On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 12:53:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 12 Mar 2013, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 9:20:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 11 Mar 2013, at 18:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> What does it mean to contribute causally to a deterministic process 
>> though? What contribution does the stone make to its rolling down hill?
>>
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>> I have no evidence that a stone support a will relatively to its 
>> environment. I was not talking about stones, but about computers.
>>
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> Computers are fuzzy though, because we can always point to an open ended 
> future of possibility. Stones are a better example to work with because of 
> the absurd simplicity. Any understanding about determinism should be 
> clearer there. A computer is informed by human will, so it is really a bad 
> example of determinism.
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> What is that for a kind of reasoning?
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>

> "I will show you that computer cannot be conscious, but as computer are 
> complex man made machine, I will show you this for my fridge instead". Come 
> on Craig. 
>

We're talking about the basic principle of determinism though. We should 
use a basic example of it. What special ingredient does complexity add 
which changes the nature of determinism? One stone rolling or a trillion 
digital stones rolling and colliding and sticking together and breaking 
apart - what difference does it make to the ontology of determinism?
 

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>>> A free spectator in a deterministic machine can feel no responsibility 
>>> or presence.
>>>
>>>
>>> Not only a machine (the person supervening on a machine) can feel 
>>> responsibility, but that person can be responsible.
>>>
>>
>> Why should there be any such feeling even possible in the universe as 
>> 'responsibility' under determinism? Who feels responsible for the rolling 
>> stone?
>>
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>>>
>>>
>>> I was watching a CGI cartoon this morning and was noticing that the 
>>> sterility of the medium must be fought every step of the way by the 
>>> animators to inject some warmth and character. The digital medium is not 
>>> neutral, it is anesthetically biased. Because computation is devoid both of 
>>> the gravity of realism 
>>>
>>>
>>> You betray a naive conception of computations. 
>>>
>>> I would say that my analysis is more rooted in aesthetic and 
>> experiential qualities rather than conceptual evaluations of computation. I 
>> look at what all CGI has in common, and how that differs from what other 
>> forms of animation, or film, or reality have in common.
>>
>>
>> You can rely only on 3p behavior. Once a machine is allowed to look 
>> inward, his behavior can become very complex, and involve non communicable 
>> truth. Nobody says that all computations support consciousness, but that 
>> some might.
>>
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> How do you know the machine looks inward at all? 
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> A machine can invoke herself and represent herself in different possible 
> situation.
>

How do you know that it represents herself to herself rather than to the 
programmer?
 

> That self-reference is made possible by a theorem in computer science 
> (Kleene's second recursion theorem). I have explained and will re-explain 
> on FOAR. It is sump up by the Dx = "xx" trick. If DA gives "AA", DD gives 
> "DD".
>

"These words do not refer to themselves." 

You are taking symbols literally, which is your privilege as a conscious 
person. Computers don't have that capacity. They can take symbols only in 
the way that we intend them to be taken. I don't think that I have even 
heard you acknowledge that there is a such thing as the Use-mention 
distinction or map-territory relation. Do you see that a computer need not 
be able to hear music itself in order for you to hear music as a result of 
what a computer does? If so, then why assume that Dx = "xx" is anything 
other than an empty formalism? A simple monkey-see, monkey-do substitution.
 

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> If I watch a movie, it might look like characters are being introspective, 
> but that has nothing to do with the video screen or DVD player.
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> It is a branch of math, and we reason from what we know. Character in a 
> movie have no self-referential abilities at all, 
>

Sure they do. They can tell you all about themselves. You can arrange many 
different movie clips which correspond to a number of buttons that you can 
push which have certain questions written next to them that the character 
will answer. A museum kiosk could have just such a video information system 
with canned responses about the character reading them. The Bugs Bunny 
museum can have Bugs Bunny recordings that kids can watch where he answers 
the questions that have been scripted.
 

> and there is no computation involved in the movie projection (or a trivial 
> one). In the frame of the content of the movie, the character have 
> self-referential abilities, in the sense that we can locally attribute them 
> such, for appreciating the plot, but we tend to believe they have not (if 
> not we would find all horror drama being inhuman and forbid them).
>

What Comp says though, is that given enough computing power, the horror 
drama will become inhuman, and the characters, as avatars of universal 
machines, will in fact become persons living in the movie. If you subscribe 
to determinism, then you simply include the illusion of free will and these 
characters can re-live the same horror over and over, each time believing 
that they can change the ending. Once consciousness generates consciousness 
through complexity, what happens if you then trim out the complexity little 
by little? What if you take the machine who learns to interact freely with 
their world, and put them in a movie which does not respond?
 

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>>> and the vitality of animation, the CGI animator must compensate with low 
>>> level visual distractions at all times - plugging the holes in the 
>>> audience's experience with lots of clever details.
>>>
>>>
>>> I am not talking about today's machine, but about what is Turing 
>>> emulable in principle. 
>>>
>>
>> Emulation is a theory or an assumption. I don't think that it holds up. 
>> Emulation is always limited to observations of observations, not realities.
>>
>>
>> You might be right. The point is that you might be false, also.
>>
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> OK. 
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> That was my point. But then why do you assert that comp is false. 
>

Because the possibility that I'm wrong is no reason to think that comp is 
true. Comp is false for the same reason that the map is not the territory. 
Information has no plausible access to either matter-like presentations 
(i.e. geometry, spatial physics) or experience (i.e. sensory modalities and 
qualities). We know this for a fact because we build computers without 
caring about any kind of internal presentation. If computers had an 
internal presentation then we wouldn't need screens or speakers, we could 
just listen to the digits directly. We know from synesthesia, blindsight, 
and neurological experiments that the brain does not invariably turn 
information into any particular qualia. We can and do behave as zombies in 
many ways as far as we are concerned. We sleep walk, we drive to work 
without noticing, etc.


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> Another possibility is that how true or false it seems depends on the 
> intentions and awareness of the person asking.
>
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> This escapes the conclusion. The consciousness of someone with a digital 
> brain will not depend on what other can think and ask, even if, obviously, 
> the quality life of the person having that consciousness, will depend on 
> other's attitude. 
>

It won't to the patient, no, but the doctor will go on lobotomizing people 
and in his mind the evidence will support his actions.
 

>
> "... and the dentist told me: "---I will no more use anesthetics because I 
> came to the conclusion that all that pain is only in your head". " Well, no 
> thanks.
>

Exactly, but what if he hypnotizes patients who tell you that he is right?
 

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>>> What is not Turing emulable in your theory.
>>>
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>> The only thing that is Turing emulable is public positions in space. 
>> Nothing private is emulable.
>>
>>
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>> But here you are provably false. Self-referential machines have private 
>> life, in the sense that they too can refer to sense and uncommunicable true 
>> knowledge. 
>>
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> How do you know that though?
>
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> But that is exactly what I explain in the papers, and here in the posts. 
>

I missed that part. I have only seen that you point to the holes in math's 
completeness and suggest that 'here lies 1p'.
 

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> How can you demonstrate that the movie, even an interactive movie, has 
> some kind of private life when you can see how easy it is for us to fall 
> into the pathetic fallacy?
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> There is just no evidences at all that movies, fridge and stone handle 
> self-referential algorithm. There are evidence that animals and humans do 
> that. And there is proof that computer can do that.
>

If you plug the computer with the self-referential algorithm into the movie 
- is it the algorithm who is playing the part of the actor in the movie, or 
is it just referring to itself and unaware of the actor?
 

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>> You just decide that they have not the right shape, and that looks like a 
>> form of racism.
>>
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> It's not shape that I think makes the difference, it's experience. Not 
> racism, but natural elitism.
>
>
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> But the point is that computer can have experience. 
>

What makes you think so? It's begging the question.
 

> So they participate to the natural, or divine elitism as much as we might 
> do ourselves. 
>
> You are the one saying that they have not the right shape (silicon, 
> instead of carbon, etc.).
>

You misunderstand my position (or straw man intentionally). I have never, 
ever said that molecular shape is involved. I say that molecular shape may 
be a symptom, or a game piece of the sensory-motive narrative which does 
matter. If silicon cannot become a living organism, it is not because of 
the shape of silicon but because of that that shape has been used for 
throughout eternity. For better or worse, the only story of life that we 
know is written in the pages of DNA. If we want to assume that is 
meaningless, then we should at least have one example or one reason to 
think that other than our total ignorance of what is required for life as 
an open invitation. Just because I have never personally tried to eat glass 
and aluminum cans doesn't mean that I don't know it's a bad idea.


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>>> Don't answer with "sense", because the simplest theory of machine's 
>>> sense makes them also non Turing emulable. The non Turing emulability of 
>>> sense is not an argument against comp, it is a correct intuition that 
>>> machine can have about themselves, when looking inward.
>>>
>>> If you study computer science, you can understand that most attribute of 
>>> machine are more complex notion than computation and Turing emulability. 
>>> Machines are such that the whole can be far more complex and rich than 
>>> any of the parts, or the disjoint union of the parts.
>>>
>>
>> Complexity and richness aren't enough to suggest any kind of 
>> participation or perception.
>>
>>
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>> The modal logics, invented to study qualities, suggest the contrary. 
>>
>
> Would they suggest that were we not expecting to find them?
>
>
> Indeed. before Gödel, people believed that []p, []p & p, []p & Dt, []p & 
> Dt & p, would all collapsed, especially for the correct machine. It does in 
> most modal logics, but not in the modal logics of self-reference.
> And they do collapse, in some sense, even there, but, and that is the 
> surprise, not from the machine points of view. 
> All results in that field are a priori rather counter-intuitive. We really 
> learn from listening to them. Nobody programmed them to say what they 
> already say.
>

They are programmed though. It is the programmer who is defining their 
program as 'self-referential' and who is interpreting 'from the machine 
points of view'. How do you know more about whether a computer is conscious 
than whether a person is conscious?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
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>>> Negative assertions seems premature to me, here.
>>>
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>> What would it take to make it not seem that way?
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>> I don't know. 
>>
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> OK
>
> Craig
>  
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>> Bruno
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>> Craig
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>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Craig
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>> >> A court would not let you off if you got an expert witness in to 
>>>>>>> say that 
>>>>>>> >> you were not responsible for your crime due to the way your brain 
>>>>>>> works. 
>>>>>>> >> This is not because the judge does not believe the expert 
>>>>>>> witness, it is 
>>>>>>> >> because brain physics is not relevant to the question of 
>>>>>>> responsibility for 
>>>>>>> >> a crime. 
>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>> > 
>>>>>>> > When a suspect pleads insanity, they are saying precisely that the 
>>>>>>> brain 
>>>>>>> > physics is relevant to the question of responsibility for a crime. 
>>>>>>> An expert 
>>>>>>> > witness who can establish that you have a tumor in an area of your 
>>>>>>> brain 
>>>>>>> > which is associated with impulse control will have a very good 
>>>>>>> chance of 
>>>>>>> > convincing a judge that brain physics is indeed relevant. 
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Mentally ill people don't have different brain *physics*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Splitting hairs. Using English words in a nonsense order may 
>>>>>> technically be *English* but it is still a language problem.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>> If the brain 
>>>>>>> is deterministic in a well person it is deterministic in a mentally 
>>>>>>> ill person as well. The difference is that the mentally ill person 
>>>>>>> may 
>>>>>>> not be able to (deterministically) respond to certain situations in 
>>>>>>> the way a well person will (deterministically) respond to them. 
>>>>>>> Judges 
>>>>>>> are usually quite intelligent people and I expect that most of them 
>>>>>>> are aware that everything in the world must be either determined or 
>>>>>>> random, but they still make their judgements despite this. 
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No judge could make any judgment against a person if they really 
>>>>>> believed that everything must be determined or random. That would mean 
>>>>>> that 
>>>>>> their judgments would also be deterministic or random, so that they 
>>>>>> would 
>>>>>> not be a judge at all, but rather a pawn of "inevitable and necessary 
>>>>>> consequences of antecedent states of affairs."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Judgment is impossible under determinism.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unless it's determined, in which case non-judgement is impossible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You are confusing determinism with omnipotent magic.
>>>>>
>>>>> Craig
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Craig
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou 
>>>>>>>
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