On 12 Mar 2013, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 9:20:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Mar 2013, at 18:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

What does it mean to contribute causally to a deterministic process though? What contribution does the stone make to its rolling down hill?

I have no evidence that a stone support a will relatively to its environment. I was not talking about stones, but about computers.

Computers are fuzzy though, because we can always point to an open ended future of possibility. Stones are a better example to work with because of the absurd simplicity. Any understanding about determinism should be clearer there. A computer is informed by human will, so it is really a bad example of determinism.


What is that for a kind of reasoning?

"I will show you that computer cannot be conscious, but as computer are complex man made machine, I will show you this for my fridge instead". Come on Craig.














A free spectator in a deterministic machine can feel no responsibility or presence.

Not only a machine (the person supervening on a machine) can feel responsibility, but that person can be responsible.

Why should there be any such feeling even possible in the universe as 'responsibility' under determinism? Who feels responsible for the rolling stone?



I was watching a CGI cartoon this morning and was noticing that the sterility of the medium must be fought every step of the way by the animators to inject some warmth and character. The digital medium is not neutral, it is anesthetically biased. Because computation is devoid both of the gravity of realism

You betray a naive conception of computations.

I would say that my analysis is more rooted in aesthetic and experiential qualities rather than conceptual evaluations of computation. I look at what all CGI has in common, and how that differs from what other forms of animation, or film, or reality have in common.

You can rely only on 3p behavior. Once a machine is allowed to look inward, his behavior can become very complex, and involve non communicable truth. Nobody says that all computations support consciousness, but that some might.

How do you know the machine looks inward at all?

A machine can invoke herself and represent herself in different possible situation. That self-reference is made possible by a theorem in computer science (Kleene's second recursion theorem). I have explained and will re-explain on FOAR. It is sump up by the Dx = "xx" trick. If DA gives "AA", DD gives "DD".





If I watch a movie, it might look like characters are being introspective, but that has nothing to do with the video screen or DVD player.

It is a branch of math, and we reason from what we know. Character in a movie have no self-referential abilities at all, and there is no computation involved in the movie projection (or a trivial one). In the frame of the content of the movie, the character have self- referential abilities, in the sense that we can locally attribute them such, for appreciating the plot, but we tend to believe they have not (if not we would find all horror drama being inhuman and forbid them).













and the vitality of animation, the CGI animator must compensate with low level visual distractions at all times - plugging the holes in the audience's experience with lots of clever details.

I am not talking about today's machine, but about what is Turing emulable in principle.

Emulation is a theory or an assumption. I don't think that it holds up. Emulation is always limited to observations of observations, not realities.

You might be right. The point is that you might be false, also.

OK.

That was my point. But then why do you assert that comp is false.




Another possibility is that how true or false it seems depends on the intentions and awareness of the person asking.

This escapes the conclusion. The consciousness of someone with a digital brain will not depend on what other can think and ask, even if, obviously, the quality life of the person having that consciousness, will depend on other's attitude.

"... and the dentist told me: "---I will no more use anesthetics because I came to the conclusion that all that pain is only in your head". " Well, no thanks.












What is not Turing emulable in your theory.

The only thing that is Turing emulable is public positions in space. Nothing private is emulable.


But here you are provably false. Self-referential machines have private life, in the sense that they too can refer to sense and uncommunicable true knowledge.

How do you know that though?

But that is exactly what I explain in the papers, and here in the posts.



How can you demonstrate that the movie, even an interactive movie, has some kind of private life when you can see how easy it is for us to fall into the pathetic fallacy?

There is just no evidences at all that movies, fridge and stone handle self-referential algorithm. There are evidence that animals and humans do that. And there is proof that computer can do that.





You just decide that they have not the right shape, and that looks like a form of racism.

It's not shape that I think makes the difference, it's experience. Not racism, but natural elitism.


But the point is that computer can have experience. So they participate to the natural, or divine elitism as much as we might do ourselves.

You are the one saying that they have not the right shape (silicon, instead of carbon, etc.).









Don't answer with "sense", because the simplest theory of machine's sense makes them also non Turing emulable. The non Turing emulability of sense is not an argument against comp, it is a correct intuition that machine can have about themselves, when looking inward.

If you study computer science, you can understand that most attribute of machine are more complex notion than computation and Turing emulability. Machines are such that the whole can be far more complex and rich than any of the parts, or the disjoint union of the parts.

Complexity and richness aren't enough to suggest any kind of participation or perception.


The modal logics, invented to study qualities, suggest the contrary.

Would they suggest that were we not expecting to find them?

Indeed. before Gödel, people believed that []p, []p & p, []p & Dt, []p & Dt & p, would all collapsed, especially for the correct machine. It does in most modal logics, but not in the modal logics of self- reference. And they do collapse, in some sense, even there, but, and that is the surprise, not from the machine points of view. All results in that field are a priori rather counter-intuitive. We really learn from listening to them. Nobody programmed them to say what they already say.

Bruno






Negative assertions seems premature to me, here.

What would it take to make it not seem that way?

I don't know.

OK

Craig


Bruno





Craig


Bruno



Craig


Bruno




Craig


Bruno











>> A court would not let you off if you got an expert witness in to say that >> you were not responsible for your crime due to the way your brain works. >> This is not because the judge does not believe the expert witness, it is >> because brain physics is not relevant to the question of responsibility for
>> a crime.
>
>
> When a suspect pleads insanity, they are saying precisely that the brain > physics is relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. An expert > witness who can establish that you have a tumor in an area of your brain > which is associated with impulse control will have a very good chance of
> convincing a judge that brain physics is indeed relevant.

Mentally ill people don't have different brain *physics*.

Splitting hairs. Using English words in a nonsense order may technically be *English* but it is still a language problem.

If the brain
is deterministic in a well person it is deterministic in a mentally ill person as well. The difference is that the mentally ill person may not be able to (deterministically) respond to certain situations in the way a well person will (deterministically) respond to them. Judges are usually quite intelligent people and I expect that most of them are aware that everything in the world must be either determined or
random, but they still make their judgements despite this.

No judge could make any judgment against a person if they really believed that everything must be determined or random. That would mean that their judgments would also be deterministic or random, so that they would not be a judge at all, but rather a pawn of "inevitable and necessary consequences of antecedent states of affairs."

Judgment is impossible under determinism.

Unless it's determined, in which case non-judgement is impossible.

You are confusing determinism with omnipotent magic.

Craig


Brent


Craig



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