...which fully supports my entire philosophy of science and understanding of free will.
http://mills.quora.com/Free-Will-and-the-Fallibility-of-Science/comments?__ac__=1#comment200399 Free Will and the Fallibility of Science > *Mills Baker <http://www.quora.com/Mills-Baker> * > *5* votes by David Cole <http://www.quora.com/David-Cole>, Marc > Bodnick<http://www.quora.com/Marc-Bodnick>, > Craig Weinberg <http://www.quora.com/Craig-Weinberg>, > (more)<http://mills.quora.com/Free-Will-and-the-Fallibility-of-Science/comments?__ac__=1#> > One of the most significant intellectual errors educated persons make is > in underestimating the fallibility of science. The very best scientific > theories containing our soundest, most reliable knowledge are certain to be > superseded, recategorized from "right" to "wrong"; they are, as physicist > David Deutsch says, *misconceptions:* > > I have often thought that the nature of science would be better understood > if we called theories “misconceptions” from the outset, instead of only > after we have discovered their successors. Thus we could say that > Einstein’s Misconception of Gravity was an improvement on Newton’s > Misconception, which was an improvement on Kepler’s. The neo-Darwinian > Misconception of Evolution is an improvement on Darwin’s Misconception, and > his on Lamarck’s… *Science claims neither infallibility nor finality.* > > > This fact comes as a surprise to many; we tend to think of science —at the > point of conclusion, when it becomes *knowledge*— as being more or less > infallible and certainly final. Science, indeed, is the sole area of human > investigation whose reports we take seriously to the point of > crypto-objectivism. Even people who very much deny the possibility of > objective knowledge step onto airplanes and ingest medicines. And most > importantly: *where science contradicts what we believe or know through > cultural or even personal means, we accept science and discard those truths, > * often enough wisely. > > An obvious example: the philosophical problem of free will. When Newton's > misconceptions were still considered the exemplar of truth *par > excellence, *the very model of knowledge, many philosophers felt obliged > to accept a kind of determinism with radical implications. Give the > initial-state of the universe, it appeared, we should be able to follow all > particle trajectories through the present, account for all phenomena > through *purely physical *means. In other words: the chain of causation > from the Big Bang on left no room for your volition: > > Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian physics, which > depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set > of fixed, knowable laws. The "billiard ball" hypothesis, a product of > Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe > have been established, the rest of the history of the universe follows > inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of > physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, > then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of > every event that will ever occur (*Laplace's > demon*<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon>). > In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same > fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each > other in predictable ways to produce predictable results. > > > Thus: the movement of the atoms of *your* body, and the emergent > phenomena that such movement entails, can all be *physically* accounted > for as part of a chain of merely physical, causal steps. You do not > "decide" things; your "feelings" aren't governing anything; there is no > meaning to your sense of agency or rationality. From this essentially > unavoidable philosophical position, we are logically-compelled to derive > many political, moral, and cultural conclusions. For example: if free will > is a phenomenological illusion, we must deprecate phenomenology in our > philosophies; it is the closely-clutched delusion of a faulty animal; > people, as predictable and materially reducible as commodities, can be > reckoned by governments and institutions as though they are numbers. > Freedom is a myth; you are the result of a process you didn't control, and > your choices aren't choices at all but the results of laws we can discover, > understand, and base our morality upon. > > I should note now that (1) many people, even people far from epistemology, > accept this idea, conveyed via the diffusion of science and philosophy > through politics, art, and culture, that most of who you are is determined > apart from your will; and (2) the development of quantum physics has not in > itself upended the theory that free will is an illusion, as the sorts of > indeterminacy we see among particles does *not* provide sufficient room, > as it were, for free will. > > Of course, few of us can behave for even a moment as though free will is a > myth; there should be no reason for personal engagement with ourselves, no > justification for "trying" or "striving"; one would be, at best, a > robot-like automaton incapable of self-control but capable of > self-observation. One would account for one's behaviors not with reasons > but with causes; one would be profoundly divested from outcomes which one > cannot affect anyway. And one would come to hold that, in its basic > conception of time and will, the human consciousness was totally deluded. > > As it happens, determinism is a *false* conception of reality. Physicists > like David Deutsch and Ilya Prigogine have, in my opinion, defended free > will amply on scientific grounds; and the philosopher Karl Popper described > how free will is compatible in principle with a physicalist conception of > the universe; he is quoted by both scientists, and Prigogine begins his > book *The End of Certainty,* which proposes that determinism is no longer > compatible with science, by alluding to Popper: > > Earlier this century in *The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism, > * Karl Popper wrote," Common sense inclines, on the one hand, to assert > that *every* event is caused by some preceding events, so that every > event can be explained or predicted… On the other hand, … common sense > attributes to mature and sane human persons… the ability to choose freely > between alternative possibilities of acting." This "dilemma of > determinism," as William James called it, is closely related to the meaning > of time. Is the future given, or is it under perpetual construction? > > > Prigogine goes on to demonstrate that there is, in fact, an "arrow of > time," that time is *not* symmetrical, and that the future is very much > open, very much compatible with the idea of free will. Thus: in our > lifetimes we have seen science —or parts of the scientific community, with > the rest to follow in tow— reclassify free will from "illusion" to "likely > reality"; the question of your own role in your future, of humanity's role > in the future of civilization, has been answered differently just within > the past few decades. > > No more profound question can be imagined for human endeavor, yet we have > an inescapable conclusion: *our phenomenologically obvious sense that we > choose, decide, change, perpetually construct the future was for centuries > contradicted falsely by "true" science*. Prigogine's work and that of his > peers —which he calls a "probabilizing revolution" because of its emphasis > on understanding unstable systems and the potentialities they entail— > introduces concepts that restore the commonsensical conceptions of > possibility, futurity, and free will to defensibility. > > If one has read the tortured thinking of twentieth-century intellectuals > attempting to unify determinism and the plain facts of human experience, > one knows how submissive we now are to the claims of science. As Prigogine > notes, we were prepared to believe that we, *"as imperfect human > observers, [were] responsible for the difference between past and future > through the approximations we introduce into our description of > nature."*Indeed, one has the sense that the more counterintuitive the > scientific > claim, the eagerer we are to deny our own experience in order to > demonstrate our rationality. > > This is only degrees removed from ordinary orthodoxies. The point is > merely that the very best scientific theories remain misconceptions, and > that where science contradicts human truths of whatever form, it is > rational to at least contemplate the *possibility* that science has not > advanced enough yet to account for them; we must be pragmatic in managing > our knowledge, aware of the possibility that some truths we intuit we > cannot yet explain, while other intuitions we can now abandon. > > It is vital to consider how something can be both true and not in order to > understand science and its limitations, and even more the limitations of > second-order sciences (like social sciences). Newton's laws were * > incredible* achievements of rationality, verified by all technologies and > analyses for hundreds of years, before their unpredicted exposure as *deeply > flawed* ideas applied to a limited domain which in total provide > incorrect predictions and erroneous metaphorical structures for > understanding the universe. > > I never tire of quoting Karl Popper's dictum: > > Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a > sign that you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it > was intended to solve. > > > It is hard but necessary to have this relationship with science, whose > theories seem like the only possible answers and whose obsolescence we > cannot imagine. A rational person in the nineteenth century would have > laughed at the suggestion that Newton was in error; he could not have known > about the sub-atomic world or the forces and entities at play in the world > of general relativity; and he *especially* could not have imagined how *a > theory that seemed utterly, universally true and whose predictive and > explanatory powers were immense could **still** be an incomplete > understanding, revealed by later progress to be completely mistaken about > nearly all of its claims.* > > Can you imagine such a thing? It *will* happen to nearly everything you > know. Consider what "ignorance" and "knowledge" really are for a human, > what you can truly know, how you should judge others given this > overwhelming epistemological instability! > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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