On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:38:26 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Apr 2013, at 17:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 10:54:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 Apr 2013, at 15:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 9:15:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 09 Apr 2013, at 20:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, April 8, 2013 5:38:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 07 Apr 2013, at 19:20, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: 
>>>>
>>>> > On 07.04.2013 19:12 meekerdb said the following: 
>>>> >> On 4/6/2013 11:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: 
>>>> >>> On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following: 
>>>> >>>> Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11 
>>>> >>>> 
>>>> >>>> 
>>>> http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg 
>>>> >>>> 
>>>> >>> 
>>>> >>> 
>>>> >>>> I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors 
>>>> >>> literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically 
>>>> >>> speaking in the brain. 
>>>> >> 
>>>> >> Yes our 3d model of the world is in our minds (not our brains). It's 
>>>> >> not "there" geometrically speaking.  Geometry and "there" are part 
>>>> of 
>>>> >> the model.  Dog bites man. 
>>>> > 
>>>> > Well, if you look into the paper, you see that authors take it   
>>>> > literally as in neuroscience mind means brain. Mind belongs to   
>>>> > philosophy. 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive   
>>>> science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain   
>>>> is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such   
>>>> theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse   
>>>> mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink. 
>>>> Neurophilophers are usually computationalist and weakly materialist,   
>>>> and so are basically inconsistent. 
>>>>
>>>
>>> If we used a logic automata type of scheme, then mind and brain would be 
>>> the same thing. 
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>> ?
>>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDCwrbqHfTM
>> The Future of Computing -- Reuniting Bits and Atoms Neil Gershenfeld 
>> talking about using digital fabrication to replace digital computation.
>>
>>
>> Interesting, but out of topics.
>>
>
> Why is it off topic? It addresses exactly what we are talking about - the 
> gap between pure function and form. By closing that gap, we can see that it 
> makes no difference and that there is no problem to running an anesthetic 
> program.
>
>
> ?
>

It's not off topic.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic 
>>> assemblies. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Two apples is not the number two.
>>>
>>
>> With logic automata, the number two would not be necessary....matter 
>> would embody its own programs.
>>
>>
>> With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent.
>>
>
> Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide.
>
>
> ?
>

Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter 
doesn't relay on geometry?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the 
>>> same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire 
>>> feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take 
>>> for granted.
>>>
>>
>> The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single process 
>> should show that there is no implicit aesthetic preference. A program is a 
>> functional shape whose relation with other functional shapes is defined 
>> entirely by position. There is no room for, nor plausible emergence of any 
>> kind of aesthetic differences between functions we would assume are 
>> associated with sight or sound, thought or feeling. 
>>
>>
>> Why?
>>
>
> Because the function is accomplished with or without any sensory 
> presentation beyond positions of bits. 
>
>
> So there is some sensory presentation. 
>

In reality there would be low level sensory presentation, but without a 
theory of physics or computation which supports that, we should not allow 
it to be smuggled in.
 

>
>
>
> With comp you already assume the immaterial so its easier to conflate that 
> intangible principle with sensory participation, 
>
>
> Which conflation? On the contrary, once a machine self-refers, many 
> usually conflated views get unconflated.
>

The conflation is between computation and sensation. A machine has no 
sensation, but the parts of a machine ultimately are associated with low 
level sensations at the material level. It is on those low level 
sensory-motor interactions which high level logics can be executed, 
instrumentally, with no escalation of awareness.
 

>
>
>
>
> since sense can also be thought of as immaterial also. 
>
>
> Which ease, but does not solve the things, you need a self between.
>

Not sure how that relates, but how do you know that a self is needed?
 

>
>
>
> With logical automata we can see clearly that the functions of computation 
> need not be immaterial at all, and can be presented directly through 4-D 
> material geometry. 
>
>
> Either it violates Church thesis, and then it is very interesting, or not, 
> and then it is a red herring for the mind-body peoblem, even if quite 
> interesting in practical applications.
>

My point is that computation need not have a mind - it can be executed 
using bodies alone, and logic automata demonstrates that is true.
 

>
>
>
>
> In doing this, we expose the difference between computation, which is an 
> anesthetic automatism and consciousness which is an aesthetic direct 
> participation.
>
>
> In doing this, all what I see is that you eliminate the person who got a 
> brain prosthesis. 
>
> Saying that God made the human following his own image also expose a 
> difference, but not in a quite convincing way. 
>

Why isn't the logic automata example convincing? Are you saying that there 
still must be some mind there even though all functions are executed by 
bodies? What is your objection?
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Logic automata proves that none of these differences are meaningful in a 
>> functionalist universe.
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>
> That any function performed by a logical automata would be the same 
> configuration of bricks whether we ultimately read the output as a visual 
> experience or an auditory experience.
>
>
> There is a big difference between computationalism and functionalism. Comp 
> says that functionalism is correct, at some unknown level, and in fine, 
> this plays some role, as we cannot know which machine we are. We are only 
> free to bet on some level, in case we need some new body, or after death. 
> if functionalism was correct, you can replace the entire universe by the 
> program "do nothing", as it will do the same thing as the entire universe.
> A machine is *much* more than a function. In the math, we distinguish 
> intensional and extensional, to talk about that difference. Modal logic 
> aboard the intensional aspects, already existing in the extensional math, 
> when looked from some (internal or not) point of view.
> I think you conflate extension and intension (note the "s").
>

I would say that a machine is a collection of logical functions which 
produce another collection of logical functions. What more is there to it, 
or more to the point, what more is there which could generate any aesthetic 
experience?

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> but would output behaviors consistent with our expectations for those 
>>> experiences.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
>>>> Bruno 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > 
>>>> > Evgenii 
>>>> > 
>>>> > 
>>>> > -- 
>>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google   
>>>> > Groups "Everything List" group. 
>>>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,   
>>>> > send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. 
>>>> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>>>> > Visit this group at 
>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
>>>> > . 
>>>> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. 
>>>> > 
>>>> > 
>>>>
>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
>>> .
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>  
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>  
>>  
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>.
> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>
> .
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>  
>  
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to