On 18 Mar 2013, at 14:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 18, 2013 6:01:18 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2013, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 17, 2013 10:47:05 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2013, at 03:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:43 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Mar 2013, at 20:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote:
No, I think that you haven't understood it,
That's because you are only working with a straw man of me. What
is it that you think that I don't understand? The legacy view is
that if you have many molecular systems working together
mechanically, you will naturally get emergent properties that
could be mistaken for teleological entities. You can't tell the
difference between a brain change that seems meaningful to you
and a meaningful experience which causes a brain change. Just
because you feel like you are moving your arm doesn't mean that
isn't just a narrative fiction that serves a valuable
All of that is fine, in some other theoretical universe. In our
universe however, it can't work. There is no evolutionary purpose
for consciousness or narrative fictions. The existence of the
feeling that you can control your body makes no sense in universe
where control is impersonal and involuntary. There is no
possibility for teleology to even be conceived in a universe of
endless meaningless chain reactions - no basis for proprietary
attachment of any kind. It's circular to imagine that it could be
important for an epiphenomenal self to believe it is phenomenal.
Important how? It's like adding a steering wheel to a mountain.
due to whatever biases have led you to invest so much in your
theory - a theory which is AFAICT completely unfalsifiable and
No theory which models consciousness will ever be falsifiable,
because falsifiability is a quality within consciousness. As far
as prediction goes, one of the things it predicts that people who
are bound to the extremes of the philosophical spectrum will be
intolerant and misrepresent other perspectives. They will cling
pathologically to unreal abstractions while flatly denying
Materialism + computationalism can lead to nihilism. But
computationalism, per se, does not deny ordinary experiences. It
starts from that, as it is a principle of invariance of
consciousness for a digital substitution made at some level.
It may not deny ordinary experiences, but it doesn't support them
It supports them as much as possible. It supports some
irrationalism like non communicable truth on the par of the machine.
Being non-communicable is a property of experience but non-
communicability itself doesn't imply experience at all.
You are right. But knowledge of a non communicable truth has to be
experienced, may be.
In reality, I agree, because I think that is the symmetry: Phenomena
are extended publicly on the outside, and intended privately on the
That is still Aristotelian philosophy. Mind is identified to matter,
or -matter. But comp leads to the Plato view, where matter is more
like the border of the universal mind. It is bigger than the physical.
but that is multisense realism physics, not arithmetic.
That's not a reason.
Arithmetic would have to provide a way to get to that quality
But it has. Worst! We can't avoid them, and that can be show by
accepting the simplest known theory of knowledge (S4), and the
simplest definition of (correct belief, the axiom of PA, say).
And you get terrestrial qualities, but also divine qualities as well,
in a sense which makes basically all theology, from Theaetetus to
Proclus, a sequence of theorem in computer science, and in arithmetic.
Why, as far as numbers are concerned, does privacy equate to
Nobody equated it. But machine can relay private experience.
Experience can imply a use for computation, as a method of
distributing access to experiential qualities, but computation
cannot imply a use for experience.
That contradicts what machines already say when looking inward. It
is not the computation which is thinking, but the person supported
by one (and then an infinity of one).
You deny the existence of that person, and I don't see why. Bringing
matter, time or indeterminacy does not help.
If machines all can be made to say the same thing when looking
inward, then I don't think that they are having an experience.
This does not follow. All human have a quite similar experience if
they put their hand in a fire, and that does not make them not having
Looking inward leads to the same experience, because it leads to a
Goddess, and there is only one Goddess. To be short.
As someone brought up on another conversation on FB, the
construction of neural networks coincides with the end of conscious
If you decide so, it might as well lead to that. But this idea is
based on a confusion between syntax and semantics. Simple programs
can have complex semantics. Enough complex to be cautious about
attribution or non attribution of consciousness.
I don't think it is a decision based on syntax and semantics at all,
it is an observation about learning and memory. When we learn, we
lose the necessity of conscious awareness of what we have learned,
and at the same time, we observe that connections in our neural
network or strengthened or extended.
Good idea. Some comp theory of consciousness are based on that idea.
Consciousness would appear when our automated theory goes awry. Like
when you open the car in the morning, still unconscious, but then you
don't find the key and this makes you think. In my opinion, we are
always conscious, and the key event just change the attention focus of
All this has nothing to do with comp, as we can expect different
mechanism for consciousness and attention.
- the disappearance of personal attention into automatism. Learning
makes consciousness redundant. Repetition allows awareness to
withdraw from the act, which becomes robotic.
No worry. Our environment should be enough rich to remind us that
our lives should not be taken for granted.
Only because we are conscious to begin with,
We, the universal number? OK.
and our neural networks follow our experience. If we build a
synthetic neural network, there is not experience to drive it but
only the computations skeleton of which describe eunexperienced
That's an argument like the old argument that planes cannot fly. Only
birds can fly. Forget the evidences, as theoretical computer science
is more advanced on the fundamentals, and all the evidence is that
simple programs can tell you a lot about what they can feel, observe,
know, belief, and pray on.
What is a reason why computation would be processed as an ordinary
experience, when we clearly can be accomplished through a-
signifying mechanical activities?
You lost me here.
We see that generic mechanical activities can be used to imitate
experiences without actually embodying them.
We can see that, but that's is only a partial view of truth. Even
for machine, we know that the syntactical description of the
behavior of its components does only give a pârtial description of
what the machine is able to know, without any external observer
capable of guessing that truth. You continue to treat the machines
in a pre-Turing-Gödel way. You defend a reductionist conception of
machine, which does not fit what we already know about them.
What makes Turing-Gödel more convincing as a mechanism for
experience rather than an imitator?
Turing-Gödel (and some work) is convincing, not as a mechanism of
experience, but as the presence of experience supported by some kind
of computations, and set of computations.
To me, a computer is the very image of imitation - the universal
purveyor of disconnected fragments and ungrounded illusion. The
entire contents of the internet is pure human sense, all of the
computers in the world contribute nothing to it except our
accessibility to our own digitally mediated content. Computation is
a medium with no message.
The beginning of the beginning has not yet begun. Study the math.
Illuminated pixels can stimulate our consciousness to experience
characters and scenes which are not literally present in the
pixels. The pixel arrangements do not literally become people and
A computation is something far more rich and subtle than any pixel
Sure, but rich and subtle to our sensibilities.
To their's too.
To the computation itself, I think that richness and subtlety are
very likely meaningless.
No, they are meaningful, to the person supported by some computation,
even to the point that they know they cannot justify it.
Machines have already understood that if you decide that they are not
conscious, then they cannot convince you in any rational way. They
will probably try the irrational way.
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