On Wednesday, April 17, 2013 2:41:55 AM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 01:41:07PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 16 Apr 2013, at 04:14, Russell Standish wrote: 
> > 
> > >On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 02:41:19PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > >> 
> > >> 
> > >>You cannot be more right on this. It has been part of my job to show 
> > >>that if the brain is Turing emulable, then the interior experience 
> > >>is not at all isomorphic to brain activity. It is already done 
> > >>explicitely in step seven (you don't need the more subtle step 8). 
> > >> 
> > > 
> > >If you have shown this, then empirically, COMP is falsified. 
> > 
> > Why? 
> > Only if you still believe in primitive material brain. But the point 
> > is that does not exist primitively. 
> > 
>
> This has nothing to do with "primitiveness". Stick an fMRI scanner on 
> your brain, and think some thoughts. You will find you cannot have a 
> different thought without different brain activity. Moreover, there 
> appears to be a quite close correspondence, viz experiments where 
> computers are taught to read someone's mind. The experiments are 
> getting better over time - I would say its pretty overwhelming 
> evidence that mind supervenes on (phenomenal) physical matter 
> (particularly the brain). 
>
> Furthermore, the anthropic principle is completely unexplainable with 
> some sort of "phenomenal" physical supervenience. 
>

One example that crossed my mind is eyelids. If comp were true, I would 
think that eyelids would be unnecessary. Any optical data could be accessed 
directly from the data source so that the physical character of a sense 
organ should not be relevant. An obvious adaptation would be for a machine 
who loses her eyes to simply use some other appendage to reproduce the 
effect.

I disagree however, that the correlation between human brain activity and 
human experience is evidence that *all* experience *supervenes* on brain 
activity. We see the correlation, but since the fMRI can find no evidence 
whatsoever of any experience at all, we cannot claim supervenience. Our 
conscious experience is reflected in brain activity, yes. It is not 
reflected in liver activity or intestine activity, yes (I presume). Some 
brain activity is not correlated with conscious awareness, yes. That's all 
fine, but that does not mean that unconscious brain activity is not 
associated with experience on some extra-personal level, and it does not 
mean that experience is a product of brain activity, or is local to brain 
activity at all. Indeed, locality is not necessarily a coherent quality of 
consciousness, and my understanding is that is the case as subjectivity is 
physically tied to time rather than space.

Craig



> > 
> > 
> > 
> > >However, 
> > >you yourself, have stated that all that is shown is that the brain 
> > >(and physics generally) cannot be ontologically primitive. 
> > 
> > Yes. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > >We're getting close to the latter (on foar) - if we can find a way of 
> > >expressing the MGA that doesn't rely on an intuition. 
> > 
> > All proofs and theories relies on some intuition and common sense. 
>
> Only in setting the axioms. You're allowed to argue with an axiom, of 
> course, but that does not invalidate a proof. 
>
> > 
> > Common sense is the only tool that we have to go beyond common sense. 
> > 
> > But where you think I did use intuition, I was using only the 
> > definition of comp. See my preceding posts. 
> > 
>
> Primarily where you assert that conscious states supervening on 
> recordings are an absurdity. There are some other places where 
> intuition has cropped up, but that seems to be the main one. 
>   
>
> -- 
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
>
> Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpc...@hpcoders.com.au<javascript:> 
> University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
>
>

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