On 4/9/2013 12:19 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 08.04.2013 11:38 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 07 Apr 2013, at 19:20, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 07.04.2013 19:12 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/6/2013 11:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:
Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11

http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg





I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors
literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically
speaking in the brain.

Yes our 3d model of the world is in our minds (not our brains).
It's not "there" geometrically speaking. Geometry and "there"
are part of the model. Dog bites man.

Well, if you look into the paper, you see that authors take it
literally as in neuroscience mind means brain. Mind belongs to
philosophy.


But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive
science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain
is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such
theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse
mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink. Neurophilophers
are usually computationalist and weakly materialist, and so are
basically inconsistent.

I guess, this is a way how science develops. Neuroscientists study brain and they just take a priori from the materialist and reductionism paradigm that mind must be in the brain.

The materialist view is just that the mind is a process in the brain, like a computation is the process of running a program in a computer. As processes they may be abstracted from their physical instantiation and are not anywhere, except maybe in Platonia.

After that, they write papers to bring this idea to the logical conclusion. To this end, they seem to have two options. Either they should say that the 3D visual world is illusion (I guess, Dennett goes this way)

I think "illusion" has too strong a connotation of fallacious. I think "model" is more accurate. So long as we realize the world we conceptualize is a model then we are not guilty of a fallacy.

or put phenomenological consciousness into the brain.

I don't know what this means. That phenomenological consciousness depends on the brain is empirically well established. But to "put it into" the brain implies making a spatial placement of an abstract concept.



Let us see what happens along this way.

The paper in a way is well written. The only flaw (that actually is irrelevant to the content of the paper) that I have seen in it, is THE ENTROPY. Biologists like the entropy so much that they use it in any occasion. For example from the paper:

“Thus, changes in entropy provide an important window into self-organization: a sudden increase of entropy just before the emergence of a new structure, followed by brief period of negative entropy (or negentropy).”

I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is Life?,
reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made my comments

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html


Still tilting at that windmill?

"A) From thermodynamic tables, the mole entropy of silver at standard conditions S(Ag, cr) = 42.55 J K-1 mol-1 is bigger than that of aluminum S(Al, cr) = 28.30 J K-1 mol-1. Does it mean that there is more disorder in silver as in aluminium?"

Yes, there is more disorder in the sense that raising the temperature of a mole of Ag 1deg increases the number of accessible conduction electron states available more than does raising the temperature of a mole of Al does.

I agree that disorder is not necessarily a good metaphor for entropy. But dispersal of energy isn't always intuitively equal to entropy either. Consider dissolving ammonium nitrate in water. The process is endothermic, so the temperature drops and energy is absorbed, but the process goes spontaneously because the entropy increases; the are a lot more microstates accessible in the solution even at the lower temperature.

Your quote of Arnheim makes me suspect that *he* is one who has confounded our language. Receiving information reduces uncertainty; it doesn't necessarily increase order. Chaos and unpredictability and information do not "carry a maximum of information". What they do is allow for a maximum increase of information when they are resolved. Disorder doesn't provide information - it provides the opportunity for using information, just as ignorance of what a message will be is a measure of how much information the message will contain when it removes the ignorance.

Brent

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