On 14 Mar 2013, at 05:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, Mar 14, 2013 at 3:08 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

Who are you to say that natural phenomena are superfluous?


Who are you to say that they aren't?

The natural world is as it is. It's not my place to say the the Great
Red Spot of Jupiter is superfluous, that the electron is superfluous,
or that intelligent apes are superfluous.

Hmm... Keep in mind that IF the brain work like a digital computer, THEN the physical reality is emerging in a special way from number relations. Up to now, the quantum reality seems completely OK with computationalism, but we must keep open the possibility of a refutation of comp. In that case a physicalist association between a non computable matter and a non computable mind would be necessary. So Craig's point might make sense. But most of his argument does not and he begs the question systematically. What we know today (or should know) is that the mind body problem is necessarily reduced to the problem of justifying the emergence of the physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. As long as this is not done (compeletely: propositional physics has already been isolated) we must remain open to a refutation of computationalism. In a sense, with comp, nature is *superfluous* as it is the border of the possible arithmetical mind. Nature is something complex with a quite precise logical, or logico-arithmetical origin.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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