On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>> Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness
>>>
>>>
>>> This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You 
>>> can't do that. 
>>>
>>> You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and they 
>>> dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative 
>>> statement on a large class of people.
>>>
>>
>> That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large 
>> classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep 
>> questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI 
>> is a program...a meme or spandrel?
>>
>>
>> What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you 
>> become a zombie? 
>>
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> Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they 
> were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not 
> itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely 
> quantitative inevitability?
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>>> You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, 
>>> and that is indeed incompatible with comp.
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>> I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a 
>> sensory-motive theory of physics.
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>> I will wait for serious progresses.
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>>> But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and 
>>> contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.
>>>
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>> That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more 
>> question than comp does.
>>
>>
>> You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you 
>> assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do 
>> something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an 
>> argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp 
>> must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question.
>>
>
> Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I 
> understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental 
> principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these 
> reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic 
> fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for 
> arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can 
> easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia 
> arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in 
> reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose 
> to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the 
> echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only 
> mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to 
> notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a 
> presentation problem, and it is not going to go away.
>
>
> Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for 
> you. 
>

I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only 
because no other option ultimately makes as much sense.
 

> The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.
>

No, it's more important than logic.
 

> You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have 
> naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive. 
>

That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is a 
machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion meme which 
arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality rather than the 
capacity to project and receive them.
 

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>> I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see 
>> that I am being careless at all.
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>> Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be 
>> frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other 
>> people. 
>>
>
> I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What 
> other people think and do is none of my business.
>
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> You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, 
>

I have been asserting my arguments in writing for thousands of hours. Why 
do you say that it is without argument unless it is simply too awful to 
accept that there is no valid counter-argument?
 

> and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no 
> argument that your personal feeling.
>

Why are common sense observations shared by all people since the beginning 
of humanity reduced to 'my personal feeling', but esoteric works of 
mathematics from the last couple of centuries are are infallible?
 

> I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling, as it 
> looks like when we listen to them.
>

I understand that, but I'm saying that the whole idea that machines might 
have any feeling at all is unsupported by anything except the very theory 
which begs the question to begin with. Why would machines feel anything? 
"Well, lets assume that we are machines, and therefore whatever we do is 
something that a machine can do, including feel." Or, we could assume that 
we are ears of corn, and therefore whatever we do is something that an ear 
of corn can do if it was coaxed into becoming as complex a vegetable as we 
are. We could decide that we are a TV show, and that TV shows will someday 
evolve into us, so that the shows we see now are just baby shows where the 
characters haven't grown very realistic yet.

Thanks,
Craig


> Bruno
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> Craig
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>> Bruno
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>> Craig 
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>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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