On Sunday, March 17, 2013 10:47:05 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 17 Mar 2013, at 03:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:43 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 15 Mar 2013, at 20:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote:
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>>> No, I think that you haven't understood it, 
>>>
>>
>> That's because you are only working with a straw man of me. What is it 
>> that you think that I don't understand? The legacy view is that if you have 
>> many molecular systems working together mechanically, you will naturally 
>> get emergent properties that could be mistaken for teleological entities. 
>> You can't tell the difference between a brain change that seems meaningful 
>> to you and a meaningful experience which causes a brain change. Just 
>> because you feel like you are moving your arm doesn't mean that isn't just 
>> a narrative fiction that serves a valuable evolutionary purpose.
>>
>> All of that is fine, in some other theoretical universe. In our universe 
>> however, it can't work. There is no evolutionary purpose for consciousness 
>> or narrative fictions. The existence of the feeling that you can control 
>> your body makes no sense in universe where control is impersonal and 
>> involuntary. There is no possibility for teleology to even be conceived in 
>> a universe of endless meaningless chain reactions - no basis for 
>> proprietary attachment of any kind. It's circular to imagine that it could 
>> be important for an epiphenomenal self to believe it is phenomenal. 
>> Important how? It's like adding a steering wheel to a mountain.
>>  
>>
>>> due to whatever biases have led you to invest so much in your theory - a 
>>> theory which is AFAICT completely unfalsifiable and predicts nothing.
>>>
>>
>> No theory which models consciousness will ever be falsifiable, because 
>> falsifiability is a quality within consciousness. As far as prediction 
>> goes, one of the things it predicts that people who are bound to the 
>> extremes of the philosophical spectrum will be intolerant and misrepresent 
>> other perspectives. They will cling pathologically to unreal abstractions 
>> while flatly denying ordinary experience.
>>
>>
>> Materialism + computationalism can lead to nihilism. But 
>> computationalism, per se,  does not deny ordinary experiences. It starts 
>> from that, as it is a principle of invariance of consciousness for a 
>> digital substitution made at some level.
>>
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> It may not deny ordinary experiences, but it doesn't support them 
> rationally either. 
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> It supports them as much as possible. It supports some irrationalism like 
> non communicable truth on the par of the machine.
>

Being non-communicable is a property of experience but non-communicability 
itself doesn't imply experience at all. Experience can imply  a use for 
computation, as a method of distributing access to experiential qualities, 
but computation cannot imply a use for experience. As someone brought up on 
another conversation on FB, the construction of neural networks coincides 
with the end of conscious involvement - the disappearance of personal 
attention into automatism. Learning makes consciousness redundant. 
Repetition allows awareness to withdraw from the act, which becomes robotic.
 

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> What is a reason why computation would be processed as an ordinary 
> experience, when we clearly can be accomplished through a-signifying 
> mechanical activities?
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> You lost me here. 
>

We see that generic mechanical activities can be used to imitate 
experiences without actually embodying them. Illuminated pixels can 
stimulate our consciousness to experience characters and scenes which are 
not literally present in the pixels. The pixel arrangements do not 
literally become people and places.

Craig
 

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> Bruno
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> Craig
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>> Bruno
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>> Craig
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>>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
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>>>>
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>>>> On Friday, March 15, 2013 1:55:26 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Exactly. It is interesting also in that it seems to be like one of 
>>>>>> those ambiguous images, in that as long as people are focused on one 
>>>>>> fixed 
>>>>>> idea of reality, they are honestly incapable of seeing any other, even 
>>>>>> if 
>>>>>> they themselves are sitting on top of it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> The irony in that statement is staggering. I couldn't satirize you any 
>>>>> better if I tried. 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why, do you think that I have never considered the bottom up model of 
>>>> causation?
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>
>>>
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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