On Saturday, April 13, 2013 6:47:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Apr 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >>> With comp, matter relies on the numbers law, or Turing equivalent. >>> >> >> Matter also relies on geometry, which comp cannot provide. >> >> >> ? >> > > Does that mean you think that comp can generate geometry, or that matter > doesn't relay on geometry? > > > "comp can generate geometry" does not mean something clear. >
I think its pretty clear. Without a printer or video screen, my computer cannot generate geometry. It doesn't matter how much CPU power or memory I have, the functions will come no closer to taking on a coherent geometric form somewhere. I can make endless computations about circles and pi, but there is never any need for any literal presentation of a circle in the universe. No actual circle is present. > > But what can be shown is that in the comp theory, you can assume only > number (or combinators) and the + and * laws, this generates all the > dreams, which can be shown to generate from the machine points of view, > geometry, analysis, and physics. > That's only because you have given + and * the benefit of the dream to begin with. Comp is tautology. > Then we can compare physics with the empirical data and confirm of refute > comp (but not proving comp). > Since already Diophantus, but then systematically since Descartes, the > relation between geometry and arithmetic are deep and multiple. It is a > whole subject matter, a priori independent from comp. > What is the relation between comp and geometry? Craig > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the >>>> same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire >>>> feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to >>>> take for granted. >>>> >>> >>> The fact that logic automata unites form and function as a single >>> process should show that there is no implicit aesthetic preference. A >>> program is a functional shape whose relation with other functional shapes >>> is defined entirely by position. There is no room for, nor plausible >>> emergence of any kind of aesthetic differences between functions we would >>> assume are associated with sight or sound, thought or feeling. >>> >>> >>> Why? >>> >> >> Because the function is accomplished with or without any sensory >> presentation beyond positions of bits. >> >> >> So there is some sensory presentation. >> > > In reality there would be low level sensory presentation, but without a > theory of physics or computation which supports that, we should not allow > it to be smuggled in. > > > So we agree. > > > > > >> >> >> >> With comp you already assume the immaterial so its easier to conflate >> that intangible principle with sensory participation, >> >> >> Which conflation? On the contrary, once a machine self-refers, many >> usually conflated views get unconflated. >> > > The conflation is between computation and sensation. A machine has no > sensation, > > > I can agree. We must distinguish a machine from the person who own that > machine, or is supported by the machine. > > > > > but the parts of a machine ultimately are associated with low level > sensations at the material level. > > > If that exist. > > > > It is on those low level sensory-motor interactions which high level > logics can be executed, instrumentally, with no escalation of awareness. > > > > May be you should work with Stephen. Despite he defends comp, he point > constantly on math which should be better for a non-comp theory like yours. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> since sense can also be thought of as immaterial also. >> >> >> Which ease, but does not solve the things, you need a self between. >> > > Not sure how that relates, but how do you know that a self is needed? > > > Because sense makes sense for a subject, which is a person, and which has > different sort of self (like the 8 "hypostases" in comp + some definition). > > > > > > >> >> >> >> With logical automata we can see clearly that the functions of >> computation need not be immaterial at all, and can be presented directly >> through 4-D material geometry. >> >> >> Either it violates Church thesis, and then it is very interesting, or >> not, and then it is a red herring for the mind-body peoblem, even if quite >> interesting in practical applications. >> > > My point is that computation need not have a mind - > > > A computation has no mind. But some computation can be assumed to support > a mind, or to mke it possible for a mind---a subject--- to manifest itself > with respect to different universal mind in the local neighborhood. > > > > > it can be executed using bodies alone, and logic automata demonstrates > that is true. > > > "bodies alone" don't make sense in the comp theory. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> In doing this, we expose the difference between computation, which is an >> anesthetic automatism and consciousness which is an aesthetic direct >> participation. >> >> >> In doing this, all what I see is that you eliminate the person who got a >> brain prosthesis. >> >> Saying that God made the human following his own image also expose a >> difference, but not in a quite convincing way. >> > > Why isn't the logic automata example convincing? Are you saying that there > still must be some mind there even though all functions are executed by > bodies? What is your objection? > > > It introduces a notion of bodies, when a simpler theory can explain them, > in a way making that simple theory testable. > Your argument that machine cannot support a mind mirrors the elimination > of person by materialists. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> Logic automata proves that none of these differences are meaningful in a >>> functionalist universe. >>> >>> >>> ? >>> >> >> That any function performed by a logical automata would be the same >> configuration of bricks whether we ultimately read the output as a visual >> experience or an auditory experience. >> >> >> There is a big difference between computationalism and functionalism. >> Comp says that functionalism is correct, at some unknown level, and in >> fine, this plays some role, as we cannot know which machine we are. We are >> only free to bet on some level, in case we need some new body, or after >> death. >> if functionalism was correct, you can replace the entire universe by the >> program "do nothing", as it will do the same thing as the entire universe. >> A machine is *much* more than a function. In the math, we distinguish >> intensional and extensional, to talk about that difference. Modal logic >> aboard the intensional aspects, already existing in the extensional math, >> when looked from some (internal or not) point of view. >> I think you conflate extension and intension (note the "s"). >> > > I would say that a machine is a collection of logical functions which > produce another collection of logical functions. What more is there to it, > or more to the point, what more is there which could generate any aesthetic > experience? > > > Truth. > > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> but would output behaviors consistent with our expectations for those >>>> experiences. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> > Evgenii >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > -- >>>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> > Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>> > send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> > Visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>>>> > . >>>>> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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