On 18 Mar 2013, at 14:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, March 18, 2013 6:01:18 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Mar 2013, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sunday, March 17, 2013 10:47:05 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Mar 2013, at 03:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:43 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Mar 2013, at 20:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote:
No, I think that you haven't understood it,

That's because you are only working with a straw man of me. What is it that you think that I don't understand? The legacy view is that if you have many molecular systems working together mechanically, you will naturally get emergent properties that could be mistaken for teleological entities. You can't tell the difference between a brain change that seems meaningful to you and a meaningful experience which causes a brain change. Just because you feel like you are moving your arm doesn't mean that isn't just a narrative fiction that serves a valuable evolutionary purpose.

All of that is fine, in some other theoretical universe. In our universe however, it can't work. There is no evolutionary purpose for consciousness or narrative fictions. The existence of the feeling that you can control your body makes no sense in universe where control is impersonal and involuntary. There is no possibility for teleology to even be conceived in a universe of endless meaningless chain reactions - no basis for proprietary attachment of any kind. It's circular to imagine that it could be important for an epiphenomenal self to believe it is phenomenal. Important how? It's like adding a steering wheel to a mountain.

due to whatever biases have led you to invest so much in your theory - a theory which is AFAICT completely unfalsifiable and predicts nothing.

No theory which models consciousness will ever be falsifiable, because falsifiability is a quality within consciousness. As far as prediction goes, one of the things it predicts that people who are bound to the extremes of the philosophical spectrum will be intolerant and misrepresent other perspectives. They will cling pathologically to unreal abstractions while flatly denying ordinary experience.

Materialism + computationalism can lead to nihilism. But computationalism, per se, does not deny ordinary experiences. It starts from that, as it is a principle of invariance of consciousness for a digital substitution made at some level.

It may not deny ordinary experiences, but it doesn't support them rationally either.

It supports them as much as possible. It supports some irrationalism like non communicable truth on the par of the machine.

Being non-communicable is a property of experience but non- communicability itself doesn't imply experience at all.

You are right. But knowledge of a non communicable truth has to be experienced, may be.

In reality, I agree, because I think that is the symmetry: Phenomena are extended publicly on the outside, and intended privately on the inside -

That is still Aristotelian philosophy. Mind is identified to matter, or -matter. But comp leads to the Plato view, where matter is more like the border of the universal mind. It is bigger than the physical.

but that is multisense realism physics, not arithmetic.

That's not a reason.

Arithmetic would have to provide a way to get to that quality theoretically.

But it has. Worst! We can't avoid them, and that can be show by accepting the simplest known theory of knowledge (S4), and the simplest definition of (correct belief, the axiom of PA, say). And you get terrestrial qualities, but also divine qualities as well, in a sense which makes basically all theology, from Theaetetus to Proclus, a sequence of theorem in computer science, and in arithmetic.

Why, as far as numbers are concerned, does privacy equate to "experience"?

Nobody equated it. But machine can relay private experience.

Experience can imply a use for computation, as a method of distributing access to experiential qualities, but computation cannot imply a use for experience.

That contradicts what machines already say when looking inward. It is not the computation which is thinking, but the person supported by one (and then an infinity of one). You deny the existence of that person, and I don't see why. Bringing matter, time or indeterminacy does not help.

If machines all can be made to say the same thing when looking inward, then I don't think that they are having an experience.

This does not follow. All human have a quite similar experience if they put their hand in a fire, and that does not make them not having experience. Looking inward leads to the same experience, because it leads to a Goddess, and there is only one Goddess. To be short.

As someone brought up on another conversation on FB, the construction of neural networks coincides with the end of conscious involvement

If you decide so, it might as well lead to that. But this idea is based on a confusion between syntax and semantics. Simple programs can have complex semantics. Enough complex to be cautious about attribution or non attribution of consciousness.

I don't think it is a decision based on syntax and semantics at all, it is an observation about learning and memory. When we learn, we lose the necessity of conscious awareness of what we have learned, and at the same time, we observe that connections in our neural network or strengthened or extended.

Good idea. Some comp theory of consciousness are based on that idea. Consciousness would appear when our automated theory goes awry. Like when you open the car in the morning, still unconscious, but then you don't find the key and this makes you think. In my opinion, we are always conscious, and the key event just change the attention focus of consciousness. All this has nothing to do with comp, as we can expect different mechanism for consciousness and attention.

- the disappearance of personal attention into automatism. Learning makes consciousness redundant. Repetition allows awareness to withdraw from the act, which becomes robotic.

No worry. Our environment should be enough rich to remind us that our lives should not be taken for granted.

Only because we are conscious to begin with,

We, the universal number? OK.

and our neural networks follow our experience. If we build a synthetic neural network, there is not experience to drive it but only the computations skeleton of which describe eunexperienced events.

That's an argument like the old argument that planes cannot fly. Only birds can fly. Forget the evidences, as theoretical computer science is more advanced on the fundamentals, and all the evidence is that simple programs can tell you a lot about what they can feel, observe, know, belief, and pray on.

What is a reason why computation would be processed as an ordinary experience, when we clearly can be accomplished through a- signifying mechanical activities?

You lost me here.

We see that generic mechanical activities can be used to imitate experiences without actually embodying them.

We can see that, but that's is only a partial view of truth. Even for machine, we know that the syntactical description of the behavior of its components does only give a pârtial description of what the machine is able to know, without any external observer capable of guessing that truth. You continue to treat the machines in a pre-Turing-Gödel way. You defend a reductionist conception of machine, which does not fit what we already know about them.

What makes Turing-Gödel more convincing as a mechanism for experience rather than an imitator?

Turing-Gödel (and some work) is convincing, not as a mechanism of experience, but as the presence of experience supported by some kind of computations, and set of computations.

To me, a computer is the very image of imitation - the universal purveyor of disconnected fragments and ungrounded illusion. The entire contents of the internet is pure human sense, all of the computers in the world contribute nothing to it except our accessibility to our own digitally mediated content. Computation is a medium with no message.

The beginning of the beginning has not yet begun. Study the math.

Illuminated pixels can stimulate our consciousness to experience characters and scenes which are not literally present in the pixels. The pixel arrangements do not literally become people and places.

A computation is something far more rich and subtle than any pixel arrangements.

Sure, but rich and subtle to our sensibilities.

To their's too.

To the computation itself, I think that richness and subtlety are very likely meaningless.

No, they are meaningful, to the person supported by some computation, even to the point that they know they cannot justify it. Machines have already understood that if you decide that they are not conscious, then they cannot convince you in any rational way. They will probably try the irrational way.



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