On 3/15/2013 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 14 Mar 2013, at 23:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>> Dear Bruno,
>>
>> This is a nice lecture by Johan van Benthem that covers the kind of
>> approach that I am trying to use in my critique of comp:
>> http://videolectures.net/esslli2011_benthem_logic/ It gives a nice
>> alternative to the concept of a universal Platonic Mind or secular God
>> to whom all true statements are known to be true.
>>
>> It might help you understand my thinking. ;-)
>
> But it does not. Comp needs only arithmetical realism, and oppose itself
> to stronger form of platonism or realism, even for the physical. So I
> fail to see your point.
Dear Bruno,
Arithmetic realism is self-stultifying as it assumes that properties
are innate at the ontological level. This denies the necessity of an
observer for what purpose would such have?
>
> Please make you point explicitly.
Objects cannot be said to have properties independent of the means to
confirm the truthfulness of statements about those objects.
>
> But from your last post, I think that your theory is no-comp. But I am
> not interested in defending the truth of any theory. Just the validity
> of a reasoning, which shows that comp leads to a body problem.
Your reasoning is correct but flawed as it assumes a fallacy ab initio.
> And
> that's what makes comp interesting, imo, as comp explains that the
> physical laws have a non physical origin. As a scientist, I don't care
> about the truth of a theory. I care only on its refutability.
>
How is it possible to refute a theory that cannot account for the
existence of the entities (bodies) capable of refuting it? Unless you
have a solution of the arithmetic body problem your program is born dead.
--
Onward!
Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
