On Monday, March 25, 2013 1:25:30 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 25 Mar 2013, at 14:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Monday, March 25, 2013 6:26:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 24 Mar 2013, at 20:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Sunday, March 24, 2013 1:44:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Mar 2013, at 12:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, March 24, 2013 7:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 21 Mar 2013, at 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013 1:28:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 20 Mar 2013, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130320115111.htm
>>>>>
>>>>> "We are examining the activity in the cerebral cortex *as a whole*. The 
>>>>> brain is a non-stop, always-active system. When we perceive something, 
>>>>> the 
>>>>> information does not end up in a specific *part* of our brain. 
>>>>> Rather, it is added to the brain's existing activity. If we measure the 
>>>>> electrochemical activity of the whole cortex, we find wave-like patterns. 
>>>>> This shows that brain activity is not local but rather that activity 
>>>>> constantly moves from one part of the brain to another." 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Please, don't confuse the very particular neuro-philosophy with the 
>>>>> much weaker assumption of computationalism. 
>>>>> Wave-like pattern are typically computable functions. 
>>>>> (I mentioned this when saying that I would say yes to a doctor only if 
>>>>> he copies my glial cells at the right chemical level).
>>>>>
>>>>> There are just no evidence for non computable activities acting in a 
>>>>> relevant way in the biological organism, or actually even in the physical 
>>>>> universe.
>>>>> You could point on the the wave packet reduction, but it does not make 
>>>>> much sense by itself.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Right, I'm not arguing this as evidence of non-comp. Even if there was 
>>>> non-comp activity in the brain, nothing that we could use to detect it 
>>>> would be able to find anything since we would only know how to use an 
>>>> exrternal detection instrument computationally. Mainly I posted this to 
>>>> show the direction that the scientific evidence is leading us does not 
>>>> support any kind of narrow folk-neuroscience of point to point 
>>>> chain-reactions.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Good.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Not looking very charitable to the bottom-up, neuron machine view.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ideas don't need charity  but in this case it is totally charitable, 
>>>>> even with neurophilosophy, given that in your example, those waves still 
>>>>> seem neuron driven.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How do you know that it seem neuron driven rather than whole brain 
>>>> driven?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In neurophilosophy, they are used to global complex and distributed 
>>>> brain activity, but still implemented in term of local computable rules 
>>>> obeyed by neurons.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you look at a city traffic pattern, you will see local computable 
>>> rules obeyed by cars, but that doesn't mean there aren't non-computable 
>>> agendas being pursued by the drivers.
>>>
>>>
>>> Indeed.
>>>
>>> But that is what you get at the Turing universal threshold. If you look 
>>> at the computer's functioning, you will see local computable rules obeyed 
>>> by the gates, but that doesn't mean there aren't non-computable agendas 
>>> being pursued by genuine person supported by those computations.
>>>
>>
>> Absolutely, but does it mean that it has to be a genuine person? To me it 
>> makes sense that the natural development of persons may be restricted to 
>> experiences which are represented publicly in zoological terms. The 
>> zoological format is not the cause of the experience but it is the minimum 
>> vessel with the proper scale of sensitivity for that quality of experience 
>> to be supported. Trying to generate the same thing from the bottom up may 
>> not be feasible, because the zoological format arises organically, whereas 
>> an AI system skips zoology, biology, and chemistry entirely and assumes a 
>> universally low format. 
>>
>>
>> It is does not. Self-reference leads machine to develop multi-variated 
>> leves of "formatting".
>>
>
> Why would it, and how could it?
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> You must study  bit of computer science. 
>

But just in very general terms, what would be the principle which would tie 
together the function of self reference with any kind of presented 
experience? 


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> I might find it convenient to invent an entirely new spectrum of colors to 
> keep track of my file folders, but that doesn't mean that this new spectrum 
> can just be 'developed' out of thin air.
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> You must not ask a machine something that you can't do yourself, to 
> compare it to yourself.
>

But if you are saying that a machine can come up with a new format by 
virtue of its self reference, then that is what I assume Comp says is the 
origination of color.
 

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>> Consciousness does not seem to be compatible with low level unconscious 
>> origins to me. Looking at language, the rules of spelling and grammar do 
>> not drive the creation of new words. A word cannot be forced into common 
>> usage just because it is introduced into a culture. There is no rule in 
>> language which has a function of creating new words, nor could any rule 
>> like that possibly work. 
>>
>>
>> You ignore completely the notion of creative set or universal machine. 
>> You talk like if we could have a complete theory about them, but we can't, 
>> provably so if we are Turing emulable. 
>> You just communicate your feeling where the machine already can explain 
>> why their feeling can be misleading on this subject.
>>
>
> Any particular feeling can be misleading only relative to some other felt 
> expectation and felt realization. 
>
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> I am OK with this. All content of consciousness can be doubted, except one 
> ...
>

OK
 

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> The existence of feeling itself can't be misleading though.
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> ... yes. That one. Consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt.
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> Universal machine looking inward are lead to that constructive and 
> creative doubt.
>

Couldn't it perform the functions associated with doubt without 
experiencing doubt though? I could look at the flame of a candle swaying 
back and forth and project some narrative of doubt and prevarication, but 
must that be the case?
 

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> I don't know what you are saying that I am ignoring. 
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> That universal machine are more weird entities that you and me can 
> suspect. 
>

That I don't doubt, but I doubt that their weirdness is the same as our 
weirdness. I think it is a perpendicular weirdness which cannot stand 
independently of some sensory experience.
 

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> I don't deny that machines could be unintentionally creative, but it isn't 
> the same thing that we experience. We care, machines don't.
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> Well, as you know I assume that we are machines, so by definition, 
> whatever I or you can do, some machines can do it (us).
>
> I study the consequence of that hypothesis, and I object only to you 
> argument that such an hypothesis is obviously false.
>

I would not say that it is obviously false, only that I can't see how it 
could be true given that experience doesn't make sense as a product of 
forms or functions, but forms and functions naturally follow from the 
extension of sense into its own absence (entropy/spacetime). If there is 
something that functions+awareness can do that functions alone cannot, then 
I have no problem considering Comp to be an equal possibility. Further, 
while I agree that the third person view of our body and its behaviors are 
a good fit for mechanism, I don't see that such a mechanism can coexist 
with the natural universe in which we find ourselves where 1p and 3p are 
orthogonally juxtaposed. Given the nature of our actual experience, it only 
makes sense to me that 3p mechanism could arise as a multiplicity of 1p 
experiences, reflected in a drastically diminished (and thus mechanical 
seeming) presentation.
 

>
> I don't know if it is true or false, nor if that would be a good news or a 
> bad news. Some consequences are fascinating, and it leads to an elegant 
> scheme of (incomplete of course) TOE (like elementary arithmetic).
>

I think it is false from an absolute perspective, but nearly true from a 
local perspective, so that studying consequences of Comp is worthwhile, and 
indeed the only possible way to really deduce knowledge about the 1p - 
provided that we remember to invert the conclusions. Where Comp points to 
mechanism, we should see it as a mechanistic reflection of the genuine 
experience which we cannot contact indirectly.
 

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>> If you could control the behavior of language use from the bottom up 
>> however, you could simulate that such a rule would work, just by 
>> programming people to utter it with increasing frequency. This would 
>> satisfy any third person test for the effectiveness of the rule, but of 
>> course would be completely meaningless.
>>
>>
>> Don't confuse machine and language.
>>
>
> Interesting... aren't they both made of the same thing in Comp? Is there a 
> separate arithmetic truth which creates machines and one which creates 
> languages?
>
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> Language is when machine talks, but the machine's mindscape is much vaster 
> than any of their possible language and theories.
>

Can't you use one machine's language to build another nested machine 
though? Isn't that the self-referential implications of Church-Turing?
 

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>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What would it look like if the brain as a whole were driving the 
>>>> neurons?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Either it would be like saying that a high level program can have a 
>>>> feedback on some of its low level implementations, which is not a problem 
>>>> at all, as this already exist, in both biology and computer science, or it 
>>>> would be like saying that a brain can break the physical laws, or the 
>>>> arithmetical laws and it would be like pseudo-philosophy.
>>>>
>>>
>>> What about the relation between high level arithmetic laws - like the 
>>> ones which allow for 1p subjectivity in UM, LM, etc and the programs which 
>>> support them? 
>>>
>>>
>>> To eat or to be eaten relatively to the most probable universal 
>>> neighbors. The relations can be complicated.
>>>
>>
>> Their being complicated is what I would expect from high level laws - but 
>> how is it that low level processes wind up being influenced by them? How 
>> does the law that says dumb code can begin to think for itself come to be 
>> followed by dumb code?
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>> How do low level processes know that they are subject to the commands of 
> the high level processes?
>
>
> Usually, they don't know. But then some can observe and infer, and build 
> theories/questions.
>

Maybe 'know' is too strong. What I meant, is how do low level processes 
come to receive and respond to high level commands?
 

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>>>
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>>>
>>> Not between the high level program and the low level program, but 
>>> between the X-Level truths and laws and all local functions?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Above the substitution level, only god knows, but you can bet and 
>>> theorize locally, and, below the substitution level, you get the full 
>>> arithmetical mess, the union on all sigma_i formula, well beyond the 
>>> computable. It is not easy, but there are mathematical lanterns, and deep 
>>> symmetries, and deep self-referential insight. 
>>> It is a reality that the universal machines cannot avoid.
>>>
>>> It is the advantage of comp, you can translate the problem in 
>>> arithmetic, but it is not necessarily a "simple", sigma_1, problem. 
>>> There is a no universal panacea capable of satisfying all universal 
>>> machines at once, nothing is easy. 
>>> You have to look inward, eventually.
>>>
>>
>> I won't be able to understand that, but it seems to me that if exotic 
>> capabilities like 1p awareness can be made up of dumb programmatic 
>> elements, then the top-down influence of potential intelligence must be 
>> equally important as the bottom-up blind stacking of logical operators. It 
>> seems like you want it both ways - that the higher order arithmetic magic 
>> of UMs are both separate from the primitive machines of today, but the 
>> potential for magic is inherent and inevitable strictly from inferences of 
>> the lowest arithmetic truths.
>>
>>
>> Not at all, they are beyond. You still think about arithmetic like if 
>> incompleteness wasn't discovered.
>>
>
> I see incompleteness as a limitation on the ontology of arithmetic, but 
> you see it as an invitation to omnipotence. 
>
>
> I see it as pointing on the fundamental difference between truth and what 
> is observable, guessable, sharable, communicable, etc. Incompleteness 
> concerns our limitation, already just in front of the arithmetical facts.
>
>
Since we can know that incompleteness exists though, I see that as 
supporting the idea that sense transcends the limits of any particular 
arithmetic or logical model of it.
 

>
>
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> I don't understand why. Lots of things are incomplete, but we don't assume 
> that it means they are the ground of being. Why not language? That seems 
> much more incomplete and creative than arithmetic. 
>
>
>
> Language are mode of expression. You *can* see machines as languages, but 
> it can confuse the beginners. The important distinction is between truth 
> and communicable.
>
> We are indeed question ourselves. A brain, or a universal number, is just 
> an encapsulation of a question that the arithmetical reality asks to 
> itself, somehow. We are divine hypotheses, not answers.
>

I don't see the human experience as merely hypothesis or questions. We are 
participants, shapers of divinity itself. When we are thirsty and drink 
cool pure water, there is no question or answer, there is only the 
explosive tangibility of direct sensory participation. The representation 
function is not plausible to justify such a presentation. We need certain 
vitamins also, yet we do not find the inhalation of powdered vitamin pills 
to be an adequate substitute for nutritious food. Even if pleasure could be 
justified as a motivator (it can't, really) in a quantitative universe, 
there would not be any advantage to having aesthetic variation in that 
pleasure. As in a game, the abstraction of 'points' or 'scoring' is quite 
sufficient to drive any advantageous mechanical action.

Thanks,
Craig


> Bruno
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>
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> Craig
>
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>> Bruno
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>>
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>>
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>> Craig
>>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>  
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Craig
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Craig
>>>>>
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>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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