lots of clever details.
I am not talking about today's machine, but about what is Turing
emulable in principle.
Emulation is a theory or an assumption. I don't think that it holds
up. Emulation is always limited to observations of observations, not
realities.
You might be right. The point is that you might be false, also.
What is not Turing emulable in your theory.
The only thing that is Turing emulable is public positions in space.
Nothing private is emulable.
But here you are provably false. Self-referential machines have
private life, in the sense that they too can refer to sense and
uncommunicable true knowledge. You just decide that they have not the
right shape, and that looks like a form of racism.
Don't answer with "sense", because the simplest theory of machine's
sense makes them also non Turing emulable. The non Turing
emulability of sense is not an argument against comp, it is a
correct intuition that machine can have about themselves, when
looking inward.
If you study computer science, you can understand that most
attribute of machine are more complex notion than computation and
Turing emulability.
Machines are such that the whole can be far more complex and rich
than any of the parts, or the disjoint union of the parts.
Complexity and richness aren't enough to suggest any kind of
participation or perception.
The modal logics, invented to study qualities, suggest the contrary.
Negative assertions seems premature to me, here.
What would it take to make it not seem that way?
I don't know.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
>> A court would not let you off if you got an expert witness in
to say that
>> you were not responsible for your crime due to the way your
brain works.
>> This is not because the judge does not believe the expert
witness, it is
>> because brain physics is not relevant to the question of
responsibility for
>> a crime.
>
>
> When a suspect pleads insanity, they are saying precisely that
the brain
> physics is relevant to the question of responsibility for a
crime. An expert
> witness who can establish that you have a tumor in an area of
your brain
> which is associated with impulse control will have a very good
chance of
> convincing a judge that brain physics is indeed relevant.
Mentally ill people don't have different brain *physics*.
Splitting hairs. Using English words in a nonsense order may
technically be *English* but it is still a language problem.
If the brain
is deterministic in a well person it is deterministic in a
mentally
ill person as well. The difference is that the mentally ill
person may
not be able to (deterministically) respond to certain situations
in
the way a well person will (deterministically) respond to them.
Judges
are usually quite intelligent people and I expect that most of
them
are aware that everything in the world must be either determined
or
random, but they still make their judgements despite this.
No judge could make any judgment against a person if they really
believed that everything must be determined or random. That
would mean that their judgments would also be deterministic or
random, so that they would not be a judge at all, but rather a
pawn of "inevitable and necessary consequences of antecedent
states of affairs."
Judgment is impossible under determinism.
Unless it's determined, in which case non-judgement is impossible.
You are confusing determinism with omnipotent magic.
Craig
Brent
Craig
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