On Thursday, March 21, 2013 9:42:34 AM UTC-4, Roger Clough wrote:
> Leibnizian causation differs from most other forms of causation in that
> no forces are involved, only ideas, although from any objective viewpoint
> it might seem "as if" the usual types of forces cause the event.
> This makes sense if the resultant situation is a meaningful one
> because generated by the dominant monad.
> In that respect it is similar to meaningful causation (synchronicity) as
> envisionized it, wherein the "forces" are meanings, just as monads
> are grouped according to meanings. Hence meaning or synchronicity
> becomnes a causal determinant. and perhaps dominated by the
> most powerful meanings, whatever that mean sin a Darwinian sense.
> Meanings arwe in some ways similar to relational quauntum histories,
I think you are on the right track, although I would differentiate between
meaning, idea, and causation. Ideas and meanings can inspire motives, but
only actual motive investment - will - causes changes that can be publicly
Quantum histories are an impersonal, third person view of the 'places where
meaning would be', but ultimately quantum theory has nothing to say about
meaning. We can try to reverse engineer meaning or will to quantum
functions, but it is really like looking for the dog's face from the wrong
end of the dog.
> Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 3/21/2013
> "Coincidences are God's way of remaining anonymous."
> - Albert Einstein
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.