On Thursday, March 14, 2013 10:59:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 14 Mar 2013, at 05:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 14, 2013 at 3:08 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >>> Who are you to say that natural phenomena are superfluous?
> >> Who are you to say that they aren't?
> > The natural world is as it is. It's not my place to say the the Great
> > Red Spot of Jupiter is superfluous, that the electron is superfluous,
> > or that intelligent apes are superfluous.
> Hmm... Keep in mind that IF the brain work like a digital computer,
> THEN the physical reality is emerging in a special way from number
> relations. Up to now, the quantum reality seems completely OK with
> computationalism, but we must keep open the possibility of a
> refutation of comp. In that case a physicalist association between a
> non computable matter and a non computable mind would be necessary. So
> Craig's point might make sense. But most of his argument does not and
> he begs the question systematically.
> What we know today (or should know) is that the mind body problem is
> necessarily reduced to the problem of justifying the emergence of the
> physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. As long as this is not
> done (compeletely: propositional physics has already been isolated) we
> must remain open to a refutation of computationalism. In a sense,
> with comp, nature is *superfluous* as it is the border of the possible
> arithmetical mind. Nature is something complex with a quite precise
> logical, or logico-arithmetical origin.
My argument only seems to you to beg the question because you frame the
question from the start in a way that unfairly places a theory about
experience as being equivalent to experience itself. Comp assumes that
third person realism is reality and the question is only who does first
person experience fit in with that reality. I see that this assumption
takes the foundation of experience itself for granted. Arithmetic and
machines are conjured into Platonic non-locality and erupt spontaneously
into florid locality, when in fact no such geometric expression is
explainable by Comp. I have pointed out many times that all arithmetic
operations supervene on lower level input-output sense ontologies, but you
seem to avoid this stark revelation and try to patch it up with the
expediencies of theory. You say 'we have to start somewhere', but that too
is an intuitive anchor rather than something which can be produced by
machine logic. The logic of Comp rests on the unacknowledged physics of
sense, which it mistakes for a disembodied arithmetic primitive - the
shadow of sense reflected on disowned idealized matter (digital, solid body
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