On 14 Mar 2013, at 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, March 14, 2013 10:59:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Mar 2013, at 05:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 14, 2013 at 3:08 PM, Craig Weinberg
> <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> Who are you to say that natural phenomena are superfluous?
>>
>>
>> Who are you to say that they aren't?
>
> The natural world is as it is. It's not my place to say the the Great > Red Spot of Jupiter is superfluous, that the electron is superfluous,
> or that intelligent apes are superfluous.

Hmm... Keep in mind that IF the brain work like a digital computer,
THEN the physical reality is emerging in a special way from number
relations. Up to now, the quantum reality seems completely OK with
computationalism, but we must keep open the possibility of a
refutation of comp. In that case a physicalist association between a
non computable matter and a non computable mind would be necessary. So
Craig's point might make sense. But most of his argument does not and
he begs the question systematically.
What we know today (or should know) is that the mind body problem is
necessarily reduced to the problem of justifying the emergence of the
physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. As long as this is not
done (compeletely: propositional physics has already been isolated) we
must remain open to a refutation of computationalism. In a sense,
with comp, nature is *superfluous* as it is the border of the possible
arithmetical mind. Nature is something complex with a quite precise
logical, or logico-arithmetical origin.

Bruno

My argument only seems to you to beg the question because you frame the question from the start in a way that unfairly places a theory about experience as being equivalent to experience itself.

On the contrary. The theory of machine experience, which is expressible, explains in all detail why most experiences are not expressible.




Comp assumes that third person realism is reality and the question is only who does first person experience fit in with that reality. I see that this assumption takes the foundation of experience itself for granted. Arithmetic and machines are conjured into Platonic non- locality and erupt spontaneously into florid locality, when in fact no such geometric expression is explainable by Comp.

You make too much negative assertion without any argument.




I have pointed out many times that all arithmetic operations supervene on lower level input-output sense ontologies,

"input-output sense ontologies" are too fuzzy to me, and a priori more complex than elementary arithmetic.




but you seem to avoid this stark revelation

I don't. But I show that comp + materialism can't avoid that avoidance.



and try to patch it up with the expediencies of theory.

You betray here that you are not interested in a theory. Yet you make negative assertion about possibilities. Without a sharable set of assumptions this look like arbitrariness.



You say 'we have to start somewhere', but that too is an intuitive anchor rather than something which can be produced by machine logic. The logic of Comp rests on the unacknowledged physics of sense, which it mistakes for a disembodied arithmetic primitive - the shadow of sense reflected on disowned idealized matter (digital, solid body groupings).

You clearly have not studied the theory. Your critics miss the point.

Bruno




Craig



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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